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INTRODUCTION
Late in 1994, the Office of the Controller of the Currency ("OCC")
proposed certain seemingly modest changes to its mostly technical
rules concerning the "corporate activities" of national banks, which
are set forth in Part 5 of its regulations in the Code of Federal Regula-
tions ("Proposed Part 5 Rules").' Among other things, these Pro-
posed Part 5 Rules dealt with the activities of "operating subsidiaries,"
which under regulations then in force were corporations controlled by
national banks that engaged in a variety of activities related to the
business of banking.2 Those regulations stated generally that all pro-
visions of law and regulation applicable to national banks were
"equally applicable" to their operating subsidiaries, unless a statute or
regulation provided otherwise.3
One change in the Proposed Part 5 Rules was that OCC may, where
appropriate, exempt an operating subsidiary from such a provision of
law or regulation applicable to national banks, even in the absence of
a formal statutory or regulatory exemption.4 OCC suggested that this
action might be appropriate, for instance, where the provision in ques-
tion imposes a specific restriction on the authority of a national bank
to conduct a particular activity, but such restrictive provision does not
necessarily apply to the bank's subsidiaries.5
1. Rules, Policies, and Procedures for Corporate Activities, 59 Fed. Reg. 61,034 (1994). The
Office of the Controller of the Currency ("OCC") offered these proposals in compliance with
section 303 of the Riegle Community Development and Regulatory Improvement Act of 1994.
12 U.S.C. § 4803 (1994). Under this Act, OCC has implemented a broad Regulatory Review
Program designed "to update and streamline OCC regulations and to reduce unnecessary regu-
latory costs and other burdens." Rules, Policies, and Procedures for Corporate Activities, 59
Fed. Reg. at 61,034.
2. Rules, Policies, and Procedures for Corporate Activities, 59 Fed. Reg. at 61,056 (Proposed
Part 5 Rules § 5.34).
3. 12 C.F.R. § 5.34(d)(2)(i). These previously effective regulations, 12 C.F.R. pt. 5 (1996), are
hereinafter referred to as the "Old Part 5 Rules."
4. Rules, Policies, and Procedures for Corporate Activities, 59 Fed. Reg. at 61,056 (Proposed
Part 5 Rules § 5.34(d)(3)).
5. Rules, Policies, and Procedures for Corporate Activities, 59 Fed. Reg. at 61,039 (Proposed
Part 5 Rules § 5.34(d)(2)).
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This seemingly modest change, however, attracted an enormous
amount of attention in the financial services industry6 and incurred
the wrath of influential members of Congress.7 House Banking Com-
mittee Chairman James Leach, who had been trying to shepherd fi-
nancial services statutory reform through a reluctant Congress,
strongly objected that this proposed change by OCC of its own regula-
tions was utterly without statutory basis and dangerous to boot.8 Con-
fronted with such ferocious hostility, OCC abandoned its schedule for
finalizing the proposed rules9 and moved them to the back burner.10
When financial institution reform failed again in Congress, however,
the proposed rules returned to the front burner and, with certain mi-
nor changes made by OCC in response to comments on the proposed
rules, were finalized, effective December 31, 1996 ("New Part 5
Rules").11 Promptly thereafter, opponents vigorously renewed their
objections and in due course the New Part 5 Rules will no doubt land
6. See infra notes 92-93 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 103-06 and accompanying text.
8. See Pamela Atkins, Leach Objects to OCC's Move To Allow Bank Subs Broader Powers, 64
Banking Rep. (BNA) 729 (Apr. 10, 1995), available in LEXIS, BNA Library, BNABus File (en-
gaging in nonbanking activities jeopardizes the federal deposit insurance system).
9. OCC's announcement of the Proposed Part 5 Rules requested that comments on them be
delivered not later than January 30, 1995, Rules, Policies, and Procedures for Corporate Activi-
ties, 59 Fed. Reg. at 61,034, based upon which it would proceed to completion and adoption of
final rules. According to a published report, the rules were to be finalized by the end of May of
1995. See Leslie R. Bullock, Regulators Publish Agendas; OCC's Part 5 Proposal Set for Final
Action During May, 64 Banking Rep. (BNA) 950 (May 15, 1995), available in LEXIS, BNA
Library, BNABus File.
10. Formal action on the rules ceased after they drew heavy criticism, and Congress and the
Administration began pursuing serious efforts at statutory reform. Under the circumstances,
discretion seemed to dictate that OCC stay its regulatory hand until the prospects for legislative
reform became clearer. See Olaf de Senerpont Domis, OCC May Get Upper Hand in Bid To
Expand Activities Allowed in Bank Subsidiaries, AM. BANKER, Feb. 12, 1996, at 4 (OCC Chief
Counsel Julie L. Williams said OCC in "holding pattern" on Proposed Part 5 Rules and "moni-
toring what Congress [wa]s doing"); Justin Fox, Hopes for Wider Powers Now Pinned on Courts,
Regulators-Not Congress, AM. BANKER, Jan. 2, 1996, at 1.
11. Rules, Policies, and Procedures for Corporate Activities, 61 Fed. Reg. 60,341 (1996) (to be
codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 5).
Participants in the ongoing legislative and administrative efforts to reform financial institution
regulation had predicted that OCC would proceed with the Proposed Part 5 Rules if Congress
was unable to enact significant reform legislation, the Supreme Court held in favor of the bank-
ing industry in the Barnett Bank insurance sales case, Barnett Bank v. Nelson, 116 S. Ct. 1103
(1996), and Congress did not act to protect insurance agents against bank competition. See de
Senerpont Domis, supra note 10, at 4; Fox, supra note 10, at 1. Banks won a major victory in the
insurance arena with Barnett Bank, 116 S. Ct. at 1111 (holding that federal statute permitting
national banks located in small communities to sell insurance preempts Florida statute prohibit-
ing such sales; anti-preemption rule of McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1994), does
not apply). Further, Congress abandoned its effort at significant statutory reform. See infra note
47 and accompanying text. Thus, the stage was thus set for finalization of the proposed rules.
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in the courts.'2 Thus, their validity and wisdom are again timely and
important topics.
This Article will explore OCC's operating subsidiary reforms set
forth in the New Part 5 Rules and the objections to them. The re-
forms appear to be both entirely permissible under the existing statu-
tory regime and a desirable administrative contribution 13 to the
broader ongoing effort to enable banks to adapt to and prosper in a
rapidly changing financial services environment. It is to that broader
effort, however, that this Article first briefly turns in Part I, both to
give historical context to the new rules and to explain why they have
aroused so much attention and opposition. Thereafter, Part II will
summarize the key elements of the New Proposed Part 5 Rules. Part
III will consider the very fundamental, but still contested, question of
whether national banks are permitted to have operating subsidiaries.
The balance of this Article will examine the most important objections
to specific parts of the new rules, including whether the bank owner-
ship requirement may be reduced from eighty percent to a bare ma-
jority (or even less) of the operating subsidiary's stock (Part IV) and,
most importantly of all, whether and under what circumstances an op-
erating subsidiary might be permitted to engage in activities that its
parent national bank may not (Part V).
I. BACKGROUND
The statutory regime that governs national banks is a none-too-tidy
accumulation of legislation beginning with the National Bank Act of
1864,14 with important modifying and supplementing enactments con-
sisting of, among others, the Glass-Steagall Act in 193315 and the
Bank Holding Company Act in 1956,16 plus a number of lesser acts. 17
12. See Niles S. Campbell, OCC Rule Expands Bank Business Lines; Operating Subsidiary
Section Draws Fire, 67 Banking Rep. (BNA) 873 (Nov. 25, 1996), available in LEXIS, BNA
Library, BNABus File (American Council for Life Insurance and Securities Industry Association
threaten both legal and legislative action to block new rules).
13. The New Part 5 Rules are thus an example of "incremental regulatory change" that I have
previously suggested is, under current political circumstances, a useful prelude to a broader legis-
lative overhaul of financial services laws. That broader overhaul is plainly inevitable but none-
theless slow in coming. James R. Smoot, Financial Institutions Reform in the Wake of VALIC, 29
CREIGrHTON L. REV. 691, 692 (1996); see infra notes 46-51 and accompanying text.
14. Act of June 3, 1864, ch. 106, 13 Stat. 99 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 38 (1994)).
15. Glass-Steagall was a part of the Banking Act of 1933. Ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
16. Pub. L. No. 84-511, ch. 240, 70 Stat. 133 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-50
(1994)).
17. E.g., Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-
242, 105 Stat. 2236 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.); Garn-St. Germain
[Vol. 46:651
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While the original 1864 legislation, when enacted, was intended to
give national banks relatively broad powers,'18 many of the subsequent
acts circumscribed those powers in a manner that confines American
banks to relatively narrow parts of the financial services business.
Thus, while banks in many parts of the world are permitted and ex-
pected to offer a broad range of financial services, including securities
and insurance services, 19 in this country the Glass-Steagall Act has im-
posed significant limitations on the authority of banks to engage in
securities activities,20 and Congress also has restricted bank involve-
ment in insurance underwriting and sales.21
Depository Institutions Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat. 1469 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
18. At the time, Congress wanted to encourage formation of national, rather than state, banks
and to encourage owners of banks organized under state charters to convert to national bank
charters. See Edward L. Symons, Jr., The "Business of Banking" in Historical Perspective, 51
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 676, 699 (1983).
19. See EDWARD L. SYMONS, JR. & JAMES J. WHITE, BANKING LAW: TEACHING MATERIALS
349-51 (3d ed. 1991) (insurance); Firewall Restrictions Atypical Worldwide, Reports Survey of
Laws in EU, 49 Nations, 67 Banking Rep. (BNA) 722 (Oct. 28, 1996), available in LEXIS, BNA
Library, BNABus File (securities and insurance); Robert M. Garsson, Most Major Nations Are
Said To Permit Securities Underwriting Within a Bank, AM. BANKER, Oct. 6, 1995, at 2 (securi-
ties); William M. Isaac & Melanie L. Fein, Facing the Future-Life Without Glass-Steagall, 37
CATH. U. L. REV. 281, 296 (1988) (securities); Jonathan R. Macey, The Inevitability of Universal
Banking, 19 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 203, 203-04 (1993) (insurance); Edward L. Symons, Jr., The
United States Banking System, 19 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 1, 22 (1993) (insurance); Julie L. Williams &
Mark P. Jacobsen, The Business of Banking: Looking to the Future, 50 Bus. LAW. 783, 785
(1995) (securities); Ron Chernow, Saving the Banks: Bank Reform? What Bank Reform?, WALL
ST. J., Apr. 19, 1991, at A14 (insurance); Peter J. Wallison, Saving the Banks: Banking and
Commerce Belong Together, WALL ST. J., Mar. 27, 1991, at A14 (insurance).
20. 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh) (1994) (securities dealing by national banks limited to nonre-
course purchase and sale of securities for and at the request of customers; no underwriting); id.
§ 78 (no joint service by individuals as officers, directors, partners, or employees of both invest-
ment banks and Federal Reserve System member banks); id. § 377 (no affiliation by Federal
Reserve System bank with any organization that is "engaged principally" in issuing, underwrit-
ing, or distributing securities); id. § 378(a)(1) (prohibiting anyone "engaged in the business of
issuing, underwriting, selling, or distributing... stocks, bonds, debentures, notes, or other securi-
ties" from also "receiving deposits"). The limitations on national bank securities activities set
forth in section 24 (Seventh) apply equally to state banks that are members of the Federal Re-
serve System. Id. § 335.
21. The Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982 provided that "it is not closely
related to banking" for a bank holding company to "provide insurance as a principal, agent or
broker," except as specifically permitted in seven exemptive provisions that are limited to credit
life insurance, certain grandfathered activities, insurance for the holding company and its em-
ployees, insurance activities in places with fewer than 5,000 inhabitants, or where there is a
showing of inadequate insurance availability. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8)(A)-(G) (1994). This 1982
legislation restricted language in the original Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 that permitted
a holding company to own shares of a company that was engaged exclusively in "financial, fidu-
ciary, or insurance" activities that the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System deter-
mined were "so closely related to the business of banking" as to be a "proper incident thereto."
Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-511, § 4(c)(6), 70 Stat. 133, 137. When the
Board broadly interpreted this language to permit holding company subsidiaries to sell a wide
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For several decades, these restrictions were not serious impedi-
ments to profitable operations by banks. While their markets were
indeed largely confined to such traditional activities as taking depos-
its, making loans, and clearing payments,22 those markets were also
for the most part protected, low-risk, and generally profitable.2 3 Be-
ginning about thirty years ago, however, certain of those markets be-
came attractive to other participants in the broader financial services
industry. Thus, banks began losing loan business to pension funds,
insurance companies, and even investment banking firms,24 which
range of insurance products, see Symons, supra note 19, at 25, an alarmed insurance industry
convinced Congress to enact a provision in the 1982 legislation to reduce the scope of bank
holding company insurance activities, see Joyce Palomar, Bank Control of Title Insurance Com-
panies: Perils to the Public That Regulators Have Ignored, 44 Sw. L.J. 905, 914 (1990).
Similarly, as to national banks themselves, section 92 of the National Bank Act provides that
banks "located and doing business in any place the population of which does not exceed five
thousand inhabitants" have authority to act as agents in the sale of fire, life, and other insurance.
12 U.S.C. § 92 (1994). Insurance interests have asserted that this language precludes, by nega-
tive implication, authority for national banks located in larger places to sell insurance, an asser-
tion that has found some judicial support. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co. v. Clarke, 998 F.2d
1295, 1298 (5th Cir. 1993), rev. sub nom. NationsBank of North Carolina v. Variable Annuity
Life Ins. Co., 115 S. Ct. 810 (1995). However, the point remains open. 115 S. Ct. at 814-15 (not
reaching the issue because the annuities at issue were held not to be insurance).
The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System is also frequently referred to (includ-
ing in this Article) by a number of shorthand terms, such as the "Federal Reserve Board," the
"Board" and the "Fed." This Article also from time to time refers to bank holding companies,
which are dealt with in the Bank Holding Company Act and defined at 12 U.S.C. § 1841(a)(1),
as "holding companies."
22. The federal definition of "bank" is:
[an institution ... which both-
(i) accepts demand deposits or deposits that the depositor may withdraw by check or
similar means for payment to third parties or others; and
(ii) is engaged in the business of making commercial loans.
12 U.S.C. § 1841(c)(1)(B). National banks are more specifically given authority to exercise:
all such incidental powers as shall be necessary to carry on the business of banking; by
discounting and negotiating promissory notes, drafts, bills of exchange, and other evi-
dences of debt; by receiving deposits; by buying and selling exchange, coin, and bullion;
[and] by loaning money on personal security; and by obtaining, issuing, and circulating
notes ....
Id. § 24 (Seventh).
23. See Emeric Fischer, Banking and Insurance-Should Ever the Twain Meet?, 71 NEB. L.
REV. 726, 771-75 (1992); Helen A. Garten, Subtle Hazards, Financial Risks, and Diversified
Banks: An Essay on the Perils of Regulatory Reform, 49 MD. L. REV. 314, 323-24 (1990).
24. Investment banking firms, or "investment banks," are financial organizations that engage
in "activities associated with securities underwriting, making a market in securities, and arrang-
ing mergers, acquisitions and restructuring .... Investment banking also includes the services of
brokers or dealers in secondary market transactions .... ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BANKING AND
FINANCE 661 (Charles J. Woelfel ed., 10th ed. 1994). Investment banks have historically been
contrasted with "commercial banks," which are banks engaged in the activities described previ-
ously in note 22. This contrast was especially important in the legislative history and subsequent
implementation of the Glass-Steagall Act, which was intended to separate commercial and in-
vestment banking activities. See, e.g., Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Investment
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could offer very competitive interest rates to business borrowers.
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Businesses also discovered that offshore lenders26 and the commercial
paper markets27 were quite satisfactory alternatives to borrowing
from domestic banks. Similarly, in the consumer lending markets,
banks have lost considerable market share in, for example, such im-
portant lines as credit card lending28 and automobile and other con-
sumer installment loans.29
During the same recent period, moreover, banks began losing de-
posits, their primary source of funding for loans, to a variety of non-
bank businesses that could offer deposit, safe keeping, investment,
and payment services that were quite competitive to banks. Thus, de-
Co. Inst., 450 U.S. 46, 62 (1981); Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 629 (1971); S. REP.
No. 73-77, at 10 (1933); 77 CONG. REC. 4179, 4179 (1933) (remarks of Sen. Glass) (stating that
the legislation would "confine to their proper business activities these large private concerns
[investment banks] whose principal business is that of dealing in investment securities ... and
deny them the right to conduct the deposit bank business at the same time"); 77 CONG. REC.
3835, 3835-36 (1933) (remarks of Rep. Steagall).
I have argued elsewhere that the degree of separation between commercial and investment
banks that was actually achieved by Glass-Steagall or even intended by the Congress that en-
acted it is subject to debate. See James R. Smoot, Striking Camp and Moving to Higher Ground:
The Hazardous Subtleties of "Subtle Hazards" in Bank Regulation, 4 GEO. MASON L. REV. 21
(1995).
25. See Donald C. Langevoort, Statutory Obsolescence and the Judicial Process: The Revision-
ist Role of the Courts in Federal Banking Regulation, 85 MICH. L. REV. 672, 679 (1987); G. Bruce
Knecht, Merrill Intends To Originate Major Loans-Securities Firm To Compete with Commer-
cial Banks in Lending to Businesses, WALL ST. J., June 20, 1994, at A2.
26. See Isaac & Fein, supra note 19, at 296 (foreign financial institutions compete successfully
with domestic banks because, inter alia, they are not "encumbered by Glass-Steagall-type re-
straints"); Williams & Jacobsen, supra note 19, at 785.
27. Commercial paper consists of short-term, unsecured, and typically discounted (though it
may be interest-bearing) obligations of a corporation. DICTIONARY OF FINANCE AND INVEST-
MENT TERMS 96 (John Downes & Jordon E. Goodman eds., 4th ed. 1995). The issuing corpora-
tion ordinarily pays a slightly lower effective interest rate than on a comparable bank loan. Id.
In this credit market, the corporation sells its short-term obligations (with terms of up to 270
days) to investors, either directly or through a broker, which will place the paper and keep
necessary records. See U.S. TREASURY DEP'T, MODERNIZING THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM, U.S.
TREASURY DEPARTMENT RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SAFER, MORE COMPETITIVE BANKS 23
(1991) [hereinafter MODERNIZING THE SYSTEM]. The commercial paper market has grown enor-
mously in recent decades, Role of Financial Institutions: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Tele-
communications and Finance of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 100th Cong. 6
(1987) (statement of Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Board of Governors, Federal Reserve System).
Further, that market has more or less equalled commercial bank lending in size. See MODERNIZ-
iNG THE SYSTEM, supra, at 126, fig. 10 (ratio of outstanding commercial bank loans to commer-
cial paper reduced from approximately 10:1 in 1960 to 1.2:1 in 1989); Fischer, supra note 23, at
771-75.
28. See Lisa Fickenscher, Banks Lose More Ground as Credit Card Issuers, AM. BANKER,
Sept. 11, 1995, at 32 (banks held only 51.2% of the market for credit card receivables on March
31, 1995, down from 53.6% in 1993).
29. Automobile and storefront finance companies have made significant inroads into banks'
market shares. See Fischer, supra note 23, at 771-75.
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positors' funds that in prior decades flowed into bank accounts were
siphoned off into brokerage firm asset-management accounts30 and es-
pecially into money market funds.31 More recently still, bank custom-
ers have found satisfactory alternative providers for such traditional
bank services as trust management 32 and even currency dispensing.33
The cumulative effect of these and related developments was that
traditional commercial banking ceased being the safe, comfortable,
and predictably profitable business it formerly had been, particularly
as bankers sought business in riskier lending markets after their for-
mer, higher quality customers found other credit relationships. 34
Banks responded to these incursions into their markets in kind by pro-
posing and offering new services and products in financial services
markets then exclusively occupied by other players in the financial
services industry. These new services and products were related to
commercial banking and lent themselves well to commercial bank ex-
ploitation by virtue of the existing expertise and assets of the banks,35
but they were not part (or at least an important part) of the traditional
commercial bank catalog.
While banks have had considerable success in expanding into these
new areas, that expansion has not been smooth or effortless. For one
thing, the statutory limitations Congress imposed to confine banks
and their holding company affiliates to traditional commercial bank-
ing activities36 posed significant impediments. The incentives for
banks to overcome those impediments and expand, however, were
powerful. Glass-Steagall may have been intended, at least in part, to
prevent a recurrence of the rash of bank failures that occurred during
the Depression, 37 which was commonly attributed at the time to ex-
30. See Vanessa O'Connell, Tired of Banks? Try Checking Out an Alternative, WALL ST. J.,
Sept. 8, 1995, at C1 (noting that asset-management accounts combine stock and bond trading
with access to money funds, pay market related interest rates, and are as easy to use as checking
accounts).
31. See S. REP. No. 96-378, at 4-6 (1979); JOSEPH AUERBACK & SAMUEL L. HAYES, INVEST-
MENT BANKING AND DILIGENCE: WHAT PRICE DEREGULATION? 92-93 (1986).
32. See Ellen E. Schultz, Banks Get New Competition for Trusts, WALL ST. J., Nov. 24, 1995, at
C1 (noting that more people are placing their trust accounts in brokerage firms and mutual fund
companies).
33. See Beth Piskora, EDS Poised To Wrest Top Spot in ATMs from BankAmerica, AM.
BANKER, Aug. 28, 1995, at 1.
34. See Isaac & Fein, supra note 19, at 296; Macey, supra note 19, at 207-10; Williams &
Jacobsen, supra note 19, at 785-86.
35. See Thomas G. Fischer et al., The Securities Activities of Commercial Banks: A Legal and
Economic Analysis, 51 TENN. L. REV. 467, 571 (1984).
36. See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
37. Approximately 5,000 banks failed during the first four years of the Depression, prior to
enactment of Glass-Steagall in 1933. Modernization of the Glass-Steagall Act. Hearing Before
[Vol. 46:651658
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cessive bank involvement in speculative securities activities. 38 How-
ever, in the current era of increased competition from nonbanks,
limitations on the ability of banks to diversify their business activities
perversely serve to add to the riskiness of the banking enterprise. 39
Accordingly, larger commercial banks set about the task of convinc-
ing their regulators to permit them and their affiliates to engage in a
broader range of securities 40 and, more recently, insurance-related 4'
the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 100th Cong. 33 (1987) (statement of
Donald A. Ritchie, Associate Historian, Senate Historical Office).
38. See, e.g., Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Investment Co. Inst., 450 U.S. 46,
61 (1981) (stating that the Glass-Steagall Act was enacted to protect against "any repetition of
the widespread bank closings that occurred during the Great Depression" and at the time Con-
gress believed that "the connection between commercial banking and investment banking, had
contributed" to such closings).
39. See Langevoort, supra note 25, at 682-83; Robert E. Litan, Evaluating and Controlling the
Risks of Financial Product Deregulation, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 10, 18-19 (1985) (30% reduction
in volatility of bank earnings when product line limitations were removed); Jonathan R. Macey,
Special Interest Groups Legislation and the Judicial Function: The Dilemma of Glass-Steagall, 33
EMORY L.J. 1, 12 (1984); Note, Restrictions on Bank Underwriting of Corporate Securities: A
Proposal for More Permissive Regulation, 97 HARV. L. REV. 720, 729 (1984) (analysis drawing
upon portfolio theory suggested that combining bank and securities activities may reduce enter-
prise riskiness).
Moreover, the idea that the widespread bank failures during the Depression were the result of
bank involvment in securities activities is highly questionable. See Legislative Proposals To
Restructure Our Financial System: Hearings on S. 1886, S. 1891 and S. 1905 Before the Senate
Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 100th Cong. 92 (1987) (statement of Alan
Greenspan, Chairman, Board of Governors, Federal Reserve System) [hereinafter Hearings on
S. 1886] (banks with securities operations "did not fail in proportionately greater numbers" than
other banks); Isaac & Fein, supra note 19, at 285-87;.
Indeed, there is growing recognition of the likelihood that, on balance, traditional bank lend-
ing is a riskier activity than underwriting and dealing. See Isaac & Fein, supra note 19, at 299-
300; Macey, supra note 19, at 206; Bankers Support Leach Bill, with Caveats; Baker Looks at
Insurance, Systemic Risks, 64 Banking Rep. (BNA) 730 (Apr. 10, 1995), available in LEXIS,
BNA Library, BNABus File [hereinafter Bankers Support Leach Bill] (statement by Michael E.
Patterson, Chief Administrative Officer, J.P. Morgan & Co., Inc.); Charles S. Sanford, Jr.,
Should the Glass-Steagall Act Be Repealed: Two Views, AM. BANKER, Mar. 8, 1984, at 4 (position
of President of Bankers Trust Co., New York).
40. Thus, holding company affiliates of banks obtained regulatory approval to act as discount
brokers, 12 C.F.R. § 225.125 (1996); see Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of Fed.
Reserve Sys., 468 U.S. 207 (1984), and as underwriters and dealers in (i) mortgage-backed se-
curities, Citicorp, 73 Fed. Res. Bull. 473 (1987), affd sub nom. Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board
of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 839 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1988), (ii) corporate debt and equity
issues, J.P. Morgan & Co., Inc., 75 Fed. Res. Bull. 192, 213 (1989), and (iii) municipal revenue
bonds, Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 839 F.2d 47 (2d
Cir. 1988).
41. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co. v. Clarke, 998 F.2d 1295, 1297 (5th Cir. 1993) (quoting
Comptroller's Letter of March 21, 1990, approving sale of annuity contracts by a national bank
subsidiary acting as agent for life insurance companies), rev'd sub nom. NationsBank of North
Carolina v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 115 S. Ct. 810, 814-15 n.4 (1995) (approving sale of
annuity contracts by a national bank subsidiary acting as agent for life insurance companies); R.
Christian Bruce, Judge Rules Against Retirement CD; Blackfeet National Sues Treasury, 64 Bank-
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activities. They have had considerable success in this campaign with
OCC and the Federal Reserve Board,42 but their efforts to implement
proposals for expanded services and products after approval by the
regulators were met with vigorous challenge in the courts by other
participants in the financial services industry whose turf these propos-
als seemingly invaded, including, most especially, investment bank-
ing43 and insurance" interests.
While banks and their affiliates have ultimately won many of these
battles, they have also suffered significant setbacks,45 with the result
that the legal landscape is even more scrambled than before. It is
surely apparent that the statutory scheme for regulating the financial
ing Rep. (BNA) 1097 (June 5, 1995), available in LEXIS, BNA Library, BNABus File (describ-
ing OCC approval of "retirement certificate of deposit," which has some of the tax-deferred
elements of an annuity contract).
42. See supra notes 40-41.
43. Investment banking and related trade organizations have challenged commercial bank or
bank affiliate involvement in a number of securities activities approved by bank regulatory
bodies:
(i) bank holding company or a nonbank subsidiary offering advice to closed-end investment
company, Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Investment Co. Inst., 450 U.S. 46 (1981);
(ii) bank holding company ownership of a company involved in the retail sales of securities,
Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 468 U.S. 207 (1984);
(iii) bank assisting corporate customers in placing their commercial paper, Securities Indus.
Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 468 U.S. 137 (1984); Securities Indus.
Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 807 F.2d 1052 (D.C. Cir. 1986);
(iv) bank offering automatic stock purchasing services for its customers, New York Stock
Exch., Inc. v. Smith, 404 F. Supp. 1091 (D.D.C. 1975), vacated sub nom. New York Stock Exch.,
Inc. v. Bloom, 562 F.2d 736 (D.C. Cir. 1977);
(v) nonbank affiliate of a bank holding company underwriting and dealing (within certain
limits) in government-issued or -guaranteed securities, Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Gov-
ernors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 839 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1988);
(vi) nonbank affiliate of a bank holding company underwriting and dealing (within certain
limits) in commercial paper, Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve
Sys., 847 F.2d 890 (D.C. Cir. 1988);
(vii) bank selling mortgage pass-through certificates, Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Clarke, 885
F.2d 1034 (2d Cir. 1989);
(viii) affiliate of a bank holding company underwriting and dealing (within certain limits) in
corporate securities, Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 900
F.2d 360 (D.C. Cir. 1990); and
(ix) federal savings and loan associations jointly investing in a brokerage and investment advi-
sory company, Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Federal Home Loan Bank Bd., 588 F. Supp, 749
(D.D.C. 1984).
44. See, e.g., Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 998 F.2d 1295, rev'd sub nom. NationsBank of
North Carolina v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 115 S. Ct. 810 (1995) (annuities); American
Land Title Ass'n v. Clarke, 968 F.2d 150, 157 (2d Cir. 1992) (title insurance); Saxon v. Georgia
Ass'n of Indep. Ins. Agents, 399 F.2d 1010, 1016 (5th Cir. 1968) (automobile, home, casualty, and
liability insurance).
45. See, e.g., Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617 (1971) (organizing, sponsoring, man-
aging, and underwriting mutual funds); American Deposit Corp. v. Schacht, 84 F.3d 834 (7th Cir.
1996) (retirement CD).
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services industry is ripe for broad rethinking. Many of the existing
statutes address the problems of a different era and, as they have ac-
cumulated over the decades, they have failed to make reasonable ac-
commodations to the changing needs and problems of today. Thus, it
is not surprising that Congress has tried three times in the last ten
years to come to grips with the task of reformulating policy and law in
this area.
The first two efforts, in 1988 and 1991, failed due to a combination
of (i) the inability of the major players (commercial banks, investment
banks, and insurance interests) to come to a compromise of their posi-
tions and (ii) a lack of political will on the part of Congress, faced with
this disarray among the interested players, to impose significant statu-
tory reform.46 The third effort, undertaken by the last Congress,
failed as well, for much the same reason.47 In any event, the kinds of
compromises given consideration late in the last session would, if en-
acted, entail implementation of some significant undesirable elements
and would, for a number of reasons, plainly be worse than continuing
to muddle through under the status quo.48 Legislative paralysis is thus
a kind of blessing.
46. See Smoot, supra note 13, at 752-55.
47. See id. at 755-59; Pamela Atkins, Leach Seeks Roundtable Support in Effort To Move Bill
to House Floor, 66 Banking Rep. (BNA) 852 (May 20, 1996), available in LEXIS, BNA Library,
BNABus File (Rep. Leach's bill was strongly opposed by banking interests, as well as Clinton
Administration, and in any event the Senate was unable to act that session); Niles S. Campbell,
Fed Raises Section 20 Revenue Limit, Urges Congress To Act on Glass-Steagall, 68 Banking Rep.
(BNA) 3 (June 6, 1997), available in LEXIS, BNA Library, BNABus File (during prior session,
Congress unable to come to consensus over form that modem financial industry should take);
Niles S. Campbell, Leach Abandons Broad Bank Reform, Settles for "Stripped-Down" Ap-
proach, 66 Banking Rep. (BNA) 1065 (June 17, 1996), available in LEXIS, BNA Library,
BNABus File (Rep. Leach acknowledged that "comprehensive bank industry modernization
cannot move forward this year" and proposed stripped-down version of piecemeal reform); Ge-
raldine Fabrikant, Pataki Proposes Allowing Sale of Insurance by Banks, N.Y. TIMES, June 17,
1996, at D4 (legislation has "little chance of passage this year"); Bill McConnell, Whitewater
Move to Bank Panel Seen Stalling Legislation, AM. BANKER, Apr. 4, 1996, at 2 (Senate Banking
Committee Chair D'Amato's preoccupation with ongoing Whitewater inquiry left little time for
other legislative matters and Banking Committee members were in no mood to move difficult
legislation).
48. See Smoot, supra note 13, at 759-67. I argued in this Article that, all things considered, but
especially in light of (i) the expansive view recently taken by the Supreme Court in NationsBank
of North Carolina v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 115 S. Ct. 810 (1995), of the statutory con-
cept of "the business of banking," 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh) (1994), and the very broad discretion
the Court gave OCC in determining what constitutes "the business of banking," 115 S. Ct. at
813-14 & n.2, and (ii) OCC's clear intent to explore the limits of national bank powers under
section 24 (Seventh), the best course is for Congress to stay its hand and permit OCC to con-
tinue its piecemeal consideration of the subject.
The various legislative compromises under serious consideration at the end of the last session
entailed a trade-off of consolidation and some augmentation of bank securities powers against,
among other things, limits on and even dimunition of insurance powers, potentially drawing a
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Undaunted by prior failures, legislators have introduced several fi-
nancial services industry reform bills in the current session of Con-
gress.49 While hope springs eternal that Congress can finally reach
agreement on broad reform,50 it appears doubtful that Congress will
be able to do so any time soon.5' Under the circumstances, then, it
appears that any change in the nature or mix of products and services
to be offered by banks and their affiliates in the foreseeable future will
line of demarcation, which would no doubt prove difficult to erase or move in the future, be-
tween banking and insurance similar to the one drawn in the Thirties between banking and
securities. This would be costly to banks and to consumers of banking, securities, and insurance
services, and would defy policy and economic sense. Smoot, supra note 13, at 759-67.
49. See D'Amato, Baker Introduce Modernization Bill Permitting Merger of Banking, Com-
merce, 68 Banking Rep. (BNA) 297 (Feb. 17, 1997), available in LEXIS, BNA Library, BNABus
File. Senator Alfonse D'Amato and Representative Richard Baker introduced identical bills, S.
298 and H.R. 669, substantially the same as the bills they introduced in the last Congress, that
would broadly remove most barriers between banking and nonbanking (that is, commercial)
firms. Id. Representative James Leach had previously introduced his own, much more modest
reform bill, H.R. 10, that would not permit affiliation of banking and commercial enterprises. Id.
Somewhere between these two bills is a proposal by Representatives Marge Roukema and
Bruce Vento, H.R. 268, that has considerable support among interested industry groups. See
Pamela Atkins, Industry Groups in Accord on Need for Reform, But Differ on Key Details, 68
Banking Rep. (BNA) 299 (Feb. 17, 1997), available in LEXIS, BNA Library, BNABus File.
50. See, e.g., Bill McConnell, GOP Congressional Victories Seen as Boost for Glass-Steagall
Repeal, AM. BANKER, Nov. 7, 1996, at 1 (Representative Leach sees hope "for a less partisan
atmosphere"); Pamela Atkins, House Members Introduce Blueprint for Financial Services Re-
form Next Year, 67 Banking Rep. (BNA) 479 (Sept. 30, 1996), available in LEXIS, BNA Library,
BNABus File (Representative Roukema hopeful that efforts at reform in current Congress "can
avoid the deadlock over banks' insurance activities that have doomed efforts in prior years").
51. See, e.g., Pamela Atkins, Holding Company Association Says Bills Would Move System
Backward, 68 Banking Rep. (BNA) 203 (Feb. 3, 1997), available in LEXIS, BNA Library,
BNABus File (reform legislation "contentious" among leading members of Congress); Camp-
bell, supra note 12, (lawmakers and representatives of securities and insurance industries say
New Part 5 Rules "may have derailed any chance" to arrive at consensus for reform legislation);
Jeffrey Goldfarb, No Reform Likely in 105th Congress, Staff Member, Former Staff Aide, Predict,
67 Banking Rep. (BNA) 957 (Dec. 9, 1996), available in LEXIS, BNA Library, BNABus File
(Representative Leach pessimistic on chances for reform and Representative Frank predicts
"very little" will happen in new Congress); Bill McConnell, Chances Seen Slim for Moderniza-
tion, AM. BANKER, Jan. 31, 1997, at 3 (reform unlikely because of (i) inability of House, which
typically initiates legislation in this area, to reach agreement and (ii) significant differences
among industry groups, according to Sen. Robert Bennett and Rep. Michael Oxley).
As has been the case in prior sessions of Congress, the interested industry groups began the
new session in serious disarray on significant issues that have foiled Congressional action before.
See, e.g., Atkins, supra note 49 (detailing differing views and priorities of large banks, community
banks, diversified financial companies, securities firms and insurance companies); Bill McCon-
nell, Tepid Reception Is Expected for Financial Reform Bills, AM. BANKER, Feb. 11, 1997, at 2
(discussing differing positions of key bank and thrift industry organizations).
This general tone of pessimism about the possibility of any reform emerging during the next
two years from the new Congress is shared by current and former members of the House and
Senate Banking Committee staffs, who cite growing polarization among House committee mem-
bers and upcoming reelection battles for many of the Senate Banking Committee members,
including Chairman D'Amato. See Goldfarb, supra.
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come from further regulatory action, within the confines of what cur-
rent law permits, by the bank regulators, chiefly OCC and the Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve Board, 52 which brings us back to
OCC's New Part 5 Rules and changes in the operating subsidiary con-
cept found in them.
II. NEW PART 5 RULES
OCC has historically specified certain rules, policies, and proce-
dures concerning the "corporate activities" of national banks in Part 5
of its regulations in the Code of Federal Regulations. 53 Part 5 deals
with, among other things, the steps necessary for the formation of a
national bank, which is a federally chartered entity, and with such
nuts-and-bolts corporate matters as dividends, capital, and acquisi-
tions.5 4 In November 1994, OCC published a proposal to amend Part
5.55 While some of the proposed changes related to routine house-
keeping matters, the most important had to do with "operating
subsidiaries."
Under the Old Part 5 Rules, a national bank could conduct activi-
ties that were "part of or incidental to the business of banking by
means of an operating subsidiary corporation," 56 which had to be a
corporation at least 80% of the voting stock of which is owned by the
bank.57 Such entities are commonplace.5 8 For a banking business
52. National banks fall under the jurisdiction of OCC. 12 U.S.C. §§ 221, 248 (1994). The
Federal Reserve Board regulates, among other things, the parent corporations, that is, bank
holding companies, of banks under the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956. Id. §§ 1841-50.
53. Rules, Policies, and Procedures for Corporate Activities, 12 C.F.R. pt. 5 (1996).
54. The major topics addressed in the Old Part 5 Rules were: organizing the bank, id. § 5.20;
conversion by a state bank to a federal charter, id. § 5.24; fiduciary powers, id. § 5.26; establish-
ing, acquiring, and relocating branches, id. §§ 5.30, 5.40; business combinations, id. § 5.33; oper-
ating subsidiaries, id. § 5.34; investments, id. § 5.36; capital, id. §§ 5.46, 5.47; changes in
management or control, id. §§ 5.50, 5.51, dividends, id. §§ 5.61, 5.62, and applications; comments,
hearings, and decisions in connection with the foregoing, id. §§ 5.2 - 5.14. The New Part 5 Rules
deal with the same topics but contain numerous changes. See Rules, Policies, and Procedures for
Corporate Activities, 61 Fed. Reg. 60,341-57 (1996) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 5) (summariz-
ing the changes); id. at 60,357-62 (tabulating changed provisions in New Part 5 Rules); id. at
61,362-87 (text of New Part 5 Rules).
55. Rules, Policies, and Procedures for Corporate Activities, 59 Fed. Reg. 61,033 (1994).
56. 12 C.F.R. § 5.34(c) (1996).
57. Id. OCC distinguishes operating subsidiaries from two other types of corporations whose
shares a national bank may own. Operating subsidiaries are owned by banks under their inci-
dental powers authority of 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh) (1994) and regulated by OCC under 12
C.F.R. § 5.34. A "statutory subsidiary," on the other hand, is a corporation a national bank may
own by virtue of some express statutory provision, see, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 24 (agricultural credit
corporations), id. §§ 601, 618 (foreign branching and banking corporations), id. § 1861 (bank
service corporations); 15 U.S.C. § 682(d) (1994) (small business investment companies). Finally,
a "DPC" subsidiary is a corporation whose shares the bank acquired through foreclosure or
similar procedure in connection with a "debt previously contracted" by a customer of a bank.
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based upon a holding company, the "operating subsidiary" is thus an
organizational alternative to a direct subsidiary of a bank's holding
company parent. An "operating subsidiary," of course, is more di-
rectly controlled by bank management than would be a direct subsidi-
ary of the holding company. OCC policy provided that it was
"primarily a business decision" 59 of the bank to determine whether to
create or acquire an operating subsidiary or to conduct an activity
through it, but that business decision was subject to OCC's prior de-
termination that the operating subsidiary and its activities were legally
permissible and prudent. 60 Giving some content to the concept of
what was legally permissible, the Old Part 5 Rules provided that
"[u]nless otherwise provided by statute or regulation, all provisions of
Federal banking laws and regulations applicable to the operations of
the parent bank shall be equally applicable to the operations of its
operating subsidiaries."'61
The Proposed Part 5 Rules embodied two significant changes. The
first was that the voting stock ownership requirement was reduced to
"more than 50 percent" of the subsidiary's voting stock62 from at least
80 percent, a change that OCC suggested could add useful "flexibility
DPC subsidiaries are not part of the bank's continuing operations and their shares must be
disposed of in due course pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 29 (1994). See Letter from OCC in Response
to Representative Dingell's Letter Dated Dec. 27, 1994, at 8 (on file with the DePaul Law Re-
view) [hereinafter OCC Response to Dingell].
58. For example, operating subsidiaries have, with OCC approval, engaged in the (i) broker-
ing of annuities, see NationsBank of North Carolina v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 115 S. Ct.
810, 812 (1995); (ii) dealing in financial futures and options for the subsidiary's own account,
clearing transactions involving financial futures and options for its customers, and execution,
clearing, and advisory services for its customers in transactions involving agricultural, petroleum,
and metals futures and options, OCC Interpretive Letter No. 494, [1989-1990 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 83,083 (Dec. 20, 1989); and (iii) brokering agricultural and metals
futures for customers in connection with bank loans to the customers, OCC Interpretive Letter
No. 356, [1985-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 85,526 (Jan. 7, 1986).
59. 12 C.F.R. § 5.34(d).
60. Before proceeding with a proposal to create or acquire an operating subsidiary or to give
an existing operating subsidiary additional activities to perform, a bank had to notify OCC of its
intention, id. § 5.34(d)(1)(i), (ii), but it did not do so where the operating subsidiary would be
engaging in activities previously approved by OCC in connection with a prior notification, so
long as the activities continued to be legally permissible and were conducted in accordance with
any limitations imposed by OCC in its prior approval, id. § 5.34(d)(1)(iv). If OCC did not re-
spond within thirty days of notification, then the bank could proceed with its proposal. This
thirty-day abeyance period permitted OCC to consider whether the proposed activities "exceed
those legally permissible" for an operating subsidiary and whether the bank's operating subsidi-
ary proposal was "consistent with prudent banking principles" and OCC policy. Id.
§ 5.34(d)(1)(iii).
61. 12 C.F.R. § 5.34(d)(2)(i) (emphasis added).
62. Rules, Policies, and Procedures for Corporate Activities, 59 Fed. Reg. 61,033, 61,056
(1994) (Proposed Part 5 Rules § 5.34(d)(2)). In addition, no other party could "control" the
operating subsidiary. Id.
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for the operating subsidiary structure. '63 The New Part 5 Rules add
even more flexibility by permitting the bank to possess less than a
majority voting interest in the operating subsidiary, so long as it holds
effective control and no other person holds more than 50% of the
voting interest, and by defining operating subsidiary to include "a cor-
poration, limited liability company, or similar entity." 64
The more controversial change deals with the applicability to oper-
ating subsidiaries of legal rules imposed generally on banks and, by
implication, the activities in which operating subsidiaries may engage.
The Proposed Part 5 Rules carried forward some of the approach to
this issue found in the old rules,65 but they dropped the categorical
statement that laws and regulations applicable to the bank "shall be
equally applicable" to the operating subsidiary.66 Instead, the follow-
ing appeared: "Unless otherwise provided by statute or regulation, or
determined by the OCC in writing, all provisions of Federal banking
laws and regulations applicable to the operations of the parent bank
apply to the operations of the bank's operating subsidiaries. '67 This
passage, of course, retained the idea from the old rules that an operat-
ing subsidiary could be involved in services or other activities prohib-
ited to banks themselves, so long as an existing statute or regulation
applicable to operating subsidiaries so permits. 68 However, the pas-
sage added the concept that OCC might also permit a particular oper-
ating subsidiary to pursue activities prohibited to banks, even in the
absence of such a generally applicable exemptive statute or regula-
tion, if OCC determined that to be appropriate in a specific circum-
stance. OCC would presumably have done so by means of issuance of
63. Rules, Policies, and Procedures for Corporate Activities, 59 Fed. Reg. at 61,039 (Proposed
Part 5 Rules § 5.34(d)(2)). OCC reemphasized the requirement for bank control of the subsidi-
ary, notwithstanding participation in it by another entity. Id.
64. Rules, Policies, and Procedures for Corporate Activities, 61 Fed. Reg. 60,341, 60,374
(1996) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 5.34(d)(2)).
65. The kinds of business activities in which an operating subsidiary could engage under the
Proposed Part 5 Rules were dealt with, in part, under the headings "Standards and require-
ments" and "Qualifying subsidiaries," in which the Old Rules were essentially reiterated. Thus,
an operating subsidiary: (i) may "engage in activities that are a part of, or incidental to, the
business of banking under 12 U.S.C. [§] 24 (Seventh) (1994), and other activities authorized for
national banks or their subsidiaries under other statutes," Rules, Policies, and Procedures for
Corporate Activities, 12 C.F.R. § 5.34(d)(1) (1996), and (ii) "must engage only in activities that
are a part of, or incidental to, the business of banking under 12 U.S.C. [§] 24 (Seventh), or in
other activities authorized for national banks or their subsidiaries under other statutes," id.
§ 5.34(d)(2).
66. Id. § 5.34(d)(2)(i); see supra note 61 and accompanying text.
67. Rules, Policies, and Procedures for Corporate Activities, 59 Fed. Reg. 61,033, 61,056
(1994) (emphasis added) (Proposed Part 5 Rules § 5.34(d)(3)).
68. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
1971
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an interpretive letter or similar communication to a bank seeking per-
mission for its operating subsidiary to pursue such activities.
The commentary accompanying the Proposed Part 5 Rules made
clear that this revised wording was quite deliberate and purposeful:
This revised standard allows the OCC to determine on a case-by-
case basis whether an activity deemed to be within the business of
banking or incidental to banking may be conducted in an operating
subsidiary to an extent or in a manner different from the way the
activity is conducted at the parent bank level. This might include
activities that the parent bank is not allowed to conduct because of
a specific restriction that applies to the parent bank but not neces-
sarily to its subsidiaries.69
This change, however, elicited more comment from interested par-
ties than any other70 and, in response, OCC preserved the concept 7'
but added a new provision to the final rules specifying detailed proce-
dures by which OCC may determine in writing that an operating sub-
sidiary may engage in an activity that is part of or incidental to the
business of banking but in a manner that is "different from that per-
missible for the parent national bank. '' 72 OCC noted in its commen-
tary accompanying the New Part 5 Rules:
69. Rules, Policies, and Procedures for Corporate Activities, 59 Fed. Reg. at 61,039.
70. OCC received a total of seventy-one letters commenting on the Proposed Part 5 Rules,
Rules, Policies, and Procedures for Corporate Activities, 61 Fed. Reg. 60,341 (1996) (to be codi-
fied at 12 C.F.R. pt. 5), of which forty-six commented upon this element of the rules, id. at
60,350. About 75% of these comments were supportive of the new approach, citing the organi-
zational flexibility, improved efficiency and increased competition it would afford. Id. Nonethe-
less, a significant number of comments opposed it on the bases that OCC lacked authority to
adopt it, that the new approach was inconsistent with other provisions of statutory law and prior
OCC precedent, and that it would expose banks to significant risk. Id. at 60,350-51.
71. The concept is now embodied in three related provisions of the New Part 5 Rules. The
first is section 5.34(d)(1):
Authorized activities. A national bank may establish or acquire an operating subsidiary
to conduct, or may conduct in an existing operating subsidiary, activities that are part of
or incidental to the business of banking, as determined by the Comptroller of the Cur-
rency, pursuant to 12 U.S.C. [§] 24 (Seventh), and other activities permissible for na-
tional banks or their subsidiaries under other statutory authority.
Rules, Policies, and Procedures for Corporate Activities, 61 Fed. Reg. at 60,374 (to be codified at
12 C.F.R. § 5.34(d)(1) (emphasis added)). The second is section 5.34(d)(3):
Examination and supervision.... In conducting activities authorized under this section,
unless otherwise provided by statute or regulation (including paragraph (f) of this sec-
tion), applicable provisions of Federal banking law and regulations pertaining to the
operations of the parent bank shall apply to the operations of the bank's operating
subsidiary.
Id. (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 5.34(d)(3) (emphasis added)); see infra note 72 (describing
section 5.34(f)).
72. Rules, Policies, and Procedures for Corporate Activities, 61 Fed. Reg. at 60,376 (to be
codified at 12 C.F.R. § 5.34(f)). This new paragraph added significant procedural conditions and
substantive requirements to a finding by OCC that an operating subsidiary may conduct an ac-
tivity in a manner not permissible to its parent bank. Unless OCC has previously approved the
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The final rule confirms... that [permissible activities for operating
subsidiaries] may include activities different from what the parent
national bank may conduct directly, if, in the circumstances
presented, the reason or rationale for restricting the parent bank's
ability to conduct the activity does not apply to the subsidiary, and if
the ability of the subsidiary to conduct the activity would not frus-
trate a congressional purpose of preventing the activity from being
undertaken by its parent bank.73
The two passages quoted above from OCC's commentaries on the
Proposed Part 5 Rules and the New Part 5 Rules can be and have
been given several readings. A reasonably narrow reading, and one
that is consistent with other elements of the Clinton Administration's
program for financial services reform during the last session of Con-
gress, 74 is that OCC merely intends to accommodate the possibility
that, in an appropriate case, an operating subsidiary of a bank may
activity, it must publish notice in the Federal Register and thus provide an opportunity for public
comment. Id. (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 5.34(0(1)).
In addition, significant new "corporate requirements" will apply. Id. (to be codified at 12
C.F.R. § 5.34(0(2)). Among other things, under this new provision the operating subsidiary
conducting any such activity: (i) must be "physically separate and distinct" from the parent bank
in its operations and employees (if bank and operating subsidiary share same facility, operating
subsidiary's zone of business must be "distinguishable, to the extent practicable," from the area
where bank customers conduct business with the bank); (ii) must be "held out" in its written
materials and third-party relations as a "separate and distinct entity from the bank"; (iii) may
not adopt the name of its parent bank and shall take "appropriate steps to minimize the risk of
customer confusion" if its name is similar to the parent bank's; (iv) must be "adequately capital-
ized"; (v) must maintain "separate accounting and corporate records"; (vi) must conduct its ac-
tivities under "independent policies and procedures" that reinforce customer perception that the
subsidiary is separate from the bank; (vii) may enter into service contracts with bank only upon
arm's length terms; (viii) must conduct separate board meetings and other corporate formalities;
(ix) must have a board of directors at least one-third of the members of which shall not also be
members of the bank's board; and (x) must implement internal controls "appropriate" to the
"risks associated with the subsidiary." Id. at 60,376-77 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 5.34(0(2)).
Finally, under sections 5.34(f)(3)(i) and (ii) of the new provisions, a number of restrictive
requirements are to be imposed for purposes of determining the capital adequacy of the bank
where the operating subsidiary is engaged in an activity under paragraph (f) as principal. Id. at
60,377 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 5.34(f)(3)(i), (ii)). These restrictions are designed to ensure
that only financially strong and well-managed banks will undertake these activities through their
subsidiaries. Id. at 60,354.
73. Rules, Policies, and Procedures for Corporate Activities, 61 Fed. Reg. at 60,352 (citation
omitted).
74. The Clinton Administration's approach to legislative reform in the last Congress envi-
sioned that banking organizations could engage in certain activities either in a bank holding
company subsidiary or in a bank operating subsidiary. Which vehicle the banking organization
chose would be purely "a private business decision" of the organization. Pamela Atkins, Rabin
Testifies on Glass-Steagall Plan, Differs from Leach on Structuring Links, 64 Banking Rep.
(BNA) 458 (Mar. 6,1995), available in LEXIS, BNA Library, BNABus File (statement of Treas-
ury Secretary Rubin) (endorsing the idea that choice of structure in affiliates "should remain a
private business decision").
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engage in activities that are permissible for subsidiaries of bank hold-
ing companies. 75 This change, however, is potentially significant.
Holding company subsidiaries may now engage in a broader range
of securities activities than banks may themselves, given the strictures
and structure of Glass-Steagall. That Act, as case law and administra-
tive practice have recognized,76 makes an important distinction be-
tween the kinds of securities activities that are permissible for a bank
and for a nonbank affiliate of a bank. The securities activities of non-
bank affiliates are governed by Glass-Steagall section 2077 rather than
sections 1678 and 21, 79 which govern bank securities activities.
Whereas sections 16 and 21 flatly prohibit most kinds of bank under-
writing of and dealing in securities, section 20 more loosely forbids
bank affiliation with an organization "engaged principally" in such
activities.80
Thus, in a case involving a challenge to the Federal Reserve Board's
action permitting a bank holding company's nonbank affiliates8' to
underwrite and deal in commercial paper,82 the D.C. Circuit noted
that, under the wording of the relevant provisions, a nonbank affiliate
of a bank may engage in certain activities pursuant to section 20 that a
bank may not engage in at all under sections 16 and 21, "provided
those activities are not the 'principal' activities of the affiliate. '83 The
75. An even narrower reading is that the new provision would permit an operating subsidiary
to engage in an activity that a bank could, in theory, engage in but that OCC determines to be, in
a particular case, sufficiently fraught with risk that prudence dictates its being carried out instead
by an operating subsidiary. See infra notes 204-16 and accompanying text.
76. See infra notes 77-86 and accompanying text.
77. 12 U.S.C. § 377 (1994).
78. Id. § 24 (Seventh).
79. Id. § 378(a)(1).
80. Id. §§ 24 (Seventh), 378(a)(1).
81. The affiliates were not subsidiaries of banks within the holding company structure.
82. The Board has authority to regulate bank holding companies and their subsidiaries (or at
least some of them) under the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-50 (1994).
A "bank holding company" is basically a company that "has control over any bank." Id.
§ 1841(a)(1). "Control" is defined as (i) direct or indirect ownership of, or power to vote,
twenty-five percent or more of any class of voting stock of a bank, (ii) control of the election of a
majority of the board of directors of a bank, or (iii) other controlling influence over the manage-
ment or policies of a bank, as determined by the Board. Id. § 1841(a)(2).
83. Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 847 F.2d 890, 894
(D.C. Cir. 1988); see Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 839
F.2d 47, 58 (2d Cir. 1988).
The Supreme Court has also acknowledged that section 20 applies a looser standard to holding
companies and their nonbank subsidiaries than sections 16 and 21 apply to banks themselves.
Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Investment Co. Inst., 450 U.S. 46, 60 n.26 (1981)
(stating that a "less stringent standard" applies to decide if holding company has violated section
20 than applies to decide if bank has violated sections 16 and 21); id. at 64 (stating that "[i]n both
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Board had approved the commercial paper programs84 but with signif-
icant numerical limitations on the revenues that these activities gener-
ated, limitations that served to assure that the programs did not
become the "principal" activities of the affiliates. The affiliates were
thus able to engage in underwriting and dealing, to a degree, without
violating Glass-Steagall section 20.85
Since section 20's "less stringent standard" in separating commer-
cial and investment banking86 permits commercial banks to have at
least some affiliates with a degree of underwriting and dealing activi-
ties, an important question is whether the affiliated entity could be a
bank operating subsidiary instead of the traditional bank holding com-
pany affiliate. On their face, the Proposed Part 5 Rules seemed hospi-
table to that idea.87 This impression is reinforced by OCC's
the Glass-Steagall Act itself and in the Bank Holding Company Act, Congress indicated that a
bank affiliate may engage in activities that would be impermissible for the bank itself").
This difference in wording ("engaged" in section 21 versus "engaged principally" in section
20) was not inadvertent. Although section 21 as originally introduced read "engaged princi-
pally," a principle sponsor of Glass-Steagall, Senator Bulkley, deleted "principally" in a subse-
quent amendment, see Securities Indus. Ass'n, 839 F.2d at 58, because he feared that "principally
engaged" might not encompass the activities of certain of the large investment bankers, which
were at the time involved in a broad range of business activities, 77 CONG. REC. 4180 (1933)
(statement of Sen. Bulkley). If those investment banking organizations could escape coverage
under section 21 because of its looser language as originally proposed, then that provision would
not serve to prevent them from engaging in banking by accepting deposits. For a more detailed
discussion of the significance of this point, see infra Part V.B and accompanying text.
84. See Chase Manhattan Corp., 73 Fed. Res. Bull. 367 (1987) (granting permission to the
Chase Manhattan Corporation to underwrite and deal in commercial paper to a limited extent);
Bankers Trust New York Corp., 73 Fed. Res. Bull. 138 (1987) (granting permission to underwrite
and deal in municipal revenue bonds and mortgage-related securities, as well as commercial
paper).
85. The Board initially specified that underwriting and dealing must amount to less than 5%
of the nonbank affiliate's gross revenues, a level of underwriting and dealing activities seen by
the Board as not violating section 20's prohibition on bank affiliation with an organization "prin-
cipally engaged" in dealing and underwriting. After deliberation, the Board concluded that
"principally" entails a level of activity that is less than "chiefly" (which was the banks' position)
but more than "regular" or "integral" (which was the Security Industry Association's position).
The Board embraced a middle ground that "principally" really meant "substantially" and that
less than 5% of the gross revenues of the affiliate would be insubstantial. 73 Fed. Res. Bull. at
140-46. See Orders Issued Under Section 4 of the Bank Holding Company Act, 73 Fed. Res.
Bull. 473, 475-76 (1987); Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Agnew, 329 U.S. 441,
446-48 (1947) (discussing the meaning of "primary" or "primarily engaged").
The Board reconsidered this point two years later and decided that securities activities con-
tributing up to 10% of the affiliate's gross revenues would not violate section 20. Modifications
to Section 20 Orders, 75 Fed. Res. Bull. 751, 751 (1989).
The Board liberalized the revenue limits even further (to 25%) in 1996. See infra notes 231-37
and accompanying text.
86. Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Investment Co. Inst., 450 U.S. 46, 60-61 n.26
(1981).
87. The banking industry believed that the Proposed Part 5 Rules went at least that far. See
OCC Counsel Offers Roadmap for Bankers Considering New National Bank Proposals, 64 Bank-
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accompanying commentary, wherein it said that, under the proposed
rules, OCC would decide on a case-by-case basis whether a particular
activity "may be conducted in an operating subsidiary to an extent or
in a manner different from the way the activity is conducted at the
parent bank level."'8 8 For example, OCC might use this proposed au-
thority with respect to activities "that the parent bank is not allowed
to conduct because of a specific restriction that applies to the parent
bank but not necessarily to its subsidiaries.'89 One such restriction
that comes to mind in this context is that set forth in Glass-Steagall
section 16 or 21, which prevents the parent bank from engaging di-
rectly in most kinds of underwriting or dealing. The "not necessarily"
language in the commentary suggests that, while there may be room
to question the authority of operating subsidiaries to engage in such
activities as permitted under section 20, OCC has preserved its option
to make the argument in the affirmative if and when an appropriate
proposal reached its office. The final version of the rules remains hos-
pitable to this possibility, as confirmed by OCC's accompanying com-
mentary,90 which is quoted above.91
Thus, at the very least, it would appear that the New Part 5 Rules
could be a means of enabling operating subsidiaries to engage in un-
derwriting or dealing, at least for some part of their revenues. The
new rules may also, however, be read more broadly. After the pro-
posed rules appeared in the Federal Register, there was speculation in
the financial press that OCC intended to take advantage of the pro-
posed rules to authorize more direct bank involvement in revenue
bond underwriting92 and in new kinds of real estate brokerage, data
ing Rep. (BNA) 597, 597 (Mar. 20, 1995), available in LEXIS, BNA Library, BNABus File [here-
inafter OCC Counsel Offers Roadmap] ("[P]roposal appeals to bankers who say they could use it
as a new home for existing companies that operate under revenue constraints.").
88. Rules, Policies, and Procedures for Corporate Activities, 59 Fed. Reg. 61,033, 61,039
(1994) (Proposed Part 5 Rules § 5.34(d)(2)).
89. Id. (emphasis added).
90. See Rules, Policies, and Procedures for Corporate Activities, 61 Fed. Reg. 60,341, 60,352
(1996) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 5).
91. See supra note 73 and accompanying text. The commentary also notes that
[u]nder the final rule ... the OCC must evaluate an operating subsidiary application
involving this type of activity [not permissible for parent bank] on a case-by-case basis.
For each activity, the OCC will consider the particular activity at issue, and weigh: (1)
the form and specificity of the restriction applicable to the parent bank; (2) why the
restriction applies to the parent bank; and (3) whether it would frustrate the purpose
underlying the restriction on the parent bank to permit a subsidiary of the bank to
engage in the particular activity.
Rules, Policies, and Procedures for Corporate Activities, 61 Fed. Reg. at 60,352.
92. This had been seen as beyond a bank's authority under Glass-Steagall. See Robert M.
Garsson, OCC's Paperwork Rewrite Paves the Way for Banks To Expand Their Powers, AM.
BANKER, Jan. 20, 1995, at 3.
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processing services, financial management counseling, and insurance
underwriting. 93
Such speculation was no doubt encouraged by authoritative public
pronouncements subsequent to issuance of the proposed rules, sug-
gesting that OCC will be favorably disposed to bank proposals to ex-
pand the scope of their activities. For instance, at an industry
gathering in March 1995, OCC's chief counsel outlined the agency's
analytical framework for considering future bank requests for ap-
proval of new products or services.94 If OCC determines, in the exer-
cise of its broad discretion as contemplated by the Supreme Court in
NationsBank of North Carolina v. Variable Annuity Life Insurance Co.
("VALIC"), 95 that a bank's proposal involves activity that is within
"the business of banking," then the agency will be inclined to approve
where the activity is a "contemporary functional equivalent (or out-
growth) of a recognized banking function," 96 where the activity would
either benefit customers or strengthen the bank and where the risks
inherent in the activity are similar to risks banks have traditionally
encountered. 97 The "broad aim" of this approach is "to allow banks
to evolve in a changing industry without taking on too much risk,"' 98
but the chief counsel pointedly noted that "an approach that focuses
too much on limiting banks to traditional activities in a highly compet-
itive environment may actually diminish safety and soundness in the
long run."99
93. See OCC Seeks Comment on Easing Bank Rules, Opening Door for New Sub Power Re-
quests, 63 Banking Rep. (BNA) 815 (Dec. 5,1994), available in LEXIS, BNA Library, BNABus
File; Colleen Brennan & Lesia Bullock, Bankers Hopeful a Republican Congress Will Mean Ex-
panded Powers, More Relief, 64 Banking Rep. (BNA) 133 (Jan. 16, 1995), available in LEXIS,
BNA Library, BNABus File (according to Rich Whiting, General Counsel of the Bankers
Roundtable, a bank industry trade organization, the Proposed Part 5 Rules have "the potential
for not being as narrow as Glass-Steagall and securities activities"); Atkins, supra note 8. This
speculation was renewed after the rules were finalized. See Olaf de Senerpont Domis, Banks
Rush To Embrace New Freedoms, AM. BANKER, Nov. 25, 1996, at 1 (national banks' planning for
taking advantage of New Part 5 Rules includes proposals for new or expanded activities involv-
ing insurance, equipment leasing, municipal revenue bond underwriting, real estate brokerage,
and management and information processing).
94. See OCC Counsel Offers Roadmap, supra note 87 (comments by Julie Williams, chief
counsel for the OCC, to luncheon sponsored by American Conference Institute). The approach
outlined in this presentation was not limited by its terms to new operating subsidiary proposals
but would apply to all applications for approval received by OCC.
95. 115 S. Ct. 810, 814 n.2 (1995)
96. See OCC Counsel Offers Roadmap, supra note 87 (comments by Julie Williams, chief
counsel for the OCC, to luncheon sponsored by American Conference Institute).
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. If banks continue to be limited to their traditional activities, they may ultimately find
themselves taking higher risks. "Safety and soundness can be enhanced by allowing banks to
1997]
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
In light of this expansionary framework for review of bank propos-
als and OCC's recently clarified and broadened power to define "the
business of banking" in VALIC, 00 under the New Part 5 Rules, oper-
ating subsidiaries could become an important means for banks to ex-
pand the scope of their businesses, 10 a point that is not lost on bank
critics in Congress or on other participants in the financial services
industry, who have served notice that they will vigorously continue to
resist bank encroachment. This brings the Article, then, to the point:
Is the reincarnation of the operating subsidiary under the New Part 5
Rules a legitimate and permissible exercise by OCC of its powers?
Critics have taken exception both to the reduction in ownership ele-
ment and to the idea of operating subsidiary exercise of powers de-
nied to banks themselves. 10 2
III. MAY BANKS HAVE SUBSIDIARIES?
First, however, there is the question of whether national banks are
empowered to have subsidiaries and, if so, under what limitations, if
any. The foregoing discussion assumed that this was not in issue, and
national banks have certainly operated, in recent years, at least, as if it
were not. Nevertheless, OCC's Proposed Part 5 Rules rekindled in-
terest in the issue of the authority of national banks to own the stock
of operating subsidiaries. This issue is closely related to the more im-
portant one of whether operating subsidiaries may do things that na-
tional banks may not. The issue of whether banks can own an
operating subsidiary, however, is logically a prior issue and, in the de-
innovate within prudential limits, and to be responsive to emerging customer needs." Id.; see
supra note 39 and accompanying text.
100. 115 S. Ct. 810 at 814 n.2.
101. It has even been suggested that the rules will be midwife to the birth of European-style
"universal banks," Garsson, supra note 91, at 3, with broad authority to conduct business in a
manner heretofore unheard of in the United States, see de Senerpont Domis, supra note 10, at 4.
According to Karen S. Petrou, President of ISD/Shaw Inc., the operating subsidiary proposal is
"so significant because in full flower it recreates the national bank as a universal bank, which in
its own right controls an array of both banking and nonbanking services, as opposed to doing
that under a holding company." Id. This "universal bank" model was also endorsed by former
Federal Reserve Board governor, John P. LaWare, is more efficient than and equally safe as
current holding company approach. Id.
102. The New Part 5 Rules contain other elements pertaining to operating subsidiaries, such
as procedures for after-the-fact notice concerning, or expedited review of, certain types of new
bank activities, which are interesting innovations and were in the proposal stage magnets for
critical comment. See Rules, Policies, and Procedures for Corporate Activities, 61 Fed. Reg.
60,341, 60,374 (1996) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 5.34(e)). These other elements of the operat-
ing subsidiary part of the new rules are beyond the scope of this Article, as are other interesting
provisions of the new rules not pertaining to operating subsidiaries.
[Vol. 46:651
BANK OPERATING SUBSIDIARIES
bate about changes to the Old Part 5 Rules, opponents made it a sepa-
rate point.
Most vigorously asserted by Representative John Dingell in a letter
to OCC questioning numerous elements of the proposed rules,103 the
argument is simply stated as follows: First, OCC lacks specific statu-
tory authority to permit national banks to acquire or establish operat-
ing subsidiaries, whose stock they would own. This circumstance is to
be contrasted with other contexts in which national banks are ex-
pressly authorized by statute, within specific limits, to purchase and
own stock in special purpose corporations, such as bank service corpo-
rations, Edge Act companies, and safe-deposit corporations. 1°4 Sec-
ond, a part of the Glass-Steagall Act expressly prohibits national
banks from owning for their own account "any shares of stock of any
corporation,"'105 with certain exceptions not here relevant. As Repre-
sentative Dingell saw matters, this "stock purchase restriction" in
Glass-Steagall on its face prevented a bank from owning shares in an
operating subsidiary (except as otherwise specifically permitted). The
restriction was thus a bar to OCC's efforts with respect to operating
subsidiaries under the Proposed Part 5 Rules 0 6 and presumably re-
mains so under the New Part 5 Rules.
It is true that national banks do not have the benefit of a specific
statutory provision authorizing them to make use of subsidiaries in the
conduct of their business, but their authority to do so as an incident to
the conduct of the business of banking generally seems too well estab-
lished to be successfully challenged now. A national bank has author-
ity "[t]o exercise... all such incidental powers as shall be necessary to
carry on the business of banking.' 01 7 As a general matter of statutory
interpretation, for an incidental power to be "necessary" to the ac-
complishment of some purpose or achievement of some goal, it need
103. Letter from Rep. John D. Dingell, Chairman, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investiga-
tions of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, to OCC 1 (Dec. 27, 1994) (on file with
the DePaul Law Review) [hereinafter 1994 Dingell Letter]. The Securities Industry Association
made a broadly similar argument in its letter of comment on the proposed rules. Letter from
Marc E. Lockritz, President, and Steve Judge, Senior Vice-President, The Securities Industry
Association, to OCC 14 (Jan. 30, 1995) (on file with the DePaul Law Review) [hereinafter SIA
Letter].
104. 1994 Dingell Letter, supra note 103, at 2.
105. 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh) (1994).
106. 1994 Dingell Letter, supra note 103, at 2-3 (citing HARVEY PIrr ET AL., THE LAW OF
FINANCIAL SERVICES 135 (1993)). Indeed, Rep. Dingell asserts in his letter that OCC agreed
with this interpretation until 1963, when it began taking an expansive view of the authority of
national banks under their "incidental powers" authority contained in section 24 (Seventh). Id.
at 3.
107. 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh).
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not be indispensable or a sine qua non for such accomplishment or
achievement. It is sufficient that the power is "appropriate and help-
ful"' 108 or "convenient or useful." 109 Numerous courts dealing with
bank power cases have previously adopted such a broad construction
of the word "necessary,"' 110 and the Supreme Court recently gave
strong reinforcement to that approach in VALIC. 111
As OCC sees it, one such "incidental power" of national banks, a
power that banks have in common with corporations in general, is the
108. See Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 113 (1933) (meaning of "necessary" in phrase "or-
dinary and necessary expense" for the conduct of a business).
109. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 413-15 (1819). Cf. Legal Tender
Case, 110 U.S. 421, 440 (1884) (stating that article I, section 8, clause 18 of the Constitution,
containing the "necessary and proper" powers clause, encompasses powers that are "not limited
to such measures as are absolutely and indispensably necessary, without which the powers
granted must fail of execution; but they include all appropriate means which are conducive or
adapted to the end to be accomplished").
110. See Arnold Tours, Inc. v. Camp, 472 F.2d 427, 430 (1st Cir. 1972) ("sine qua non standard
would be an inappropriate measure of a national bank's incidental powers under 12 U.S.C. § 24,
Seventh"; word "necessary" does not "connote that which is indispensable").
Over the years, courts have found that a number of activities, services, and products that are
not specifically enumerated as within the powers of national banks and that could not be de-
scribed as indispensable to the conduct of the business of a bank are nonetheless permissible
under the incidental powers grant of section 24 (Seventh). Id. at 430-34. Such activities, serv-
ices, and products are sustained as incidental to the conduct of the business of banking on a
number of other less restrictive bases:
(a) Some are seen as similar to an express power. See Colorado Nat'l Bank v. Bedford, 310
U.S. 41, 50 (1940) (safe-deposit business sustained as incidental power because similar to express
power to accept deposits); First Nat'l Bank v. City of Hartford, 273 U.S. 548, 559-60 (1927) (sale
of mortgages and similar debt instruments permitted as incidental power because closely related
to power to discount or negotiate debt instruments or make loans); Clement Nat'l Bank v. Ver-
mont, 231 U.S. 120, 139-40 (1913) (paying state taxes for customers similar to express power to
receive deposits); Merchants' Bank v. State Bank, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 604, 648 (1870) (certifica-
tion of checks similar to discounting and negotiating bills of exchange); M & M Leasing Corp. v.
Seattle First Nat'l Bank, 563 F.2d 1377, 1382-83 (9th Cir. 1977) (leasing of personal property
similar to loan secured by personal property).
(b) Others are found to be "useful" or "convenient and useful" to a bank in the conduct of its
other business. See First Nat'l Bank v. Taylor, 907 F.2d 775, 778 (8th Cir. 1990) (incidental
powers "not limited to activities that are deemed essential to the exercise of express powers";
offering debt cancellation contracts permissible incidental power because useful to bank in giv-
ing customers means of retiring bank loan upon death); Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Clarke, 885
F.2d 1034, 1049 (2d Cir. 1989) (sale of mortgage pass-through certificates in connection with sale
of mortgage loans permitted because "convenient and useful").
111. NationsBank of North Carolina v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 115 S. Ct. 810, 814, 817
(1995) (holding that the power of a national bank to broker annuities, while not listed as among
the statutorily enumerated powers of national banks, is, nonetheless, "an 'incidental powe[r] ...
necessary to carry on the business of banking"' pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh) (1988 &
Supp. V 1993)). The Court in this case reversed the Fifth Circuit, which had taken the miserly
view that, even if brokering of annuities by banks could be seen as "incidental" to the business of
banking, "by no stretch of the imagination can that power be deemed 'necessary."' Variable
Annuity Life Ins. Co. v. Clarke, 998 F.2d 1295, 1302 (5th Cir. 1993), rev. sub nom. NationsBank
of North Carolina v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 115 S. Ct. 810 (1995).
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power to conduct business through a subsidiary. 12 The opposing view
has it that this approach stretches the concept of incidental powers too
far, especially in light of the fact Congress has on numerous occasions
seen fit to give specific authorization for national bank ownership of
particular types of subsidiaries.113 These contrary viewpoints basically
reduce to the question of whether national banks have historically
had, though they may not always have exercised, the power to make
use of subsidiaries in the conduct of business and, if so, to the further
question of whether Congress has restricted this power in a manner
that bars the use of operating subsidiaries as contemplated by OCC
rules (present and past). Put differently, this dispute is about whether
new or additional congressional action is a prerequisite to any previ-
ously unspecified use by banks of subsidiaries or whether, instead,
previous actions by Congress relating to bank ownership of subsidiar-
ies have done no more than confirm preexisting power or restrict the
ability of banks to own subsidiaries in particular fashions and in spe-
cific circumstances.
In this, OCC surely has the better of the argument. As a general
matter of the power of national banks to take advantage of the ordi-
nary incidents of the corporate form, banks should be able to make
use of operating subsidiaries, at least absent specific prohibition by
Congress and so long as bank regulators approve.11 4 The language of
the National Bank Act,115 which was originally adopted during the
Civil War, is surely broad enough for this purpose. The current incar-
nation of the relevant portion of that Act, found in the first sentence
of section 24 (Seventh), provides that a national bank is empowered
[t]o exercise by its board of directors or duly authorized officers
or agents, subject to law, all such incidental powers as shall be nec-
essary to carry on the business of banking; by discounting and nego-
tiating promissory notes, drafts, bills of exchange, and other
evidences of debt; by receiving deposits; by buying and selling ex-
112. See Rules, Policies, and Procedures for Corporate Activities, 61 Fed. Reg. 60,341, 60,374
(1996) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 5.34(a)); id. at 60,351-52; OCC Response to Dingell, supra
note 57, at 1.
113. Letter from Rep. John D. Dingell, Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on Over-
sight and Investigations of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, to OCC 1-4 (Jan.
30, 1995) (on file with the author) [hereinafter 1995 Dingell Letter].
114. OCC's position on the point is as follows:
It is common corporate practice in the United States for companies to conduct some of
their business through subsidiaries. Absent an express prohibition, there is no reason a
national bank should be denied such corporate flexibility. Operating a subsidiary al-
lows the bank to conduct the banking business in a manner convenient and useful to
itself and to its customers, as permitted by 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh).
OCC Response to Dingell, supra note 57, at 1.
115. Act of June 3, 1864, ch. 106, 13 Stat. 99.
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change, coin, and bullion; by loaning money on personal security;
and by obtaining, issuing, and circulating notes according to the pro-
visions of title 62 of the Revised Statutes.116
The order of the clauses in this provision (grant of incidental pow-
ers followed by listing five commonly accepted categories of banking
powers introduced by the word "by") might seem to suggest that the
extent of banks' "incidental powers" is limited to the matters referred
to in the trailing list of categories, but that order reflects a reversal of
the original 1863 ordering, in which "incidental powers" were listed at
the end of the specific powers as, in effect, a separate category of pow-
ers. 117 When the current order of clauses ("incidental powers" pre-
ceding listing of specific powers) appeared in an amendment adopted
a year later in 1864, nothing in the legislative history suggested that
Congress intended this reordering of clauses to effect a substantive
change. 1 8 Indeed, at the time, Congress intended to make a national
banking charter more attractive than a state charter and thus is un-
likely to have intended to narrow the range of national banking
powers.119
Later amendments to the National Bank Act and a study of the
antecedent statutory sources upon which that Act was based suggest
strongly that "the business of banking" consists of more than simply
the listed five categories of powers.120 In any event, the Supreme
Court clearly addressed this issue in VALIC,121 which considered an
insurance company's assertion that OCC's authorization of national
bank sales of variable annuities was invalid because, among other
things, no such activity was listed in section 24 (Seventh). The Court
expressly (and unanimously) held that the "'business of banking' is
116. 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh).
117. Act of Feb. 25, 1863, ch. 58, §11, 12 Stat. 668. National banks were therein granted the
power
to carry on the business of banking by obtaining and issuing circulating notes ... by
discounting bills, notes, and other evidences of debt; by receiving deposits; by buying
and selling gold and silver bullion, foreign coins, and bills of exchange; by loaning
money on real and personal security ... and by exercising such incidental powers as
shall be necessary to carry on such business ....
Id.
118. See Symons, supra note 18, at 700.
119. Congress was amending national banking statutes in the hope of encouraging the found-
ing of more national banks, whether as new banks or through conversion of state charters. Id. at
699. It seems highly unlikely that Congress would set about that task by narrowing national
bank powers, thereby making national banks relatively less attractive than state banks, particu-
larly those in states, for example, New York, that granted very broad banking powers to state-
chartered banking institutions. Id. at 700.
120. See Smoot, supra note 13, at 722-25.
121. NationsBank of North Carolina v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 115 S. Ct. 810 (1995).
(Vol. 46:651
BANK OPERATING SUBSIDIARIES
not limited to the enumerated powers in § 24 Seventh and that the
Comptroller therefore has discretion to authorize activities beyond
those specifically enumerated. ' 122 So long as OCC's exercise of its
discretion in approving bank activities, whether as a part of "the busi-
ness of banking" or as "incidental" thereto, is "kept within reason-
able bounds,"1123 OCC's exercise should pass muster.
When we then address the question of whether OCC "kept within
reasonable bounds" when it approved the utilization of operating sub-
sidiaries by national banks, we are faced with a timing question. In
fact, OCC did not formally authorize this practice until 1966,124 fully
103 years after enactment of the statutory basis for that action. Such
an extended delay between enactment of the underlying legislation
and administrative promulgation of implementing and interpretive
regulation, however, is neither unique in the annals of banking law
nor, as the Supreme Court made clear in another very recent banking
law case, Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota),2 5 any impediment to ju-
dicial approval of a recently promulgated rule. 126
OCC, which treated its action in 1966 as simply confirming and cod-
ifying existing national bank authority to create operating subsidiaries,
found ample authority for that step under the "incidental powers"
provision of section 24 (Seventh) and concluded that the "stock
purchase restriction" in Glass-Steagall simply did not apply.127 Signif-
icantly, in the years thereafter, challengers have often contested the
activities of operating subsidiaries, but they have not questioned the
underlying authority of national banks to own the subsidiaries as a
general matter.128
OCC's actions in 1966 did not entirely escape critical notice in Con-
gress.' 29 Congress, however, did not then and it has not since acted to
deprive OCC of its authority to permit national banks to create and
122. Id. at 814 n.2.
123. Id.
124. Acquisition of Controlling Stock Interest in Subsidiary Operations Corporation, 31 Fed.
Reg. 11,459 (1966) (codified at 12 C.F.R. § 5.34(d)).
125. 116 S. Ct. 1730 (1996).
126. Id. at 1733.
127. Acquisition of Controlling Stock Interest in Subsidiary Operations Corporation, 31 Fed.
Reg. at 11,459.
128. See, e.g., NationsBank of North Carolina v. Variable Annuity Life Insurance Co., 115 S.
Ct. 810 (1995) (brokerage subsidiary selling variable annuities); Clarke v. Securities Indus. Ass'n,
479 U.S. 388 (1987) (acquisition and creation of bank subsidiaries offering securities discount
brokerage services); American Ins. Ass'n v. Clarke, 865 F.2d 278 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (acquisition by
bank of company offering municipal bond insurance).
129. See Federal Reserve Rulings Regarding Loan Production Offices and Purchases of Oper-
ating Subsidiaries: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Banking and Currency, 90th Cong.
(1968) [hereinafter Federal Reserve Rulings] (regulations challenged by several congressmen).
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own operating subsidiaries. 130 Indeed, in the intervening years, Con-
gress has enacted legislation acknowledging the existence of operating
subsidiaries. 131 Even more significantly, however, support for the idea
that in 1966 OCC was merely confirming an incidental power that na-
tional banks had under existing law may also be found in the language
and history of the 1927 McFadden Act,132 which is best remembered
for specifying certain requirements for the establishment of branches
by national banks but also limited banks' securities powers in certain
respects.
In the course of consideration of this legislation, questions were
raised about the conduct by national banks of safe-deposit businesses.
The legislation permitted banks to continue to engage in such busi-
ness, but it did so in a curiously backhanded fashion. It did not affirm-
atively provide that banks were empowered to conduct the safe-
deposit business through a subsidiary. Rather, it merely specified by
means of a proviso that, in carrying on such business, the bank may
not invest more than 15% of its unimpaired capital and surplus in the
capital stock of a corporation organized under state law to conduct
that business. 33 This device of limiting a bank's investment in stock
or other assets is a common one in banking law 134 and typically serves
to protect banks against loss associated with a particular activity in
which investment may be made. The safe-deposit business proviso
130. See infra notes 137-60 and accompanying text (discussing whether prior action by Con-
gress in Glass-Steagall had this effect).
131. E.g., Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-86, § 102, 101 Stat. 552,
564 (added section 23B of Federal Reserve Act); Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act
of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-320, § 410, 96 Stat. 1469, 1515 (amended section 23A of Federal Reserve
Act); Financial Institutions Regulatory and Interest Rate Control Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-
630, § 105(a), 92 Stat. 3641, 3646 (added section 5(e) of Bank Holding Company Act).
132. Ch. 191, 44 Stat. 1224 (1927).
133. The relevant language in its entirety is as follows:
Provided, That in carrying on the business commonly known as the safe-deposit busi-
ness the [bank] shall not invest in the capital stock of a corporation organized under the
law of any State to conduct a safe-deposit business in an amount in excess of 15 per
centum of the capital stock of the [bank] actually paid in and unimpaired and 15 per
centum of its unimpaired surplus.
12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh) (1994).
134. For instance, in addition to the provision of section 24 (Seventh) referred to in the next
paragraph in text, further on in section 24 (Seventh) the following may be found:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this paragraph, the [bank] may purchase for its
own account shares of stock issued by any State housing corporation incorporated in
the State in which the [bank] is located and may make investments in loans and com-
mitments for loans to any such corporation: Provided, That in no event shall the total
amount of such stock held for its own account and such investments in loans and com-
mitments made by the [bank] exceed at any time 5 per centum of its capital stock
actually paid in and unimpaired plus 5 per centum of its unimpaired surplus fund.
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necessarily assumes, because it does not itself provide, that the bank
has authority to own the stock of the corporation in which the limited
investment is made.
Note further that the 15% limitation cannot have been intended to
restrict a bank to a minority investment in a safe-deposit business cor-
poration, since the proviso speaks in terms of the bank's "carrying on"
the safe-deposit business and, in any event, an investment of 15% of a
bank's capital and surplus is surely more than enough to own a. safe-
deposit business outright. This must be contrasted to another part of
section 24 (Seventh) that permits bank investment of up to 10% of
capital and surplus in the stock of another bank or a bank holding
company and that also expressly limits the bank's investment to not
more than 5% of any class of voting stock of the other bank or hold-
ing company. 135 The absence of such an ownership percentage limita-
tion in the safe-deposit proviso is telling.
Even more telling are the House and Senate reports accompanying
the legislation, which "recognize[d]" and "affirm[ed]" the previous
use of subsidiaries to conduct a safe-deposit business.136 The conclu-
sion is thus inescapable that Congress assumed, when it enacted the
safe-deposit business proviso to section 24 (Seventh) in 1927, that
banks had preexisting authority to own subsidiaries. It is more than a
135. This part of section 24 (Seventh) states:
Provided further, That notwithstanding any other provision of this paragraph, the
[bank] may purchase for its own account shares of stock of a bank insured by the Fed-
eral Deposit Insurance Corporation or a holding company which owns or controls such
an insured bank if the stock of such bank or company is owned exclusively (except to
the extent directors' qualifying shares are required by law) by depository institutions
... [and their] officers, directors, and employees, but in no event shall the total amount
of such stock held by the [bank] in any bank or holding company exceed at any time 10
per centum of the [bank's] capital stock and paid in and unimpaired surplus and in no
event shall the purchase of such stock result in [a bank's] acquiring more than 5 per
centum of any class of voting securities of such bank or company.
Id.
136. H.R. REP. No. 69-83, at 3-4 (1926); S. REP. No. 69-473, at 7 (1926); see Federal Reserve
Rulings, supra note 129, at 29 (statement of William McChesney Martin, Jr., Chairman, Board
of Governors, Federal Reserve System) (citing H.R. REP. 69-83: "in 1927 the Congress recog-
nized the authority of national banks under the incidental powers clause to establish an [operat-
ing] subsidiary"). But see 75 CONG. REC. 9899-9904 (1932) (copy of November 6, 1911, letter of
Solicitor General to Attorney General that questioned the authority of national banks to own
subsidiaries, though apparently subsidiaries in question would be banks themselves or would
engage in activities seemingly not within the range permitted by section 24 (Seventh)). This
verbose and baffling opinion is of questionable authority, particularly in light of the Supreme
Court's recent recognition of bank securities powers and activities prior to Glass-Steagall. See
NationsBank of North Carolina v. Variable Annuity Life Insur. Co., 115 S. Ct. 810, 814 (1995).
References to this letter, however, occasionally appear in modem debates on bank authority.
See 1995 Dingell Letter, supra note 113, at 2-3.
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reach to suggest that authority to own shares of a safe-deposit com-
pany may be found in the proviso itself.
The foregoing points serve to establish that national banks have his-
torically had authority to utilize the subsidiary form as an incidental
matter in the conduct of their business, but this answers only a part of
the argument, made by Representative John Dingell and others, that
national banks presently lack such authority. These critics of OCC's
actions also contend that Glass-Steagall, enacted in 1933, served to
deprive national banks of any authority they might have had to own
the stock of other companies, including the stock of subsidiaries, un-
less Congress has affirmatively granted such authority. This is a some-
what more difficult question, but OCC again clearly has the better of
the argument.
. The full text of the provision in question, added in 1933 by section
16 of Glass-Steagall and now appearing as the fifth sentence of section
24 (Seventh), is as follows: "Except as hereinafter provided or other-
wise permitted by law, nothing herein contained shall authorize the
purchase by [a national bank] for its own account of any shares of
stock of any corporation."'1 37 Read most restrictively, this sentence
prohibits all ownership by national banks of stock of other corpora-
tions except as expressly set forth in section 24 (Seventh) or as other-
wise expressly permitted by other independent and specific statutory
grants of authority. On this restrictive reading, ownership of an oper-
ating subsidiary that is not specifically authorized by statute is flatly
prohibited. Operating subsidiaries purportedly organized or acquired
solely under the incidental powers clause are thus seen as beyond the
authority of OCC to authorize. 138
Section 24 (Seventh) itself contains a rambling collection of excep-
tions to its general proscriptive language, which includes, in addition
to the stock purchase prohibition quoted above, limitations on banks'
dealing in and underwriting of securities. 139 For instance, national
banks may own limited amounts (no more than 10% of capital) of
137. 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh).
138. This is the position taken by Representative Dingell and (though less categorically) by
the Security Industry Association in their written comments to OCC in response to its request
for comments to the Proposed Part 5 Rules. 1995 Dingell Letter, supra note 113, at 2-4; 1994
Dingell Letter, supra note 103, at 2-4; SIA Letter, supra note 103, at 14.
139. The relevant part of section 24 (Seventh) provides:
The business of dealing in securities and stock by the [bank] shall be limited to purchas-
ing and selling such securities and stock without recourse, solely upon the order, and
for the account of, customers, and in no case for its own account, and the [bank] shall
not underwrite any issue of securities or stock.
12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh).
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"investment securities," meaning debt securities, as further defined by
OCC.140 The proscriptions, moreover, do not apply to an extended
list of government-issued and -guaranteed securities. 141 Nothing in
this collection of exceptions in section 24 (Seventh) itself, however,
would save OCC's operating subsidiary concept.
Thus, the critical exception category is the second one in the stock
purchase prohibition: "except as . . . otherwise permitted by law."
This looks beyond the scope of section 24 (Seventh) itself and without
question includes the statutorily specified bank subsidiaries that OCC
refers to as "statutory subsidiaries," such as bank service corpora-
tions.142 According to the most restrictive view, this is all that the
second exception includes. Power to own any other kind of subsidiary
that banks might have had as a matter of their incidental powers was
thus, on this view, eliminated when Congress enacted the "stock
purchase prohibition" in 1933.143
Another way to characterize this branch of the restrictive argument
is that Congress, by its action in 1933, implicitly repealed any existing
authority to utilize subsidiaries under the incidental powers clause. It
certainly did not repeal such authority expressly. Of course, any sug-
gestion that the stock purchase prohibition of Glass-Steagall implicitly
repealed preexisting authority of banks to conduct business in the sub-
sidiary form collides with the general rule of statutory construction
that implicit repeals are disfavored. 44 There is, however, no need to
deal further with the maxim against implicit repeals, and its attendant
convolutions and exceptions, since there is a better reading (actually
two possible readings) of the meaning of the stock purchase prohibi-
tion that leaves intact preexisting incidental powers authority to con-
duct business through subsidiaries.
140. Id.
141. Examples include obligations of the United States, general obligations of a state or polit-
ical subdivision of a state, and certain obligations of others that are insured by the Secretary of
Housing and Urban Development. Id.
142. OCC defines "statutory subsidiaries" to be corporations a national bank may own by
virtue of some express statutory provision, see supra note 57, such as 12 U.S.C. § 24 (agricultural
credit corporations), 12 U.S.C. §§ 601, 618 (foreign branching and banking corporations), and 12
U.S.C. § 1861 (bank service corporations); and 15 U.S.C. § 682(d) (1994) (small business invest-
ment companies).
143. As Representative Dingell would have it:
Congress... added the stock purchase prohibition.., to make it clear that, if national
banks had any pre-existing authority to own corporate stock (including affiliates or
subsidiaries), that authority was extinguished, except as expressly provided by statute.
1995 Dingell Letter, supra note 113, at 3.
144. See NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUcTION
§ 23.10 (5th ed. 1993).
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The stock purchase prohibition of Glass-Steagall section 16 states
that, except as permitted under the two categories of exceptions dis-
cussed above, "nothing herein contained" permits a bank to purchase
stock of any other corporation. Read cold, the quoted words are a
rather peculiar way to express the concept that banks are broadly pro-
hibited from buying stock of other corporations. What did the draft-
ers of those three words have in mind? Two readings seem possible.
One is that "herein" refers to all of section 24 (Seventh) and the other
is that "herein" refers to the provisions added to section 24 (Seventh)
by section 16 of Glass-Steagall. OCC obviously prefers the latter
reading 145 and for a variety of reasons, including the statutory history
of Glass-Steagall section 16 and the implications of other parts of
Glass-Steagall and existing law, that reading is superior.
Statutory history suggests that the words "nothing herein con-
tained" were inserted into early versions of the House and Senate bills
that ultimately became Glass-Steagall to limit the impact of a state
bank powers parity provision that appeared in all versions of the stat-
ute prior to the final version that emerged from the conference be-
tween representatives of the House and Senate. The deleted
provision granted national banks the power to engage
in all forms of banking business and [to undertake] all types of
banking transactions that may, by the laws of the State in which
such bank is situated, be permitted to banks... incorporated under
the laws of such State, except insofar as they may be forbidden by
the provisions of any Act of Congress.146
This broad grant of powers would have, among other things, permit-
ted national banks to take advantage of state banking laws that al-
lowed state banks to invest in corporate securities in a fashion that
Glass-Steagall sought to prevent. The words "nothing herein con-
145. See OCC Response to Dingell, supra note 57, at 1-2. The response states:
The 1933 Act [Glass-Steagall] spelled out in greater detail what types of securities activ-
ities were permissible for national banks. It added a new sentence to 12 U.S.C. § 24
(Seventh): "Except as hereinafter provided or otherwise permitted by law, nothing
herein contained shall authorize the purchase [by the bank] of any shares of stock of
any corporation." This disclaimer sentence clarified that nothing in the changes being
made to 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh), i.e., "nothing herein contained", should be deemed
to increase banks' existing stock-ownership authority, "except as hereinafter provided",
i.e., except as the stock-ownership authority was increased by language added following
the disclaimer in 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh). The disclaimer sentence, by saying that the
1933 Act changes were not intended to increase or decrease banks' stock-ownership
authority in 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh), in effect confirmed that authority and left it
intact.
Id.
146. S. 1631, 73d Cong. § 16 (1933); H.R. 5661, 73d Cong. § 14 (1933); see S. REP. No. 73-77,
at 16 (1933); H.R. REP. No. 73-150, at 3, 18 (1933).
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tained" thus served to give national banks most of the general benefits
of the state parity provision without undoing Glass-Steagall's new lim-
itations on their securities investment powers. The Conference Com-
mittee, however, deleted the parity provision but failed to delete as
well the stock purchase prohibition perhaps because that prohibition
had some additional applicability due to the investment securities pro-
vision also added by Glass-Steagall section 16.147
In any event, the authority of banks to create and own operating
subsidiaries under the incidental powers clause predated and thus sur-
vived adoption of the stock purchase prohibition in 1933. As already
noted, 148 prior to 1933 Congress acknowledged and confirmed that
particular exercise of incidental power. As a result, banks were
plainly "otherwise permitted by law" to have operating subsidiaries,
which were accordingly not captured by the "nothing herein con-
tained" wording of the stock purchase prohibition.
Added support for this conclusion may be found elsewhere in
Glass-Steagall itself. Section 14 of that Act 149 added a provision (sec-
tion 24A) to the Federal Reserve Act that limits the extent of a bank's
investment in the stock of a corporation that owns the bank's prem-
ises.150 Section 14 does not itself authorize a bank to own such stock.
It merely regulates the manner in which (the extent to which) the
bank owns such stock and accordingly assumes that the bank is al-
ready empowered to own the stock. Section 14 is thus very much like
the safe-deposit business proviso added to section 24 (Seventh) in
1927.151 Both demonstrate congressional acknowledgment of the pre-
existing power of banks to own stock of other corporations in the con-
duct of their business. In both cases that power must arise from the
incidental powers clause. In neither case does the "nothing contained
147. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
148. See supra notes 133-36 and accompanying text.
149. 12 U.S.C. § 371 (1994).
150. Section 14 of the Act provides:
No national bank, without the approval of the Comptroller of the Currency, and no
State member bank [that is, no state-chartered bank that is a member of the Federal
Reserve System], without the approval of the Board of Governors of the Federal Re-
serve System, shall (1) invest in bank premises, or in the stock, bonds, debentures, or
other such obligations of any corporation holding the premises of such bank, or (2)
make loans to or upon the security of the stock of any such corporation, if the aggre-
gate of all such investments and loans, together with the amount of any indebtedness
incurred by any such corporation which is an affiliate of the bank, as defined in section
221a of this title, will exceed the amount of the capital stock of such bank.
Id. (emphasis added).
151. See supra notes 133-36 and accompanying text.
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herein" language of Glass-Steagall section 16 take back what the inci-
dental powers clause of the original National Bank Act grants.
Indeed, the underlying structure of the regulatory scheme imposed
with enactment of Glass-Steagall is rife with bank subsidiary elements
without any express authority (other than the incidental powers
clause) for bank ownership of subsidiaries, starting with the very defi-
nition of "affiliate" in section 2(b), 152 which includes any entity "of
which a member bank, directly or indirectly, owns or controls . . . a
majority of the voting shares."'1 53 If the stock purchase prohibition of
Glass-Steagall section 16 was a blanket bar on bank ownership of sub-
sidiaries, such a definition would have been unnecessary and even
nonsensical. This definition is expressly cross-referenced, for instance,
in Glass-Steagall section 20, which is the key limitation in that Act on
bank affiliation with any organization "principally engaged" in the un-
derwriting of securities. 154 That limitation by its terms thus applies to
bank subsidiaries. It, too, is a regulatory and not an enabling provi-
sion. What it purports to regulate (subsidiaries of banks) must accord-
ingly be otherwise authorized.
Other legislative history of Glass-Steagall supports the conclusion
that the Act did not eliminate banks' preexisting authority to own sub-
sidiaries. One might argue that it is appropriate to find that the stock
purchase prohibition of section 16 was intended by Congress to repeal
that authority, notwithstanding the lack of express language to that
effect, if such a result would serve the broad underlying purposes of
Glass-Steagall. Such is plainly not the case here. Glass-Steagall was
clearly aimed at a very different problem-the perception by many in
Congress that bank speculation in the securities markets was responsi-
ble for the numerous bank failures that occurred after the Crash. 155
In enacting Glass-Steagall, Congress tried to achieve a degree of sepa-
ration between investment and commercial banking that would insu-
late commercial banks from the dangers associated with such
152. 12 U.S.C. § 221a(b).
153. Id. § 221a(b)(1) (emphasis added). All national banks are "member banks." Id. § 221.
154. Id. § 377. This section states:
After one year from June 16, 1933, no member bank shall be affiliated in any manner
described in subsection (b) of section 221a of this title [section 2(b) of the Act] with any
corporation, association, business trust, or other similar organization engaged princi-
pally in the issue, flotation, underwriting, public sale, or distribution at wholesale or
retail or through syndicate participation of stocks, bonds, debentures, notes or other
securities ....
Id.
155. See, e.g., Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Investment Co. Inst., 450 U.S. 46, 61
(1981); Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 716 F.2d 92, 97
(2d Cir. 1983), affd, 468 U.S. 207 (1984).
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speculation and other risky securities activities, 156 including, of course,
any such risks arising from securities activities carried on by bank se-
curities subsidiaries. 157
One searches the legislative history in vain, however, for any sug-
gestion that Congress intended in Glass-Steagall to limit bank utiliza-
tion of subsidiaries in the conduct of their business as a general
matter. A bank's acquisition of the stock of an operating subsidiary is
a far cry from investing depositors' funds in speculative securities. As
Fed Chairman William M. Martin testified in connection with an ear-
lier congressional investigation of the use of operating subsidiaries,
society errs if it presumes that Congress intended to reverse its 1927
confirmation of bank authority to own operating subsidiaries when it
enacted the Depression-era legislation dealing with quite different is-
sues.158 Indeed, in dealing with the securities speculation issues at the
heart of Glass-Steagall, Congress did so in a manner that contem-
plates that banks do possess authority to own subsidiaries. Section 20
regulates bank affiliation (which as a matter of statutory definition
plainly includes affiliation with bank subsidiaries' 59) with organiza-
tions engaged in securities underwriting (prohibiting affiliation with
organizations "engaged principally" in underwriting but permitting af-
filiations where such "engagement" is less than "principal"160 ), but it
does not itself authorize the creation of any such subsidiary.
Thus, it seems clear that banks do have general authority, under the
incidental powers clause, to create and own operating subsidiaries and
that any suggestion that the stock purchase prohibition in Glass-Stea-
gall section 16 was intended to or does deny that authority overshoots
the proscriptive mark of that provision. It simply proves too much. 161
156. Commercial bank involvement in "speculation in corporate stocks" was "high on the list
of abuses" that Glass-Steagall was intended to correct. Federal Reserve Rulings, supra note 129,
at 30 (statement of William M. Martin, Jr., Chairman, Board of Governors, Federal Reserve
System); see S. Rep. No. 73-77, at 11 (1933) (after citing "constitutional weaknesses" of banks in
the conduct of their business, the report notes that legislation would deal with this by, inter alia,
"[m]ore careful restriction of investments"); S. REP. No. 72-584, at 11 (1932) (similar report
concerning predecessor bill); 77 CONG. REc. 3924 (1933) (debating whether Congress should
pass legislation to prevent banks from engaging in "wild speculation" with depositors' funds); 76
CONG. REC. 2401 (1933) (stating that the purpose of legislation's drafters was "to prohibit the
national banks from dealing in securities that could not be very readily convertible and that
would be likely to be frozen in their hands").
157. See 75 CONG. REC. 9911 (1932); WILLIAM N. PEACH, WALL STREET AND THE SECURITIES
MARKETS: THE SECURrrY AFFILIATEs OF NATIONAL BANKS 18 (1941).
158. Federal Reserve Rulings, supra note 129, at 30.
159. See supra notes 152-54 and accompanying text.
160. See supra notes 77-86 and accompanying text.
161. In addition to the many points raised in text there is yet another problem with a broad
reading of section 16 to prohibit bank ownership of any shares of stock of any other corporation
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Particularly in light of the substantial deference that the Supreme
Court has held that federal courts owe to OCC's interpretation of the
meaning of the National Bank Act, 162 such a broad interpretation as is
urged by opponents of the New Part 5 Rules will surely fail if litigated.
IV. MAY BANKS OWN LESS THAN 80% OF OPERATING
SUBSIDIARIES? MUST OPERATING SUBSIDIARIES
BE CORPORATIONS?
OCC's rationale for decreasing the amount of voting stock in the
operating subsidiary that a bank must own from "at least 80 percent"
in the Old Part 5 Rules163 to "more than 50 percent" in the Proposed
Part 5 Rules 64 and for further loosening the degree of control to
either "more than 50 percent" or when the "bank otherwise controls
the subsidiary" in the New Part 5 Rules 65 is that banks would thereby
be afforded greater "flexibility" in structuring their operating subsidi-
aries.' 66 Flexibility, in this context, generally refers to organizational
structures that are more attractive to potential minority investors in
operating subsidiaries who bring useful assets to the table. Decreasing
the bank's ownership requirement would no doubt attract interest
from other businesses with significant marketing and technical exper-
tise and other resources that could assist the operating subsidiary in
entering or creating new markets or in improving its existing products
and services. A substantial (though still not controlling) interest in an
operating subsidiary would no doubt be more appealing to at least
except as expressly permitted in other statutes. It would seem to call into question bank owner-
ship of stock that is acquired by the bank through foreclosure or similar procedure in connection
with its lending business. See supra note 57.
162. See, e.g., Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota), 116 S. Ct. 1730, 1733 (1996); VALIC, 115 S.
Ct. 810, 813 (1995).
163. 12 C.F.R. § 5.34(c) (1996).
164. Rules, Policies, and Procedures for Corporate Activities, 59 Fed. Reg. at 61,056 (Pro-
posed Part 5 Rules § 5.34(d)(2)). In addition, no other party could "control" the operating sub-
sidiary. Id.
165. Rules, Policies, and Procedures for Corporate Activities, 61 Fed. Reg. 60,341, 60,374
(1996) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 5.34(d)(2)). For instance, a bank holding less than a major-
ity of voting stock in an operating subsidiary might nonetheless achieve effective control of the
subsidiary by other means, such as by provisions appearing in a contract or in the subsidiary's
charter or bylaws. In such instances, however, no other party could hold more than 50% of the
voting interest in the operating subsidiary. Id.
166. Rules, Policies, and Procedures for Corporate Activities, 61 Fed. Reg. at 60,349; Rules,
Policies, and Procedures for Corporate Activities, 59 Fed. Reg. at 61,039. Because of the possi-
bility that other parties could obtain a larger measure of ownership interest under the proposed
and new rules, OCC stressed that the bank must in any event retain "control" or "effective
control" over the operating subsidiary. Rules, Policies, and Procedures for Corporate Activities,
61 Fed. Reg. at 60,349-50; Rules, Policies, and Procedures for Corporate Activities, 59 Fed. Reg.
at 61,039.
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some potential investors whose participation is eagerly sought by
banks.
A number of prominent bankers have said recently that affiliating
with a technologically advanced partner (perhaps a telecommunica-
tions or media business) would be a desirable means of remaining
current with technological changes that could be useful to providers of
financial services, resulting, for example, in on-line banking or data
processing services that are markedly better than what banks offer
today.167
In addition, putting aside for the moment (until Part V) the ques-
tion of new kinds of activities for operating subsidiaries, at the very
least the greater organizational flexibility in the conduct of traditional
businesses afforded by the new rules promises to increase their utiliza-
tion by banks and to augment bank profitability. Banks often favor
conducting activities related to banking within their operating subsidi-
aries rather than within subsidiaries of their bank holding company
parents because the banks enjoy more direct control over their own
subsidiaries than those of indirect affiliates and because of cost savings
attainable in the operating subsidiary structure.168 This expansion and
167. See Bankers Support Leach Bill, with Caveats, supra note 39 (Lewis W. Coleman, Vice
Chairman and Chief Financial Officer of BankAmerica Corporation, stating that Bank of
America seeks more "flexibility to affiliate with potential technology partners so that it can be
competitive in providing financial services in a new era of electronic commerce"); John L. Doug-
las, OCC Op Sub Letter Facilitates Investments in Technology Companies, 1 ELEc. BANKING L. &
COM. REP. 18 (1996); Nicholas Bray & Paul B. Carroll, Banks Go to the Source To Cut Phone
Bills: Communications Companies Find Allies in Major Customers, WALL ST. J., Oct. 6, 1995, at
A10.
In this connection, others have noted that changes in the kinds of services that financial in-
termediaries (including banks) offer have in large part been driven by technological change. See
74 Fed. Res. Bull. 91 (1988) (statement of Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Board of Governors,
Federal Reserve System); Isaac & Fein, supra note 19, at 292-93; Macey, supra note 19, at 206-07.
168. See Olaf de Senerpont Domis, Green Light for Banks To Sidestep Holding Cos., AM.
BANKER, Nov. 21, 1996, at 1 (Proposed Part 5 Rules "expected to markedly reduce the expenses
that banking companies now rack up in such fields as securities underwriting and data process-
ing"; one banking organization (Norwest Corp.) forecast by Lehman Brothers analyst Michael
Mayo expects to save $100 million of annual expenses from changes); Letter from Michael E.
Bleier, General Counsel, Mellon Bank, N.A., to OCC 2 (Jan. 26, 1995) (on file with the DePaul
Law Review) (speaking of the Proposed Part 5 Rules: "Should the proposed amendments be
adopted, many banks may begin to conduct activity through operating subsidiaries rather than as
subsidiaries of the related bank holding company. Such a change in operating structure often
results in lower funding costs for the operating subsidiary."); Letter from Michael J. Halloran,
Group Executive Vice President and General Counsel, Bank of America, to OCC 6 (Jan. 27,
1995) (on file with the DePaul Law Review) [hereinafter Halloran Letter] (in general, operating
subsidiaries "provide substantially more efficient funding capabilities for a bank's activities than
are possible with a non-subsidiary affiliate" and "permit bank management to maintain a closer
control over its activities than can be maintained when the activities are conducted by a non-
subsidiary affiliate").
688 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:651
proliferation of operating subsidiaries should result in more profitable
and efficiently run banks.1 69
Moreover, simply reducing the voting share ownership requirement
was not the only possible means that OCC might propose by regula-
tion for increasing organizational flexibility. There was no immedi-
ately apparent reason why banks had to conduct activities generally
found in operating subsidiaries in the corporate form of business or-
ganization to the exclusion of many others, such as limited liability
companies, limited partnerships, and limited liability partnerships.
When OCC requested public comment on these further possible ele-
ments of organizational flexibility in connection with the Proposed
Part 5 Rules, 170 numerous banks and other interested parties re-
sponded favorably with innovative proposals for organizational
form.17'
169. See de Senerpont Domis, supra note 168, at 1.
170. Rules, Policies, and Procedures for Corporate Activities, 59 Fed. Reg. at 61,039.
171. In their comments to OCC on the Proposed Part 5 Rules, banks, industry organizations,
and lawyers associated with them endorsed such alternative business organization forms as lim-
ited partnerships, limited liability companies and formal joint ventures and suggested further
that majority voting stock ownership was not necessary where the corporate form is adopted.
Letter from Walter C. Ayers, representing Virginia Bankers Association, to OCC 1 (Feb. 7,
1995) (on file with the DePaul Law Review) (proposing that OCC amend regulations to allow
bank ownership of operating subsidiaries formed as limited liability companies and ownership by
operating subsidiary of less than majority control of separate limited liability company); Letter
from Jill M. Considine, President, New York Clearing House, to OCC 12-13 (Feb. 15, 1995) (on
file with the DePaul Law Review) (endorsing bank operating subsidiaries formed as limited lia-
bility companies and permitting bank ownership of less than a majority of voting stock of subsid-
iaries); Letter from Forrest S. FitzRoy, Senior Vice President and General Counsel, Boatmen's
Bancshares, Inc., to OCC 2 (Jan. 27, 1995) (on file with the DePaul Law Review) (urging OCC
approval of bank operating subsidiaries in forms of limited liability companies and limited part-
nerships); Letter from Roman J. Gerber, Executive Vice President, Bank One Corporation, to
OCC 7 (Jan. 27, 1995) (on file with the DePaul Law Review) (recommending OCC authorize
banks to utilize limited liability companies and joint ventures as operating subsidiaries and own-
ership of less than majority of voting stock); Halloran Letter, supra note 168, at 7-8 (endorsing
alternative business organization forms of a joint venture, limited liability company, and limited
partnership as alternatives for operating subsidiaries); Letter from William H. McDavid, Gen-
eral Counsel, Chemical Bank, to OCC 4 (Feb. 2, 1995) (on file with the DePaul Law Review) (in
support of allowing bank use of joint ventures and limited liability companies as operating sub-
sidiaries and less than majority ownership of voting stock); Letter from Leo F. Mullin, President
and Chief Operating Officer, The First National Bank of Chicago, to OCC 2 (Jan. 27, 1995) (on
file with the DePaul Law Review) (encouraging greater opportunities for banks by allowing
banks to establish operating subsidiaries in limited liability company form); Letter from Charles
A. Neale, Counsel, National Bank of Commerce, to OCC 2 (Jan. 30, 1995) (on file with the De
Paul Law Review) (limited liability company); Letter from E. Norman Veasey, Chair, Section of
Business Law, American Bar Association, and Harold B. Finn 1I1, Co-Chair, Banking Law Com-
mittee, Section of Business Law, American Bar Association, to OCC 9 (Feb. 2, 1995) (on file
with the DePaul Law Review) (recommending operating subsidiaries in forms of limited liability
companies, limited partnerships, and joint ventures); Letter from David Wells, Operations Of-
ficer, First National Bank of Omaha, to OCC 2 (Jan. 25, 1995) (on file with the DePaul Law
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OCC responded to these comments by modifying its proposal to
provide that "an operating subsidiary in which a national bank may
invest includes a corporation, limited liability company, or similar en-
tity.' 172 It concluded that these additional forms provided safe alter-
natives to the corporation and enhanced the flexibility of banks in
structuring their operations to take advantage of the unique tax and
limited liability features available in them.173
In fact, neither use of a non-corporate form as an operating subsidi-
ary nor bank ownership of less than 80%, or even less than a majority,
of an operating subsidiary corporation's voting stock is a radical new
idea. Prior to publication of the Proposed Part 5 Rules, OCC had
already approved at least one bank application proposing a limited
liability company for conducting operating subsidiary activities. 174 In
a similar vein, OCC's original formalization of its approval of the op-
erating subsidiary concept in 1966 required that the bank have "con-
trol" of its operating subsidiary and provided that such control would
"ordinarily" be achieved though ownership of "51 percent or more of
the voting stock."' 75 It also noted even then, however, that a bank
could, "under appropriate circumstances," maintain "effective work-
Review) (proposing that the limited liability company form be included as a permissible form of
operating subsidiary for banks); Letter from John D. Wright, Vice President and Senior Counsel,
Wells Fargo Bank, to OCC 2 (Jan. 27, 1995) (on file with the DePaul Law Review) (suggesting
the OCC interpret the revised rules as permitting banks to utilize limited partnerships as operat-
ing subsidiaries).
172. Rules, Policies, and Procedures for Corporate Activities, 61 Fed. Reg. 60,341, 60,374
(1996) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 5.34(d)(2)).
173. In its commentary accompanying the New Part 5 Rules, the OCC observed:
LLCs and other similar entities, e.g., business trusts, have recently emerged in many
states as an alternative to the corporate form of ownership. These entities are hybrid
business organizations with characteristics of corporations (limited liability) and part-
nerships (tax treatment). As such, the entities have certain key attributes of corpora-
tions and joint ventures that the OCC has long permitted banks to participate in-bank
control of the entity and limitation or insulation of the bank's liability for the entity's
activities. Authorizing investment in these and similar types of entities as operating
subsidiaries increases the flexibility of national banks to structure their operations.
Moreover, to date, the OCC's experience with LLCs has not revealed any additional
risks unique to these entities.
Id. at 60,350.
174. OCC Interpretive Letter No. 645 [1994 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) T
83,554 (Apr. 29, 1994) (granting approval of LLC Formation).
175. Acquisition of Controlling Stock Interest in Subsidiary Operations, 31 Fed. Reg. 11,459
(1966). "The Comptroller of the Currency has confirmed his position that a national bank may
acquire and hold the controlling stock interest in a subsidiary operations corporation. . . The
controlling interesting is ordinarily 51 percent or more of the voting stock issued by the corpora-
tion ...... Id.
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ing control" of an operating subsidiary with less than 51% of its voting
stock.176
Indeed, OCC has already approved several bank proposals for op-
erating subsidiary activity in which the bank has less than a controlling
interest 177 and others in which the operating subsidiary itself owns less
than a controlling interest in a business that is part of, or incidental to,
the business of banking.178
These various organizational form and control approaches reflect
the needs and ingenuity of banking organizations in finding ways to
enter into joint and cooperative arrangements with nonbank service
providers. 179 In each case, OCC was satisfied that the enterprise in
which the investment is to be made would engage in activities that are
a part of, or incidental to, the business of banking and that the invest-
ment would be reasonably safe. 180
These parts of the New Part 5 Rules, the flexibility of form and
reduction of ownership elements, have attracted significantly less op-
position than the idea that operating subsidiaries may be able to en-
gage in some activities that are off-limits for banks. Indeed, if one
accepts OCC's original rationale for formalizing its approval of the
operating subsidiary concept, which is that share ownership that fur-
thers the business of banking is incidental to the business of banking
and that Glass-Steagall section 16 did not impair the rights of national
banks to utilize operating subsidiaries for this purpose,18' then it is
176. Id. "The controlling stock interest ... may be a lesser percentage [less than 51%] of
voting stock if, under appropriate circumstances, such lesser percentage constitutes effective
working control of the corporation." Id.
177. OCC Interpretive Letter No. 677 [1994-1995 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep.
(CCH) 83,625 (June 25, 1995) (operating subsidiaries of two national banks purchased com-
pany that develops and markets personal financial management software and other nonfinancial
software, including games); Letter of James J. Saxon, Comptroller of the Currency (Oct. 12,
1966), reported in Douglas, supra note 167, at 19 (bank permitted to acquire minority interest in
credit card clearinghouse owned by other institutions).
178. Douglas, supra note 167, at 18 (citing Letter from Steven J. Weiss, Deputy Comptroller,
Bank Organization and Structure, to Robert Andersen (Jan. 26, 1996), stating that operating
subsidiaries of affiliated banks may be permitted to invest in existing holding company that oper-
ates merchant credit card processing business; operating subsidiaries' investments made in form
of contribution of banks' own merchant credit card businesses to holding company; operating
subsidiaries' aggregate equity interest only 40% at outset, subject to further significant dilution
in projected public offering; other initial investors include venture capital fund, telecommunica-
tions company and holding company management); OCC Interpretive Letter No. 689 [1995-1996
Transfer Binder] Fed. L. Rep. (CCH) $ 81,004 (Aug. 9, 1995) (operating subsidiary shares equity
interest in merchant services company with subsidiary of existing nonbank merchant services
company).
179. See Douglas, supra note 167, at 18-19.
180. See id. at 19.
181. See supra notes 137-60 and accompanying text.
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difficult to see anything magical about the corporate form or about
the 80% or even majority voting control elements.
The most significant argument in opposition to abandonment of the
80% requirement is that a lesser requirement is inconsistent with what
the opposition (chiefly the securities industry) characterizes as the his-
torical OCC justification for permitting banks to own stock of operat-
ing subsidiaries-that the operating subsidiary is merely an
"incorporated department" of the bank, doing no more than what the
bank is authorized to do.182 If another investor in the operating sub-
sidiary has a sufficiently large equity interest, that investor could have
such influence on the conduct of the affairs of the operating subsidiary
that it would no longer be acting like a mere department of the
bank.183
This argument proves too much since even a 20% minority investor
could, through blocking or other veto-like provisions in the operating
subsidiary's charter or bylaws, or in a separate shareholders or operat-
ing agreement, achieve significant influence over the conduct of the
business.'8 4 OCC was aware of this potential problem when it final-
ized the new rules, which require that the bank have a stated equity
interest (more than 50%) or otherwise achieve effective control and
that, in the latter case, no other person controls more than 50% of the
voting interest of the operating subsidiary. 185
182. See SIA Letter, supra note 103, at 20-21. The letter states:
We respectfully submit that proposed § 5.34(d)(2) is inconsistent with the restriction in
§ 24 (Seventh) prohibiting a national bank from purchasing the stock of any corpora-
tion.... [T]he prior justification utilized by the OCC to permit national banks to own
shares of an operating subsidiary is that such a subsidiary is merely an incorporated
department of the national bank. Based on this theory, the OCC consistently has re-
quired an operating subsidiary [sic-national bank] to own at least 80% of the stock of
an operating subsidiary. By reducing the percentage to 50%, proposed § 5.34(d)(2)
would permit a national bank to own shares of a corporation that no longer operated as
a division of the bank. In this regard, we note that other shareholders of the corpora-
tion also could own a substantial percentage of the stock of that corporation, and thus
could have at least the power to influence control of the corporation. Indeed, to the
extent that the corporation's constituent documents contained "super-majority" voting
or various other types of provisions, even a higher percentage of ownership by the
parent bank could be insufficient to assure that the bank could exercise control of the
company. In such a case, another person could have a "blocking" impact on corporate
actions.
Id.
183. Id.
184. Indeed a nonshareholder can achieve this kind of blocking power by contract. Percent-
age of ownership is not the issue here.
185. See Rules, Policies, and Procedures for Corporate Activities, 61 Fed. Reg. 60,341, 60,349-
50 (1996) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 5).
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In any event, this particular argument against the abandonment of
the 80% ownership requirement cannot be analyzed in isolation from
the rest of the proposed rules. The argument rests upon the assump-
tion that an operating subsidiary is legitimate only if it acts as if it
were merely a department of the bank. The force of the argument
against abandoning the 80% ownership requirement, such as it is, es-
sentially disappears if the more controversial part of the proposed
rules, the part that contemplates operating subsidiaries engaging in
activities that banks may not undertake, is valid. If that part survives
judicial scrutiny, then an operating subsidiary need not act as if it were
merely an incorporated department of the bank. Thus, the Article
segues to the main point of contention.
V. WHAT (ELSE) MAY OPERATING SUBSIDIARIES Do?
There has been considerable debate on this issue,186 but it has not
been definitively settled.'8 7 To Representative James Leach, Chair-
man of the House Banking Committee and author of several related
bills intended to enact significant statutory reform in the current and
prior terms of Congress,188 the Proposed Part 5 Rules were clearly
contrary to existing law189 and would undermine or circumvent legis-
lation dealing with holding companies.1 90 He also believes that, in any
event, the proposed rules are unwise since risky, nonbanking activities
that newly liberated operating subsidiaries might undertake could
186. See SYMONS & WHITE, supra note 19, at 353-55 (for a summary of arguments on this
point).
187. It has been suggested, for instance, that the 1982 amendments to the Bank Service Cor-
poration Act, codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1861-65 (1994), which permit bank service corporations to
engage in activities closely related to banking as bank subsidiaries, could be interpreted to mean
that Congress has erased the distinction between bank subsidiaries and holding company subsid-
iaries in terms of what activities they may engage in, including activities not permitted to banks
themselves, though Professors Symons and White also survey reasons why the distinction be-
tween what these two categories of bank organization affiliates (bank subsidiaries and bank
holding company subsidiaries) may or should be maintained. Id. at 353-55.
188. Financial Services Competitiveness Act of 1997, H.R. 10, 105th Cong. (1996); Financial
Services Competitiveness Act of 1995, H.R. 1062, 104th Cong. (originally H.R. 18); Financial
Institutions Regulatory Relief Act of 1995, H.R. 1362, 104th Cong.; Financial Services Competi-
tiveness and Regulatory Relief Act of 1995, H.R. 2520, 104th Cong.
189. See Leach Blasts Comptroller's Office for Exceeding Statutory Authority, 66 Banking
Rep. (BNA) 391 (Mar. 11, 1996), available in LEXIS, BNA Library, BNABus File [hereinafter
Leach Blasts Comptroller's Office]. Indeed, Representative Leach has stated publicly that there
"is not a shred of statutory support for the notion that a national bank is authorized to conduct
activities in a subsidiary that are not permissible for the bank itself." See Atkins, supra note 8, at
729. Representative Dingell, former head of the House Commerce Committee and a legislator
with a long-standing interest in banking legislation, has agreed. See id.
190. See William M. Isaac, A Rebuttal to Rep. Leach on Comptroller's Moves, AM. BANKER,
Mar. 28, 1996, at 4.
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jeopardize the federal deposit insurance system' 91 and are plainly con-
trary to long-standing OCC policy and practice. 192 The Securities In-
dustry Association, a likely complainant in a judicial challenge to the
New Part 5 Rules, expressed similar views in its comments to OCC
concerning the proposed rules.193
A. Preliminary Considerations
In considering these arguments about the authority of OCC to grant
permission to operating subsidiaries to engage in new business activi-
ties, it is important to keep two things in mind at the outset: (i) the
narrow scope of activities in which an operating subsidiary may en-
gage under the New Part 5 Rules beyond those permitted to its parent
bank and (ii) the fact that operating subsidiaries have engaged in ac-
tivities prohibited to banks for some time without any difficulty or
fanfare.
1. Limited Scope
While the New Part 5 Rules contemplate the possibility of OCC
approval, on a case-by-case basis, of operating subsidiary activities
that are "different from that permitted for its parent [national]
bank,' 94 the scope of such activities is somewhat more limited than
the alarmed expressions of concern would seem to suggest. For in-
stance, one will not see national banks or their operating subsidiaries
making use of the new rules to acquire, for example, a toaster manu-
facturer because the activities of the manufacturer would not be "a
part of or incidental to the business of banking" (or otherwise permit-
ted by statute), as required by the New Part 5 Rules. 95
Moreover, OCC has committed in the new rules "to ensure that any
new activities are conducted safely and soundly.' 96 OCC has re-
tained its general authority to impose conditions on its approval of
any application that it determines may be appropriate under the cir-
191. See Atkins, supra note 8, at 729. Senate Banking Committee Chairman Alphonse
D'Amato has strongly criticized the New Part 5 Rules as unwise, because they may expose feder-
ally insured banks to "excessive risks," and ill-timed, since they may impede broad. legislative
reform. See Campbell, supra note 12.
192. See Atkins, supra note 8, at 4.
193. SIA Letter, supra note 103, at 14-33.
194. Rules, Policies, and Procedures for Corporate Activities, 61 Fed. Reg. 60,341, 60,351
(1996).
195. Rules, Policies, and Procedures for Corporate Activities, 12 C.F.R. § 5.34(d)(2) (1996).
196. Rules, Policies, and Procedures for Corporate Activities, 61 Fed. Reg. at 60,351.
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cumstances for assuring safe and sound banking practices. 197 Further-
more, if OCC later determines that the operation of the subsidiary is
in violation of law or regulation or that the manner of operation of the
subsidiary is unsafe or unsound or otherwise threatens the safety or
soundness of the bank, OCC has committed that it will direct "the
bank or operating subsidiary to take appropriate remedial action," in-
cluding disposition or liquidation of the subsidiary or discontinuation
of the offending activity.198
In any event, the parent bank's exposure to loss as a result of the
activities of its operating subsidiary is further reduced by the new
rules' limitations on investments that the bank may make in the oper-
ating subsidiary. The new rules impose the standards of section 23A
of the Federal Reserve Act' 99 where the operating subsidiary is engag-
ing as a principal in an activity approved under New Part 5 Rules sec-
tion 5.34(f), the provision dealing with activities that the parent bank
may not conduct. The imported standards of section 23A limit a
bank's investment in and loans to a bank affiliate to 10% of the bank's
capital and surplus. 200
197. Id. at 60,366 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 5.13(a)(1)); see id. at 60,353-54 (stating that
OCC "has available a number of measures to address safety and soundness issues that may arise
in connection with activities conducted under the authority of this section [5.34]," one of which
was authority to "impose appropriate conditions in connection with the approval of a particular
operating subsidiary application in order to ensure bank safety and soundness"); id. at 60,354
(stating that "OCC retains the authority to impose additional safeguards, either on a case-by-
case or activity-by-activity basis, to address safety and soundness issues presented by particular
types of operations").
198. 12 C.F.R. § 5.34(d)(3)). OCC also noted in its commentary to the New Part 5 Rules, see
Rules, Policies, and Procedures for Corporate Activities, 61 Fed. Reg. at 60,354, that the new
rules serve to emphasize and promote the separate identity of the operating subsidiary and thus
to insulate, as a legal matter, the parent bank from problems that may arise in connection with
activities of the operating subsidiary, see id. at 60,376 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 5.34(0(2)).
Finally, OCC observed that its ability to monitor and supervise operating subsidiaries and re-
spond to any problems that might arise in connection with them has been strengthened by a
number of recently enacted laws, including, inter alia, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpora-
tion Improvement Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-242, 105 Stat. 2236, which enables it to take
prompt corrective action where banks fail to meet capital requirements, including ordering di-
vestiture of a subsidiary if it poses a significant risk to the bank. Id. at 60,354-55.
199. 12 U.S.C. § 371c (1994). The standards of this provision of the Federal Reserve Act, as
well as section 23B of that Act, id. § 371c-1 (requiring transactions with bank affiliates to be
conducted only "on terms and under circumstances.., that are substantially the same, or at least
as favorable to such bank or its subsidiary, as those prevailing at the time for comparable trans-
actions with or involving other nonaffiliated companies;" id. § 371c-l(a)(1)(A) (1994), are incor-
porated into the New Part 5 Rules and must be applied by OCC with respect to transactions
between a bank and its operating subsidiary under the terms of 12 C.F.R.§ 5.34(0(3). See Rules,
Policies, and Procedures for Corporate Activities, 61 Fed. Reg. at 60,354.
200. 12 U.S.C. § 371c(a)(1)(A).
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In other words, any such new or differing activities approved under
the New Part 5 Rules would have to be a reasonable part of the mod-
ern conception of the business of banking and could not be likely to
jeopardize the financial health of the parent bank.201 To be sure, it is
possible that OCC from time to time will be mistaken in its assess-
ment of the impact of a proposed new operating subsidiary activity on
the safety and soundness of the parent bank, but the possibility of
such mistake in judgment is hardly unique to this new circumstance.
If OCC arrives at an overbroad view of what constitutes part of, or is
incidental to, the business of banking, objecting parties can promptly
challenge its order. As the Supreme Court has recently noted in a
different context, OCC's discretion in determining that a particular
activity is part of the business of banking "must be kept within reason-
able bounds. '20 2
Moreover, even where an activity is seemingly a part of, or inciden-
tal to, banking and can apparently be carried on with reasonable
safety, insofar as other provisions of banking law are clearly applica-
ble to or limit such activities when carried on by an operating subsidi-
ary, OCC must obviously observe such provisions and limitations in
granting approvals. Glass-Steagall section 20 is obviously such a
limitation.20 3
2. History of Bank Operating Subsidiary Activities That Are Not
Permissible for Banks
The second point to keep in mind at the outset is that operating
subsidiaries have for some time, and apparently without great fanfare
or controversy, engaged in certain activities that national bank parents
may not. Some ninety years ago, the Supreme Court held in
Merchants' National Bank v. Wehrmann that a national bank may not
serve as the general partner of a partnership. 204 This was not because
of any statute specifically denying to national banks the authority to
become general partners but because of the unlimited personal liabil-
ity for the obligations of the firm that a general partner assumes. The
assumption of such unlimited liability was, the Court concluded, be-
yond the bank's power.20 5 Since 1984, however, OCC has permitted
201. Rules, Policies, and Procedures for Corporate Activities, 61 Fed. Reg. at 60,353-54;
Rules, Policies, and Procedures for Corporate Activities, 59 Fed. Reg. 61,033, 61,039 (1994).
202. NationsBank of North Carolina v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 115 S. Ct. 810, 814 n.2
(1995).
203. 12 U.S.C. § 377 (1994); see infra notes Part V.B.
204. 202 U.S. 295, 301 (1906).
205. The national bank had taken a 9/40ths interest in a general partnership as security for a
debt. Id. at 298. The partnership was in the business of acquiring, developing, and selling a
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operating subsidiaries to act as general partners in a number of cir-
cumstances: in a partnership operating an ATM network; 206 in a lim-
ited partnership investing in real estate mortgage-related assets;207 in a
limited partnership holding a commodity pool of foreign currency
spot, forward, futures, and option contracts;20 8 and, in a partnership
issuing asset-backed securities.209
OCC has reasoned that the prohibition in Wehrmann of a bank's
ownership of a general partnership interest did not apply in the case
of ownership of the interest by an operating subsidiary because the
interposition of a corporate entity (the operating subsidiary) between
the bank and unlimited liability for partnership obligations sufficiently
(though not absolutely) insulated the bank.210 In each such case, the
partnership was engaged in activities well within the business of bank-
ing, and OCC imposed further conditions intended to protect the
bank against being called upon to answer for the obligations of the
partnership.211
This, then, is an example of operating subsidiaries having authority
to engage in activities that their national bank parents must avoid.
The particular activity would appear to be generically appropriate for
a national bank. The riskiness involved, however, arguably called the
bank's authority to conduct the activity itself into legitimate question
leasehold. Id. The bank became the owner of this interest in satisfaction of the debt, subject to
any limitation to its powers as a national bank to engage in the transaction. Id. The partnership
was unsuccessful and its partners were required to contribute toward payment of its debts. Id.
The national bank basically raised the defense of ultra vires, an argument that was sustained by
the'Court, which held that a national bank had "no authority" to become "a member of the firm
... with an unlimited personal liability." Id. at 301. The Court contrasted this circumstance
(being a general partner) to the situation of the holder of shares of stock of a corporation. A
stockholder's exposure is generally limited to the amount of the holder's investment. Id. at 299-
300. Thus, the key to the Court's holding of lack of national bank authority was the factor of
unlimited liability as a general partner, which placed the bank's status as general partner outside
its incidental powers under 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh) (1994); see Merchants' Nat'l Bank v. Wehr-
mann, 68 N.E. 1004, 1007 (1903), rev'd on other grounds, 202 U.S. 295 (1906); OCC Interpretive
Letter No. 289 (May 15, 1984), 1984 OCC Ltr. LEXIS 27 (in response to bank's proposal to
create a partnership with one of its subsidiaries, the OCC voiced concerns about the Wehrmann
prohibition (of partnership activity by national banks) but found in this case that bank would be
shielded from unlimited liability and did not object to the proposal).
206. OCC Interpretive Letter No. 289 (May 15, 1984), 1984 OCC Ltr. LEXIS 27.
207. OCC Interpretive Letter No. 423, [1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep.
(CCH) 1 85, 647 (Apr. 11, 1988).
208. OCC Interpretive Letter No. 496, [1989-1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep.
(CCH) 9 83,087 (Dec. 18, 1989), modified, OCC Interpretive Letter No. 541, [1990-1991 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 1 83,253 (Feb. 6, 1991) (expanding the subsidiary's
activities).
209. OCC Conditional Approval 150 (Aug. 8, 1994), 1994 OCC Ltr. LEXIS 108.
210. OCC Interpretive Letter 289 (May 15, 1984), 1984 OCC Ltr. LEXIS 27.
211. See supra notes 206-09 (citing OCC approvals).
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since national banks must, as a general matter, conduct their opera-
tions in a safe and sound manner.212 If they fail to do so, they may be
subject to a cease and -desist order to discontinue the unsafe or un-
sound practice,213 they may lose deposit insurance coverage, 214 and
their managers may be removed. 215
Much the same rationale has been offered by OCC in connection
with its approval of an operating subsidiary created in the form of a
limited liability company to originate and service residential real es-
tate loans: the activity is within the business of banking and "the bank
is shielded from unlimited liability for the acts of other partners or
venturers. '216 No doubt other safety-related instances of operating
subsidiaries engaging in activities that are inappropriate for national
banks will arise in the future.
The more interesting and difficult cases, however, involve a bank
operating subsidiary engaging in activities that are specifically prohib-
ited by statute to a national bank.217 Interested observers anticipate
that these activities will involve dealing and underwriting in securi-
ties,218 as to which there are significant statutory impediments to di-
rect bank involvement. It is to such possible bank-ineligible activities
by operating subsidiaries that this Article next turns. This will entail
looking, in Part B below, at the kinds of bank-ineligible securities ac-
tivities in which nonbank affiliates of bank holding companies may
engage. This will be followed, in Part C, by a consideration of reasons
why the statutory provisions that permit holding company subsidiaries
to engage in such securities activities ought to be equally applicable to
bank operating subsidiaries under the New Part 5 Rules, notwith-
standing the prohibition on direct bank involvement in them. Finally,
this Article will consider, in Part D, several other important argu-
ments offered by opponents of the New Part 5 Rules to involvement
by bank operating subsidiaries in bank-ineligible securities activities.
212. See SYMONS & WHiTE, supra note 19, at 196 ("The first principle defining the business of
banking is safety, soundness or absence of substantial risk to deposited funds and the monetary
system.").
213. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b)(1) (1994) ("engaging ... in an unsafe or unsound practice in con-
ducting" its banking business).
214. Id. § 1818(a) (same).
215. Id. § 77.
216. OCC Interpretive Letter No. 645 [1994 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH)
83,554 (Apr. 29, 1994).
217. There was no such specific statutory prohibition in the Wehrmann case. See supra notes
204-05 and accompanying text.
218. See supra notes 86-93 and accompanying text.
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B. Section 20 Subsidiaries- The Meaning of "Engaged Principally"
As noted earlier, 19 Glass-Steagall sections 16 and 21220 place an
outright prohibition on most types of national banking underwriting
and dealing.22' Glass-Steagall section 20,222 on the other hand, more
loosely forbids bank affiliation with entities that are "engaged princi-
pally" in underwriting and dealing, which the courts have accepted as
meaning that bank affiliates may engage to some degree in the under-
writing of and dealing in those securities that banks themselves may
not underwrite or deal in,22 3 that is, the so-called bank-ineligible se-
curities. In the past, the bank affiliates engaging in these securities
activities with bank-ineligible securities have been bank holding com-
pany subsidiaries, which are regulated by the Federal Reserve
Board. 224 Because (for reasons given later2 25) the experience of these
so-called "section 20 subsidiaries" may have a bearing on the imple-
mentation of, and possible challenges to, the New Part 5 Rules, the
recent history and likely future direction of their bank-ineligible activ-
ities bear examination.
In trying to give content to the concept of "engaged principally,"
the Board first concluded generally that the subsidiary would not be
so engaged unless its underwriting and dealing activities in bank-ineli-
gible securities were a "substantial line of business activity" for the
subsidiary.226 It then adopted an arithmetic test for assuring that the
subsidiary's bank-ineligible securities activities were not "substantial":
the subsidiary's bank ineligible underwriting and dealing revenues
could not exceed a specified percentage of its gross revenues.22 7
There is no statutory or other easily determined bright-line test for
219. See supra notes 78-80 and accompanying text.
220. 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh) (1994); id. § 378(a)(1) (1994).
221. Banks are permitted to underwrite and deal in government-issued and -guaranteed se-
curities and certain other types of securities. Id. § 24 (Seventh).
222. Id. § 377.
223. See supra notes 81-86 and accompanying text.
224. See supra note 82.
225. See infra Part V.C.2.
226. Bankers Trust New York Corp., 73 Fed. Res. Bull. 138, 142 (1987); see Citicorp, 73 Fed.
Res. Bull. 473, 481-83 (1987), aff d, Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed.
Reserve Sys., 839 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1988).
227. For purposes of this calculation, the Board excluded revenues derived from the subsidi-
ary's dealing in or underwriting of securities that banks themselves could underwrite or deal in.
Since the Glass-Steagall Act permitted banks themselves to engage in such activities, affiliate
involvement in them ought to be irrelevant, said the Board, for purposes of the "engaged princi-
pally" test of section 20 of the Act. See Revenue Limit on Bank-Ineligible Activities of Subsidi-
aries of Bank Holding Companies Engaged in Underwriting and Dealing in Securities, 61 Fed.
Reg. 40,643 (1996).
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what percentage is the upper permissible limit for this purpose.228 At
the outset in 1987, the Board concluded that underwriting and dealing
revenues consisting of 5% of the subsidiary's gross revenues would be
so insubstantial as to reflect an activity in which the subsidiary was not
"principally engaged. ' '229 TWo years later, the Board reconsidered the
issue and raised the limit to 10% of the subsidiary's gross revenues.2 30
In the years after 1989, banking organizations from time to time
asked the Board to revisit this topic. 231 By 1996, many of their larger
228. See Order Approving Modifications to Section 20 Orders, 79 Fed. Res. Bull. 226, 227-28
(1993) (citations omitted):
Although the statutorily-imposed "engaged principally" limitation on ineligible activi-
ties represents a "hard and fast limit" that may not be administratively modified, ...
nothing in section 20 itself dictates what criteria must be used to determine compliance
with that limit. Indeed, the statutory term "engaged principally" is "intrinsically ambig-
uous." ... Thus, the statute gives the Board discretion in selecting the criteria for
determining when ineligible securities activities become substantial.
229. Citicorp, 73 Fed. Res. Bull. at 486; see Bankers Trust New York Corp., 73 Fed. Res. Bull.
at 146.
230. See Modifications to Section 20 Orders, 75 Fed. Res. Bull. 751 (1989). The Board had
anticipated the possibility of permitting an increase to 10% of revenues, based upon its assess-
ment of the subsidiary's performance over a period of time, in one of its 1987 orders. Citicorp,
73 Fed. Res. Bull. at 485.
231. In 1993, the Board further adjusted the test, as requested by holding companies, to take
account of unexpected and unusual fluctuations in the levels and structure of interest rates,
which had an unforeseen impact on calculations under the revenue test. See Order Approving
Modifications to Section 20 Orders, 79 Fed. Res. Bull. 226. Specifically, because bank-eligible
securities (for example, government securities) tend to carry shorter terms than bank-ineligible
securities, when the steepness of the yield curve grew, revenues derived from bank-eligible se-
curities declined in relative importance to revenues from bank-ineligible securities, thus dis-
torting the relative importance of bank-ineligible activities in the total mix of holding company
securities subsidiary activities. Id. at 228; see Rules, Policies, and Procedures for Corporate Ac-
tivities, 61 Fed. Reg. at 40,644 (referring to the 1993 modification, the Board observed that "an
increase in the steepness of the yield curve had caused the revenue earned by at least some
section 20 subsidiaries from holding eligible securities to decline in relation to ineligible revenue,
even as the relative proportion of eligible and ineligible securities activities being conducted by
these subsidiaries remained unchanged").
Thus, after this further modification, the holding company subsidiary was permitted to obtain
up to 10% of its gross revenues (adjusted by indexation to the 1989 interest rate structure) from
securities activities not permissible for banks themselves. Order Approving Modifications to
Section 20 Orders, 79 Fed. Res. Bull. at 229. The indexation alternative divided securities into
thirteen categories by duration of maturity. Each category was assigned a separate numeric
factor (ranging in the original order from 2.7 for durations of one month to .97 for durations of
thirty years.) intended to be multiplied against revenues from securities in the category. The
numeric factors were to be updated by the Board on a quarterly basis. Id.
This modification obviously entailed more costly and burdensome compliance efforts, requir-
ing more sophisticated systems analytical abilities that many banks did not possess. The Board
therefore allowed banks to opt for continued use of the older, non-indexed test. Id. at 228-29.
Dissenting Governors Mullins and Angell found this modification to be "an unduly complex and
burdensome solution to the problem it is intended to address, i.e., the unreliability of the current
10 percent revenue limit." Id. at 231. The dissenters pointed out that, in light of the imprecise
nature of section 20's limitations on bank-ineligible activities as well as the Board's "considera-
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section 20 subsidiaries were close to the 10% limit2 32 and, indeed, the
Board imposed a substantial fine on at least one for exceeding the
limit.233 In that environment; the Board began considering taking ac-
tion to raise the limit but has been reluctant to do so while significant
statutory reform was possible during the last Congress. 234
Finally, after the collapse of efforts in Congress to enact major
Glass-Steagall reform in the summer of 1996, the Board proposed a
further modification of its rules to raise the revenue limit to 25%.235
It did so based upon its conclusion that the holding company subsidi-
aries had "operated in a safe and sound manner without adverse ef-
fects on their affiliated banks or the public" over the preceding nine
years. 236 The new revenue limits became effective on March 6,
1997.237
ble experience" in regulating section 20 subsidiaries, the Board should take the more fundamen-
tal step of increasing the 10% limit rather than merely fine-tuning the poorly functioning current
approach. Id.
Banks agreed. A year later, in 1994, about thirty banks suggested that the 10% revenue limit
should be raised to 25%; see Foreign, Domestic Banks Ask Fed To Raise Section 20 Revenue
Cap, 63 Banking Rep. (BNA) 115 (July 25, 1994), available in LEXIS, BNA Library, BNABus
File, and some bank lawyers and commentators then suggested that the limit be raised promptly
to 49%. See, e.g., Fox, supra note 10, at 1; Jaret Seiberg, Shadow Panel: Raise Limit on Banks'
Securities Revenue, AM. BANKER, Feb. 13, 1996, at 2; Shadow Regulators Urge Agencies To Der-
egulate Within Existing Law, 66 Banking Rep. (BNA) 262 (Feb. 19, 1996) [hereinafter Shadow
Regulators], available in LEXIS, BNA Library, BNABus File.
232. See Laurie Hays & John R. Wilke, Banks Bump Against Cap on Dealing, WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 29, 1996, at C1.
233. See id. (Swiss Bank Corp. fined $3.5 million when its securities subsidiary exceeded reve-
nue limit).
234. See Pamela Atkins, SAIF's Legislative Prospects Said To Hinge on Budget Accord, 66
Banking Rep. (BNA) 209, 211 (Feb. 12, 1996), available in LEXIS, BNA Library, BNABus File
(statement by Board General Counsel Virgil Mattingly, Jr.: Board deferring to Congress in de-
laying action on proposals to increase 10% revenue limitation); Fox, supra note 10, at 1 (Board
working on proposal to modify revenue limit; Federal Reserve Governor Susan M. Phillips said
Board would definitely consider raising limit if Congress did not enact significant reform); Hays
& Wilke, supra note 232, at C1 (Fed officials considering bankers' pleas to raise limit but no
proposal would move forward "until congressional efforts to overhaul Glass-Steagall have run
their course").
235. See Revenue Limit on Bank-Ineligible Activities of Subsidiaries of Bank Holding Com-
panies Engaged in Underwriting and Dealing in Securities, 61 Fed. Reg. 40,643 (1996).
236. Id. at 40,644. After major reform efforts collapsed, Representative Leach strongly en-
couraged the Board to take such action. See Campbell, supra note 47 (quoting Representative
Leach: "I am writing to urge the Federal Reserve Board to use its authority, which is clear and
unquestionable, to address the changes in the marketplace by increasing the percentage limita-
tions on the amount of securities underwriting that can be conducted by Section 20 affiliates.").
He applauded the action after it was announced. See R. Christian Bruce, Fed Proposes Easing of
Restrictions on Section 20 Subsidiaries, 67 Banking Rep. (BNA) 197 (Aug. 5, 1996), available in
LEXIS, BNA Library, BNABus File.
237. Rules, Policies, and Procedures for Corporate Activities, 61 Fed. Reg. 68,750 (1996).
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This significant increase in the limit, plus some contemporaneously
proposed and since finalized changes in the manner in which it is cal-
culated 238 and a relaxation of certain "fire walls" within banking orga-
nizations, 39 will undoubtedly result in a major increase in bank
holding company subsidiary securities activities. These regulatory re-
forms will surely not only encourage holding companies to extend the
securities activities of their existing affiliates but may also make out-
right acquisition of presently independent broker-dealers both attrac-
tive and feasible.2 40 It can be expected that demands for further
increases will be made by large banking organizations that will ap-
proach the new 25% limit within a short period of time.241 Indeed, at
least one petitioner has already asked the Board to raise the limit to
49%,242 a proposal that has support in other quarters.243 Even the
more modest increase in the revenue limit to 25%, however, was con-
troversial and may very well attract serious judicial challenge. 244
238. Id. See Revenue Limit on Bank-Ineligible Activities of Subsidiaries of Bank Holding
Companies Engaged in Underwriting and Dealing in Securities, 61 Fed. Reg. at 40,643 (proposal
to exclude from calculation of revenue limit any interest earned on certain kinds of debt securi-
ties that a bank is entitled to hold for its own account). See Fed Changes Revenue Treatment of
Interest Earned by Bank Securities Units, 67 Banking Rep. (BNA) 386 (Sept. 16, 1996), available
in LEXIS, BNA Library, BNABus File [hereinafter Fed Changes Revenue Treatment] (proposal
finalized September 20, 1996, to take effect March 6, 1997).
239. Review of Restrictions on Director and Employee Interlocks, Cross-Marketing Activities
and the Purchase and Sale of Financial Assets, 61 Fed. Reg. at 40,640 (proposal to ease or elimi-
nate prohibitions on (i) director, officer, and employee interlocks between section 20 subsidiaries
and affiliated banks, (ii) cross-marketing efforts by affiliated banks for section 20 subsidiaries
and (iii) transfers of financial assets between section 20 subsidiaries and affiliated banks). See
Niles S. Campbell, Fed Tears Down Key Glass-Steagall Firewalls Separating Banking and Securi-
ties Affiliates, 67 Banking Rep. (BNA) 731 (1996), available in LEXIS, BNA Library, BNABus
File (proposal finalized October 30, 1996, to take effect January 7, 1997).
240. See Jeffrey Taylor & Stephen E. Frank, Fed Set To Ease Bank Underwriting Curbs, WALL
ST. J., Aug. 1, 1996, at A2 (possible reconsideration by Bayerische Vereinsbank of the acquisition
of Oppenheimer & Co., which was proposed but dropped when the German bank realized that
acquisition would place it in violation of section 20 under the then current rules).
241. Id. (Chase Manhattan Corp.'s section 20 subsidiary could exceed 25% limitation "within
a few years") (statement of Donald H. Layton, Vice Chairman).
242. See Atkins, supra note 234, at 211 (statement by Board General Counsel Virgil Mat-
tingly, Jr.).
243. See, e.g., Fox, supra note 10, at 4 (bank counsel); Seiberg, supra note 231, at 1 (Shadow
Financial Regulatory Committee) (summarizing the committee's thoughts).
244. The Board's action in increasing the revenue limit to 25% was promptly criticized by the
Securities Industry Association (Board's action, combined with recent OCC initiatives, unfairly
favors banks' penetration further into securities business, while securities firms are restrained
from entering banking business) and the Independent Bankers Association of America (Board's
action will permit common ownership of large commercial banks and large securities firms, re-
sulting in further concentration of financial services industry that should be dealt with by Con-
gress). See Campbell, note 47, at 3. In defending its revenue limit increase the Board will have
to contend with its own statement in the 1987 Citicorp Order, 73 Fed. Res. Bull. 473 (1987), that
an applicant's proposal for a "10 to 15 percent of activity" test would "exceed the levels which
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C. Applicability of Section 20 to Bank Operating Subsidiaries
The foregoing developments are obviously important for the future
role of holding company section 20 subsidiaries, but they may also be
important for bank operating subsidiaries. The revenue limits hereto-
fore established by the Board are not directly applicable to subsidiar-
ies of banks, which are for the most part beyond the regulatory
jurisdiction of the Board.2 45 It is quite likely, however, that OCC will
closely examine and, where appropriate, adopt the reasoning of the
Board if OCC decides to approve an applicant bank's proposal that its
operating subsidiary engage in underwriting and dealing,2 46 particu-
larly in light of the fact that the Board's general approach (though not
the Board believes represent an appropriate interpretation of the provisions of section 20 that is
consistent with both its language and the intention of Congress. In the Board's judgment, at the
levels proposed by Applicants, the proposed affiliates would be clearly engaged principally in
underwriting and dealing in securities." Id. at 485. It would, of course, be appropriate for the
Board's "judgment" to be affected by its experience in the interim with section 20 subsidiaries'
operations under the 10% limit. Moreover, the financial markets have changed in a fashion that
makes reconsideration appropriate as well. See Atkins, supra note 234 (statement by Board
General Counsel Virgil Mattingly, Jr.). A reading of the Board's statement above that 10-15% is
an absolute limit in all circumstances would not be based upon any readily identifiable statutory
language or other historical documentation.
Any further increase to the 49% level suggested by applicants and others, see supra note 231,
will also have to contend With the Board's rejection of that idea in its 1987 Bankers Trust Order,
73 Fed. Res. Bull. 138 (1987), where it concluded that activity accounting for less than 50% could
nevertheless amount to an activity in which the subsidiary is "engaged principally" under section
20, id. at 141, since a broader reading "would substantially negate the purpose of section 20 by
allowing affiliations between large member banks and the largest investment banks in the coun-
try, the precise situation at which the Glass-Steagall Act was directed," id. at 142. Moreover,
when the Board finalized the 25% revenue limitation rule, Federal Reserve Board Governors
Lawrence Lindsey, Edward W. Kelley, Susan Phillips, and Laurence H. Meyer suggested that, in
their view, the Board had gone as far in loosening the revenue limitations as it could, given the
statutory restraints. See Campbell, supra.
This Article will not further explore the merits of what particular level of bank-ineligible activ-
ity is the outer limit of what section 20 permits, nor whether these prior statements by the Board
necessarily disenable it from rethinking the relevant issues. The political and business develop-
ment momentum is plainly in the direction of expanded holding company subsidiary involve-
ment in underwriting and dealing and it seems clear that the Board has discretion to raise the
current limits to some degree, see Campbell, supra (House Banking Committee Chairman Leach
agrees that new 25% revenue limit is permissible under current statutory restraints and "repre-
sents a progressive step forward in providing consumers a more competitive financial market-
place" even if the upper limit is not entirely clear); see, e.g., Melanie L. Fein, The New Business
of Banking: What Banks Can Do Now (Corporate Law and Practice Course Handbook Series
No. B4-7123 1995), available in 912 WL PLI/Corp 91, at *21; supra notes 235-37 and accompany-
ing text. In any event, this momentum will no doubt spill over into thinking about bank operat-
ing subsidiaries.
245. See infra Part V.D.1.
246. See Shadow Regulators, supra note 231, at 262-63 (Shadow Financial Regulatory Com-
mittee suggests that OCC adopt reasoning of Board in permitting bank subsidiaries to partici-
pate in securities activities, perhaps up to 50% of revenues).
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the current 25% revenue limit) has already been blessed by the
courts.
2 47
The New Part 5 Rules are written in a manner that invites a national
bank to apply for permission to launch a subsidiary for purposes of
engaging in such securities activities. The bank would assert that the
statutory limit on its authority to deal and underwrite, section 16 of
Glass-Steagall, 248 is an example of what OCC referred to, in its com-
mentary accompanying the Proposed Part 5 Rules, as "a specific re-
striction that applies to the parent bank but not necessarily to its
subsidiaries. '249 Thus, OCC could conclude that, within proper limits
(presumably similar to limits imposed on holding company section 20
subsidiaries by the Board), the operating subsidiary could deal and
underwrite "to an extent or in a manner different from the way the
activity is conducted at the parent bank level. '250 As contemplated by
the New Part 5 Rules, this would be "an activity authorized under
§ 5.34(d) for the subsidiary but different from that permissible for the
parent national bank." 251
OCC has been publicly reticent to address this specific issue, no
doubt to avoid unnecessarily raising hackles in Congress and else-
where while statutory reform was under serious consideration. In any
event, it is in the nature of the new rules that OCC need not address
the appropriateness of a particular operating subsidiary activity, in-
cluding securities activities, until an applicant makes a specific propo-
sal.252 It is, however, certainly clear from a review of the comments
submitted in response to publication of the Proposed Part 5 Rules253
that the interested parties (chiefly the banks and their investment
banking competitors) saw underwriting and dealing by operating sub-
247. Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 839 F.2d 47 (2d
Cir. 1988).
248. 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh) (1994).
249. Rules, Policies, and Procedures for Corporate Activities, 59 Fed. Reg. 61,033, 61,039
(1994) (Proposed Part 5 Rules § 5.34(d)(2)).
250. Id.
251. Rules, Policies, and Procedures for Corporate Activities, 61 Fed. Reg. 60,341, 60,376
(1996) (to be codified at 12 C.FR. § 5.34(f)). This would be "an activity that is permissible for
the subsidiary under [new] standards but different from that permissible for the parent national
bank." Rules, Policies and Procedures for Corporate Activities, 61 Fed. Reg. at 60,351.
252. Under the new rules, OCC did not give blanket permission for banks to establish securi-
ties operating subsidiaries. Rather, a bank would have to apply for permission to create such a
subsidiary (or to expand an existing subsidiary's activities to include underwriting and dealing).
OCC would then make a case-specific determination of the safety and soundness of the proposal
for the bank, whether the activity is a part of or incidental to the business of banking and
whether it is legally permissible for an operating subsidiary if the parent bank may not engage in
the activity. Id. at 61 Fed. Reg. at 60,351-54.
253. On file with the author.
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sidiaries as an important issue in connection with final approval of the
proposed rules.
Since Glass-Steagall, banks have been unable to engage in under-
writing and dealing in bank-ineligible securities and, in fact, their sub-
sidiaries have not engaged in this activity either. Opponents of the
New Part 5 Rules maintain that Glass-Steagall section 16's prohibition
on such activity by banks is equally applicable to bank operating sub-
sidiaries, which are no more than incorporated departments of
banks. 254 Supporters of the proposed rules suggest that section 20's
less rigid approach to underwriting and dealing applies to operating
subsidiaries. 255
1. Underwriting and Dealing as Part of the "Business of Banking"
In attempting to resolve this central dispute, it is useful to note at
the outset that underwriting and dealing in securities, bank-eligible or
-ineligible, is part of the "business of banking." Glass-Steagall served
to place limits (indeed, quite severe ones) on the securities activities
of banks, but it did not itself delete securities activities from the un-
derlying concept of the "business of banking." It is true that the list-
ing of bank powers in section 24 (Seventh), which refers in general
terms to taking deposits, making loans, negotiating notes and drafts,
and dealing in currency, does not expressly refer to securities activi-
ties.2 56 It is also true, however, that banks have engaged in securities
transactions for quite a long time.257 OCC's annual reports early in
this century referred to substantial bank securities activities258 and
254. See, e.g., Atkins, supra note 8; Leach Blasts Comptroller's Office, supra note 189; SIA
Letter, supra note 103, at 14-33.
255. See, e.g., Shadow Regulators, supra note 231.
256. 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh) (1994). Section 24 states that national banks possess
all such incidental powers as shall be necessary to carry on the business of banking; by
discounting and negotiating promissory notes, drafts, bills of exchange, and other evi-
dences of debt; by receiving deposits; by buying and selling exchange, coin, and bullion;
by loaning money on personal security; and by obtaining, issuing, and circulating notes.
Id.
257. See Clarke v. Securities Indus. Ass'n, 479 U.S. 388, 407-08 (1987); VINCENT P. CAROSSO,
INVESTMENT BANKING IN AMERICA: A HISTORY 97-98 (1970); PEACH, supra note 157, at 11-20;
2 F. REDLICH, THE MOLDING OF AMERICAN BANKING: MEN AND IDEAS 389-93 (1951).
258. See OCC Ann. Rep. 78 (1926); OCC Ann. Rep. 12 (1924) (observing that a substantial
number of national banks "now buy and sell investment securities and the office of the comptrol-
ler has raised no objection because this has become a recognized service which a bank must
render"; thus, proposed legislation amending Federal Reserve Act with respect to the power of
national banks to buy and sell securities would not result in significant change to the existing
situation); OCC Ann. Rep. 8-9 (1909) (discussing the extent of bank securities activity at that
time).
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early cases involving bank ownership of municipal securities, 59 which
were decided before banks were given express statutory authority to
own or deal in government securities in section 24 (Seventh), suggest
that banks have always had the power to engage in securities transac-
tions as an inherent part of the business of banking.
When Congress set about limiting bank powers to engage in securi-
ties transactions in the 1920s and 1930s, that body was well aware of
the history of bank engagement in such activities. For instance, a
committee report accompanying a bill introduced in 1924 to impose
limitations on such activities observed that national banks at that time
were
engaged to a greater or lesser extent in buying and selling invest-
ment securities. There is no express power given in the national
banking laws authorizing the conduct of this character of business.
Nevertheless, this is a form of service demanded by banks, and it
has come to be recognized as a legitimate banking service.2 60
Three years later, the McFadden Act did impose limits on bank se-
curities dealing powers, but it did so in a fashion that makes clear that
Congress assumed banks had preexisting securities powers, presuma-
bly as a part of, or incidental to, the business of banking: "[T]he busi-
ness of buying and selling investment securities shall hereafter be
limited to buying and selling without recourse marketable obligations
evidencing indebtedness. ' 261 The Act's legislative history is even
clearer on this point. The House report notes:
It is a matter of common knowledge that national banks have been
engaged in the investment-securities business ... for a number of
years. In this they have proceeded under their incidental corporate
powers to conduct the banking business. Section 2(b) recognizes this
situation but declares a public policy with reference thereto and ...
regulates these activities.262
That report also states that a proviso added to section 24 (Seventh) by
the Act "affirms the existence of a type of business [the investment
securities business] which national banks are now conducting under
their incidental charter powers."263
259. See, e.g., Newport Nat'l Bank v. Board of Educ. of Newport, 70 S.W. 186 (Ky. 1902); First
Nat'l Bank of North Bennington v. Bennington, 9 F. Cas. 97 (C.C.D. Vt. 1879).
260. S. REP. No. 68-666, at 6 (1924).
261. McFadden Act of 1927, ch. 191, § 2, 44 Stat., Part 2, 1224, 1226 (emphasis added).
262. H.R. REP. No. 69-83, at 2 (1926) (emphasis added).
263. Id. at 3 (emphasis added). The new wording added by the Act
recognizes the right of national banks to continue to engage in the business of buying
and selling investment securities .... In this connection it may be noted that this is a
business regularly carried on by State banks and trust companies and has been engaged
in by national banks for a number of years. The national banks hold to-day [sic] in the
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The congressman for whom the Act was named certainly under-
stood that banks in the 1920s possessed securities powers. His testi-
mony explaining the purposes of the McFadden Act included a
passage in which he summarily rejected the suggestion that banks
lacked authority to engage in securities activities. 264 Glass-Steagall, of
course, added further and much more draconian limits on bank securi-
ties powers beyond the McFadden Act, but even Glass-Steagall's leg-
islative history makes clear that Congress realized that it was limiting
a bank power that already existed.2 65
Indeed, the very structure of section 24 (Seventh) makes clear that
the business of banking must include engaging in securities activities.
The extended text of the section commencing with its second sentence
serves to impose an elaborate structure of limitations on, and permis-
sion to exercise certain types of bank powers involving, "underwrit-
ing" and "dealing in securities. ' 266 However, with the possible
exception of the limited traditional power of banks to negotiate evi-
dences of debt, none of the more specific bank powers listed in the
neighborhood of $6,000,000,000 of investment securities. The effect of this provision,
therefore, is primarily regulative.
Id. at 3-4; see 67 CoNo. REC. 2828 (1926).
264. Consolidation of National Banking Associations: Hearings on S. 1782 and H.R. 2 Before
a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 69th Cong. 22 (1926) (statement by
Rep. McFadden). McFadden stated:
As to investment securities provisions in section 2(b) it has been said that we are per-
mitting national banks to engage in a new business without proper safeguards. I shall
not consume any time in impeaching the sincerity of this criticism for I am sure your
committee well knows that the national banks have for many years been engaged in the
business of buying and selling investment securities without any restrictions whatsoever
except such credit criticisms as may be made by the comptroller and such limitations as
the board of directors themselves may see fit to make.... The authority under which
this business is carried on may be found in section 5136 of the Revised Statutes of the
United States which empowers national banks among other things to negotiate "other
evidences of debt."
Section 5136 is now section 24 (Seventh). Representative McFadden also testified:
Modem banking requires the conduct of an investment securities business and the pur-
pose of section 2(b) of this bill is to restrict it to proper and reasonable limits both as to
the aggregate amount of any issue which may be held and as to the character of securi-
ties that may be dealt in. The section is, therefore, definitive and restrictive. The ex-
isting law neither defines nor restricts.
Id. (emphasis added).
265. See H. REP. No. 73-150, at 3 (1933) (while provisions added by the Act would permit
banks to continue to "purchase and sell investment securities for their customers to the same
extent as heretofore," their ability to purchase and sell investment securities for their own ac-
count was "thereafter" limited).
266. See supra notes 20, 133-41 and accompanying text.
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first sentence, which is derived almost unchanged from legislation en-
acted in 1863 and 1864,267 expressly includes securities powers.268
Thus, the more recently enacted limitations on securities powers of
banks necessarily presuppose that banks have such powers to begin
with, a point made by the Supreme Court in VALIC,269 where the
Court rejected the assertion that national banks' powers were limited
to those specific powers listed in the first sentence. 270 As the prime
example of why so limited a view of the extent of the powers encom-
passed within the concept of the "business of banking" is fundamen-
tally faulty, the Court observed that Congress' actions in adding the
second sentence limitations on dealing in securities "makes sense only
if banks already had authority to deal in securities, authority presuma-
bly encompassed within the 'business of banking' language which dates
from 1863.1,271
Therefore, the starting place in the discussion of whether subsidiar-
ies owned by banks may engage in securities activities must be recog-
nition that, absent further action by Congress, banks themselves
possess the power to buy and sell securities. This makes good sense as
a matter of the underlying role that banks play in the economy-
financial intermediation. 272 Furthermore, as a general proposition,
267. Act of June 3, 1864, ch. 106, § 8, 13 Stat. 99, 101; Act of Feb. 25, 1863, ch. 58, § 11, 12
Stat. 668. The order of the clauses of these two versions of what is now the first sentence of
section 24 (Seventh) was changed slightly, but with no intent on the part of Congress to alter the
meaning; see Symons, supra note 18, at 700. Today's version is essentially identical to the 1864
version. See Smoot, supra note 13, at 721-22.
268. See supra note 256 (for the language of the first sentence).
269. NationsBank of North Carolina v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 115 S. Ct. 810 (1995).
270. Id. at 814 n.2.
271. Id. at 814 (emphasis added).
272. See SYMoN s & wHtE, supra note 19, at 1. In NationsBank of North Carolina v. Variable
Annuity Life Insurance Co., 115 S. Ct. 810 (1995), the Supreme Court referred approvingly to
OCC's invocation of the "'power [of banks] to broker a wide variety of financial investment
instruments' . . . which the Comptroller considers 'part of [banks'] traditional role as financial
intermediaries' .. . and therefore an 'incidental powe[r] ... necessary to carry on the business of
banking.' 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh); see also Interpretive Letter No. 494 (Dec. 20, 1989) (discuss-
ing features of financial investment instruments brokerage that bring this activity within the
'business of banking')." 115 S. Ct. at 814. After noting the insurance industry challenger's posi-
tion that "the business of banking" is confined to the five activities listed in the first sentence of
section 24 (Seventh) and activities incidental to those five and, thus "attribut[ing] no independ-
ent significance to the words 'business of banking,"' the Court said, "[w]e think the Comptroller
better comprehends the Act's terms." Id.
The central passage of Interpretive Letter No. 494 (cited with approval by the Supreme Court
as quoted above) "discussing features ... that bring this activity within 'the business of bank-
ing"' is the following:
Providing brokerage services for financial instruments is within the business of banking
as contemplated in section 24 (Seventh) because of the financial nature of the activity
and the relationship of this activity to other traditional banking functions. National
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and again absent further action by Congress, banks are permitted to
conduct their business, including intermediation involving securities,
using subsidiaries. 273
2. Glass-Steagall and the Distinction Between Banks and
"Affiliates "-Operating Subsidiaries as "Affiliates"
Of course, Congress has taken further action in this field, signifi-
cantly restricting the securities powers of banks in Glass-Steagall.
However, the action it has taken makes a clear distinction between
banks themselves and their affiliates. While banks themselves may
only underwrite and deal in certain types of securities (for example,
government securities),2 74 their affiliates may not only underwrite and
deal in those securities, but they may also, at least so long as they are
not "engaged principally" in it, underwrite and deal in other kinds of
securities as well.275
For purposes of securities powers, then, into which category do
bank operating subsidiaries fall? Are they to be treated like banks
themselves or like bank affiliates? The relevant statutory provisions
provide a clear answer-operating subsidiaries are surely "affiliates"
within the statutory definitional scheme of things. This answer is fur-
ther supported by legislative history and by previous pronouncements
of the Supreme Court.
banks possess various express or implied powers to invest in, trade, deal in, underwrite,
and otherwise act in various capacities with a wide variety of financial, investment, and
monetary instruments and other financial commodities (such as exchange, coin, and
bullion). Banks are regular, active participants in the financial trading markets and
normally will have trading expertise. It is a natural part of the same trading process for
banks to serve as broker for their customers in other transactions where the bank could
not or does not serve as principal but where the trading activity is essentially similar.
The participation of banks as principals in the financial trading markets is itself an
aspect of the primary function of banks as financial intermediaries. The role of a bank
is to act as an intermediary, a "dealer" in capital, facilitating the flow of money and
credit among different parts of the economy. See, e.g., Auten v. United States Nat'l
Bank of New York, 174 U.S. 125, 142-43 (1899) (citing authorities); OCC No-Objection
Letter No. 87-5, (July 20, 1987), reprinted in Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 84,034.
This role takes many forms: providing payment transmission services, borrowing from
savers and relending to users, participating in the capital markets as here, or using and
adopting whatever new methods the economy, markets, and technology develop over
time. As the recognized intermediaries between other, nonbank participants in the fi-
nancial markets and the payment systems, banks possess the expertise to effect transac-
tions between parties and to manage their own intermediation position.
OCC Interpretive Letter No. 494, [1989-1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH)
83,083 (Dec. 20, 1989) [hereinafter Interpretive Letter No. 494].
273. See supra Part Ill.
274. See supra notes 140-41 and accompanying text.
275. See supra Part V.B.
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a. Statutory Considerations
The plain meaning of the words of the relevant portions of Title 12
would seem to compel the conclusion that operating subsidiaries
should be treated like affiliates, which they in fact are, and not like
banks, which they patently are not. The outright prohibitions and
other limitations contained in Glass-Steagall section 16 apply by their
clear terms to "the association," that is, the national bank.276 There is
nothing in the wording of that provision that suggests that it applies to
entities other than banks, including affiliates of banks. 277
Affiliates are dealt with separately in section 20. Section 20's prohi-
bition on affiliation by a bank with a corporation or other organiza-
tion "engaged principally in the issue, flotation, underwriting, public
sale or distribution ... of ... securities"2 78 did not leave the meaning
of "affiliate" undefined. As enacted, section 20 recited specifically
that no bank "shall be affiliated in any manner described" in section
2(b) of Glass-Steagall with such a corporation or other organization
engaged in such securities activities.2 79 Section 2(b),280 in turn, con-
tained a broad definition of affiliation, which was broken into three
categories. Two of the categories of affiliates of banks encompassed
(i) organizations controlled by persons who control a bank2 81 and (ii)
276. The pertinent language of section 16 is as follows:
The business of dealing in securities and stock by the association shall be limited to
purchasing and selling such securities and stock without recourse, solely upon the or-
der, and for the account of, customers, and in no event for its own account, and the
association shall not underwrite any issue of securities or stock.
12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh) (1994).
277. Similarly, section 21's reciprocal prohibitions on involvement by investment banking
firms in banking refer to activities that may only be engaged in by a bank:
[I]t shall be unlawful ... for abiy person, firm, corporation, association, business trust,
or other similar organization, engaged in the business of issuing, underwriting, selling,
or distributing ... securities, to engage at the same time to any extent whatever in the
business of receiving deposits subject to check or to repayment upon presentation of a
passbook, certificate of deposit, or other evidence of debt, or upon request of the de-
positor ....
Id. § 378(a)(1). As Justice O'Connor has observed, sections 16 and 21 "approach the same prob-
lem from different directions." Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Re-
serve Sys., 468 U.S. 137, 163 (1984) (O'Connor, J., dissenting). According to Justice O'Connor:
"[B]roadly speaking, § 16 tells firms that engage in commercial banking that they cannot engage
in certain securities activities; § 21 tells firms that engage in certain securities activities that they
cannot engage in commercial banking." Id; see Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve System v.
Investment Co. Inst., 450 U.S. 46, 62 (1981).
278. 12 U.S.C. § 377.
279. Id.
280. Id. § 221a(b).
281. The relevant portion provides:
Except where otherwise specifically provided, the term "affiliate" shall include any cor-
poration, business trust, association, or other similar organization ... [o]f which control
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organizations with a majority of directors who are also directors of a
bank.282 The remaining separate category of affiliates set forth in the
1933 definition consisted-clearly and unequivocally-of subsidiaries
of banks.2 83 These three categories persist in the current statutory
version of the definition,284 which differs from the original in only one
significant respect-the addition of a fourth category of affiliate, con-
sisting of any organization holding a control block of stock of a bank
or otherwise possessing the power to elect a majority of a bank's di-
rectors, that is, basically a bank holding company.2 85 It is also to be
noted that neither section 20 nor the cross-referenced statutory defini-
tion of affiliate contains, or at any time in the past contained, any hint
that bank subsidiaries are not "affiliates" for purposes of section 20.
is held, directly or indirectly, through stock ownership or in any other manner, by the
shareholders of a member bank who own or control either a majority of the shares of
such bank or more than 50 per centum of the number of shares voted for the election of
directors of such bank at the preceding election, or by trustees for the benefit of the
shareholders of any such bank.
Id. § 221a(b)(2).
282. The statute states in part:
Except where otherwise specifically provided, the term 'affiliate' shall include any cor-
poration, business trust, association, or other similar organization ... [o]f which a ma-
jority of its directors, trustees, or other persons exercising similar functions are
directors of any one member bank.
Id § 221a(b)(3).
283. The relevant portion of the statute states:
Except where otherwise specifically provided, the term "affiliate" shall include any cor-
poration, business trust, association, or other similar organization ... of which a mem-
ber bank, directly or indirectly, owns or controls either a majority of the voting shares
or more than fifty per centum of the number of shares voted for the election of its
directors, trustees, or other persons exercising similar functions at the preceding elec-
tion, or controls in any manner the election of a majority of its directors, trustees, or
other persons exercising similar functions.
Id. § 221a(b)(1).
284. Id. § 221a(b)(1)-(3).
285. The pertinent provision states:
Except where otherwise specifically provided, the term "affiliate" shall include any cor-
poration, business trust, association, or other similar organization ... [w]hich owns or
controls, directly or indirectly, either a majority of the shares of capital stock of a mem-
ber bank or more than 50 per centum of the number of shares voted for the election of
directors of a member bank at the preceding election, or controls in any manner the
election of a majority of the directors of a member bank, or for the benefit of whose
shareholders or members all or substantially all the capital stock of a member bank is
held by trustees.
Id. § 221a(b)(4). This provision was added in 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-485, § 13(a), 80 Stat. 242, but
was derived from the former subparagraph (c), defining "holding company affiliate," which itself
was repealed by Pub. L. 89-485, § 13(b), 80 Stat. 242 (1966). Actually, this definition of "affili-
ate" in section 221a(b) differs from the definition of bank holding company found in 12 U.S.C.
§ 1841(a) in several respects, none of which is important for purposes of this discussion.
BANK OPERATING SUBSIDIARIES
It thus seems clear from the language of Glass-Steagall that Con-
gress intentionally bifurcated its treatment of banking organization se-
curities powers. Banks themselves received quite limited powers.
Their affiliates received significantly more, though they must, of
course, refrain from being "engaged principally" in bank-ineligible ac-
tivities. This would seem to be the plain meaning of the language of
the Act. It would thus appear that "Congress has directly spoken on
the precise question at issue, '286 that is, whether subsidiaries of banks
are affiliates of banks for section 20 purposes. If so, that should be
"the end of the matter" and the courts "must give effect to the unam-
biguously expressed intent of Congress. '287 The wording of the rele-
vant statutory provisions seems to leave no conclusion except that
bank subsidiaries are affiliates. The alternative, treating subsidiaries
of banks as if they are not "affiliates" for section 20 purposes but are
instead banks for section 16 purposes, would require considerable
statutory interpretational dexterity that seems unlikely to pass muster
before the courts.
If further support for the idea that bank subsidiaries are affiliates,
beyond the plain meaning of the statute on that precise question, is
necessary, it may be found (i) in the pertinent legislative history of
Glass-Steagall relating to the meaning of the term "affiliate" and (ii)
in the Supreme Court's admonition that sections 16 and 20 must be
read together in a manner that gives meaningful effect to each.
b. Pertinent Legislative History
It is clear that key congressmen considered bank subsidiaries to be
"affiliates" when they were discussing what became Glass-Steagall
and the problems leading to its enactment. At the specific request of
Senator Carter Glass, 288 Senator Robert J. Bulkley, who was another
leading proponent of that Act, addressed the Senate in 1932 on "the
subject of security affiliates and the related subject of investment
banking, ' 289 a subject into which the Senate Committee on, Banking
and Currency was looking. Senator Bulkley described at length the
286. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842
(1984).
287, "If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as
the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress." Id. at 842-43.
288. Senator Glass' subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency was
empowered, S. Res. 71, 71st Cong. (1931), to look into the causes of the financial crisis of the
Depression and to recommend measures to prevent a reoccurrence of it. See S. REP. No. 73-77,
at 1-2 (1933); 75 CONG. REc. 9909 (1932) (statement of Sen. Bulkley).
289. 75 CONG. REC. 9909 (statement of Sen. Bulkley).
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history of securities activities by national and state banks,2 90 noting
that such activities were typically carried on by bank affiliates, rather
than the banks themselves. 291 One illuminating passage from his ad-
dress follows:
Early in this century certain State banking institutions began setting
up bond departments and began to engage in the origination, under-
writing, and distribution of investment securities and also began to
trade in them. There is still a considerable volume of such transac-
tions carried on directly by banks of deposit, but a recognition of
the risks involved has impelled many banks to set up subsidiary or
so-called affiliate institutions in order that the capital stock and the
stockholders' liability of the parent bank might be held inviolate for
the protection of regular banking operations and for the benefit of
depositors. Such affiliate corporations, whether of National or State
banks, might be owned outright by the parent banks or by trustees
for the benefit of the bank or of the bank's stockholders or perhaps
by the same stockholders as the bank, with the restriction that stock
of the affiliate might be transferred concurrently with stock of the
parent bank and not otherwise.
This activity of State banking institutions spreading out into the
investment-security field has been matched by many national banks
292
The directly owned bank subsidiary was thus at the very heart of
what the so-called Glass subcommittee was investigating. Senator
Bulkley noted that, in preparing and recommending legislation for en-
actment by the Senate, the issue for the subcommittee was "whether
the securities affiliate relationship is to be permitted to continue under
strict regulation or is to be required to be terminated. 12 93 He con-
cluded his oral report to the Senate in 1932 by noting his "hope that
the sections of this bill ... prohibiting the carrying on of the invest-
ment security business by national and State member banks, whether
through the medium of affiliates or otherwise, will be adopted. '2 94
The bill that the subcommittee prepared in 1932 required outright ter-
290. Id. at 9909-13.
291. He ascribed the use of affiliates to two causes:
An investment affiliate might be desired by a bank which under its charter is not per-
mitted to go into the investment business, as is the case with national banks, or it might
be considered advisable to set up an affiliate for the purpose of segregating the capital
employed in the investment-security business so that the risks involved would not be
carried directly by the institution responsible for money received on deposit.
Id. at 9910-11. His assertion as to the then-extant securities powers of national banks was, at
best, an overstatement, in light of VALIC.
292. Id. at 9911 (emphasis added).
293. Id. at 9910.
294. Id. at 9913.
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mination of securities activities, whether directly or through affiliate
operations. 295
While this bill did pass the Senate in 1932,296 a somewhat different
bill,2 97 which ultimately became Glass-Steagall, emerged a year later.
The report on this later bill from Senator Glass' Committee on Bank-
ing and Currency noted that the "the outstanding development" in
commercial banking in the period immediately prior to the Depres-
sion was "the appearance of excessive security loans, and of over-
investment in securities of all kinds. '2 98 The most important reason
for this development, continued the report, was "the growth of 'bank
affiliates' which devote themselves in many cases to perilous under-
writing operations, stock speculation, and maintaining a market for
the banks' own stock often largely with the resources of the parent
bank.' '299 Again Senator Glass' committee was focused clearly upon
the bank subsidiary as "affiliate."
295. S. 4412, 72d Cong. (1932). Senator Bulkley described the important elements of this bill
as follows:
The bill, in section 16.... provides for separating security affiliates from national banks
after a period of three years and makes the same provision in section 5 ... for State
banks which are members of the Federal reserve system. These provisions are rein-
forced by section 18,. . . which provides that no national bank and no State member
bank may hereafter be affiliated with any organization engaged in the investment se-
curity business. The provision of section 14 ... requires national banks to get out of the
business of underwriting and dealing in investment securities, and again, in section 5,
... there is the same provision with respect to State member banks.
75 CONG. REC. 9909, 9909 (1932) (statement of Sen. Bulkley).
296. See S. REP. No. 73-77, at 1 (1933)
297. S. 1631, 73d Cong. (1933).
298. S. REP. No. 73-77, at 8 (1933).
299. Id. at 10 (emphasis added).
This report treats the securities activities that it describes as a "situation ... never contem-
plated by the National Banking Act," id.; see id. at 8; 75 CONo. REC. 9909, 9911 (1932) (state-
ment of Sen. Bulkley) ("Such a departure on the part of national banks was clearly never
authorized by law, and it is difficult to understand why it should have been permitted to grow
and develop as it has.").
In light of the Supreme Court's conclusions in VALIC about national bank securities powers
deriving from the enactment of the National Bank Act during the Civil War, NationsBank of
North Carolina v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 115 S. Ct. 810, 814 (1995), and the extended
history of bank participation in securities activities, see supra Part V.C.1, such suggestions that
national banks were "clearly" exceeding their statutory authority or congressional intent must
now be seen as, at best, ill-founded. They are perhaps best seen as period hyperbole and over-
statement reflecting (no doubt) the anxiety felt at the time and the need to blame someone or
something for the bank failures that had occurred. See note 156 (discussing congressional con-
cern during Depression with dangerous bank speculation in securities). Such "abuses" were
ultimately in fact dealt with by a different statutory regime. See Isaac & Fein, supra note 19, at
289 ("The enactment of the securities regulation system, not Glass-Steagall, was the single most
important factor in curtailing abuses in the securities business.").
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The problem resulting from affiliate securities activities required
"some legislative provisions" to deal with it and, said the report, "[i]t
has been suggested from many quarters that the affiliate system be
simply[ ] 'abolished.' 30 While "[t]his suggestion has much authority
behind it,"301 the committee rejected it largely for practical reasons. 302
It determined instead to recommend legislation that would separate
banks and their affiliates "as far as possible," 30 3 limit bank loans to
affiliates, and subject affiliates to careful periodic examination. 30 4
More specifically, as described in the Senate report, section 20 of
the proposed bill dealt with the affiliate situation by "[p]rovid[ing] for
eliminating after a period of two years all affiliations by member
banks with corporations, associations, business trusts, or other similar
organizations engaged principally in the issuance, underwriting, or dis-
tribution of securities. ' '30 5 In other words, as Senator Glass had sug-
gested during committee hearings earlier, the committee "simply
proposed to regulate ... [investment affiliates], as we conceive, in a
rational way" rather than "abolish [them] outright. '30 6
From the foregoing, it is clear that the Congress that enacted Glass-
Steagall was concerned about securities activities of bank affiliates
(including most specifically securities activities of bank subsidiaries),
but it did not abolish such activities outright and for this purpose did
not distinguish bank subsidiaries from other kinds of affiliates. In-
stead, such activities were delimited in a number of respects, as a re-
sult of which a bank could no longer have an affiliate, including a
subsidiary, that was "engaged principally" in forbidden sorts of deal-
ing and underwriting. While this outcome obviously leaves to a later
day resolution of the question of what level of affiliate activity consti-
tutes less than principal engagement (and thus avoids violating section
20's prohibition), it surely forecloses an argument that the very affili-
ates about which Congress said that it was most concerned (bank sub-
300. S. REP. No. 73-77, at 10 (1933).
301. Id.
302. The committee doubted that its legislation could ultimately succeed in preventing banks
from engaging in all of the "well-known subterfuges to maintain control" and it noted that state
legislation would no doubt continue to permit "the growth of affiliates in connection with State
banks and trust companies." Id.
303. The legislation as enacted cannot reasonably be said to approach as complete a separa-
tion "as possible." See Smoot, supra note 24, at 92-98.
304. S. REP. No. 73-77, at 10 (1933).
305. Id. at 16 (emphasis added).
306. Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, 72d Cong. 1st Sess.
(1932). More fully, Senator Glass remarked "that we had authoritative advice ... that would
have caused us to abolish investment affiliates outright.... Instead of doing that we have simply
proposed to regulate them, as we conceive, in a rational way." Id.
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sidiaries) were prohibited by Glass-Steagall from engaging in such
lesser level of securities activity as was left to bank affiliates by the
language that ultimately emerged in section 20.
c. A Word from the Supreme Court-Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System v. Investment Company Institute
Previous pronouncements by the Supreme Court concerning the
meaning of section 20, while not directly on point since they did not
deal with cases involving bank subsidiaries, nevertheless cast useful
light on this subject. In Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System v. Investment Company Institute ("IC"),307 the Court consid-
ered a challenge by the Institute3°8 to the Board's action in amending
its regulations to permit bank holding companies and their subsidiar-
ies to offer the services of an investment adviser to closed-end invest-
ment companies. 309 The Institute argued, first, that if a bank offered
such services, it would be in violation of Glass-Steagall sections 16, 20,
and 21.310 Second, according to the Institute, since a bank itself could
not offer such services, they could never be said to be "so closely re-
lated to banking . . . as to be a proper incident thereto," which is a
necessary prerequisite for Board approval of the services for holding
companies and their subsidiaries. 311 In rejecting both parts of the In-
stitute's argument,312 the Court gave useful guidance about the rela-
tionship of those parts of Glass-Steagall that relate to banks and those
parts that relate to bank affiliates.
307. 450 U.S. 46 (1981).
308. Investment Company Institute ("ICI") is a trade organization of open-end investment
companies, Ic!, 450 U.S. at 53, and a frequent party in bank securities powers litigation. See
Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617 (1971) (invalidating authorization by OCC of com-
mon trust fund created and maintained by bank for collective investment of customers' funds
held by bank as managing agent); Investment Co. Inst. v. Conover, 790 F.2d 925 (D.C. Cir. 1986)
(approving common trust fund created by bank for investment of IRA funds); Investment Co.
Inst. v. Clarke, 789 F.2d 175 (2d Cir. 1986) (approving creation of mutual fund for IRAs).
309. Under the Bank Holding Company Act, the Board is authorized to permit bank holding
companies to own shares of companies that engage in activities that are "so closely related to
banking ... as to be a proper incident thereto." 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1994). The Board had
amended its regulations to add the services of an investment adviser to closed-end investment
companies to the list of such "closely related" activities. Nonbanking Activities of Bank Holding
Companies, 37 Fed. Reg. 1463 (1972) (codified as amended at 12 C.F.R. pt. 225); Interest in
Nonbanking Activities, 36 Fed. Reg. 16,695, 17,514 (1971) (codified as amended at 12 C.F.R. pt.
222); see 12 C.F.R. § 225.4(a)(5)(ii) (1980). The Institute challenged the Board's statutory au-
thority to take such action. IC!, 450 U.S. at 49.
310. ICI, 450 U.S. at 58.
311. Id. at 58-59.
312. ICI, 450 U.S. at 59-60.
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The discussion in ICI involved activities that the Board had ap-
proved for bank holding company subsidiaries. 313 The Institute con-
tended that sections 16 and 21 ought to be applicable to those
subsidiaries because the bank and its holding company affiliates
"should be treated as a single entity" for purposes of those sections.314
The Court rejected this suggestion because, it found, the structure of
Glass-Steagall "reveals a congressional intent to treat banks sepa-
rately from their affiliates. ' 315 Thus, sections 16 and 21 "apply only to
banks and not to bank holding companies. '316 Section 21, which pro-
hibits organizations engaged in underwriting from accepting depos-
its317 and thus prevents investment banks from acting as deposit-
taking commercial banks, "cannot be read to include within its prohi-
bition separate organizations [for example, in this case, holding com-
pany subsidiaries] related by ownership with a bank, which does
receive deposits. '318 Section 21, in other words, applies to banks, not
to their affiliates.
The inapplicability of section 16 to bank affiliates is even clearer.
Section 16, said the Court, "by its terms applies only to banks. ' 319
Like section 21, section 16 "flatly prohibit[s] banks from engaging in
the underwriting business. Organizations affiliated with banks, how-
ever, are dealt with by other sections of the Act. '320 Under those sec-
tions, "bank affiliates may be authorized to engage in certain activities
that are prohibited to banks. ' 321
313. Id. at 48-49.
314. Id. at 58-59 n.24.
315. Id.
316. Id.
317. 12 U.S.C. § 378 (1994); see supra note 20 (setting forth the relevant parts of the text of
this provision).
318. ICI, 450 U.S. at 58 n.24; cf. Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Federal Home Loan Bank Bd., 588
F. Supp. 749, 763 (D.D.C. 1984) (rejecting SIA's challenge to the Board's approval of applica-
tions of savings and loan associations to permit service corporation they owned to invest in other
corporation offering certain brokerage and investment advisory services. The court stated that
"[e]ven [if] it is assumed arguendo that the proscriptions of the Glass-Steagall Act apply to
S&Ls, they are clearly inapplicable to service corporations that will not and cannot receive
deposits.").
319. ICI, 450 U.S. at 58 n.24.
320. Id. at 59 n.24.
321. Id. at 60 (footnote omitted). In making this point, the Court cited its earlier decision in
Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Agnew, 329 U.S. 441 (1947), for the proposition
that there is an important difference "in the extent of prohibition of securities-related activities
reflected in the use of the word 'engaged' in § 21 as opposed to the use of the words 'engaged
principally' in § 20." ICI, 450 U.S. at 60 n.26. In other words, continued the Court, "a less
stringent standard should apply to determine whether a holding company has violated § 20 than
is applied to a determination of whether a bank has violated §§ 16 and 21." Id. at 60-61 n.26.
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The most important of these "other sections," of course, is section
20,322 which the Court characterized as follows:
[I]mportantly, § 20 of the Act... prohibits national banks or state
bank members of the Federal Reserve System from owning securi-
ties affiliates, defined in § 2(b) .... that are "engaged principally" in
the issuance or underwriting of securities. Thus the structure of the
Act reveals a congressional intent to treat banks separately from
their affiliates. The reading of the Act urged by respondent [that is,
that provisions applicable to banks, like sections 16 and 21, apply as
well to bank affiliates] would render § 20 meaningless. 323
In other words, the various provisions of Glass-Steagall must be read
in a fashion that gives them independent meaning, rendering none of
these provisions superfluous. 324
Returning finally to the operating subsidiary question, a reading of
section 16 that would apply it to bank operating subsidiaries would do
comparable violence to the meaning of section 20. Moreover, the
Court's unqualified reference in ICI to section 20's application to se-
curities affiliates "owned" by banks is, to say the least, striking. It was
surely not mere inadvertence, sloppiness, or mistake. It surely reflects
a most straightforward reading of that section and the cross-refer-
enced definition of "affiliate," not to mention the historical fact of
bank ownership of securities subsidiaries at the time Glass-Steagall
was enacted. It furthermore renders the argument that the relatively
more permissive "engaged principally" standard applies only to bank
holding company subsidiaries and not to bank operating subsidiaries
even more precarious.
D. Other Arguments Against New Part 5 Rules
Opponents of the New Part 5 Rules advance two more important
arguments. They argue, first, that the proposed rules would create a
new and parallel system of securities subsidiaries that would exist in a
sort of regulatory limbo since Congress has enacted legislation (and
the Board has promulgated a body of implementing regulation) that
deals with a number of important issues for holding company subsidi-
aries, but Congress has taken no such action for bank operating sub-
sidiaries. Inconsistent regulation or incongruous results might ensue.
322. The Court also referred to section 19(e), since repealed, 80 Stat. 242, which provided that
a holding company could not vote shares of bank subsidiary stock unless it first divested itself of
any interest it held in a subsidiary that was "engaged principally" in issuing or underwriting
securities. ICI, 450 U.S. at 58-59 n.24.
323. Id. (emphasis added).
324. See Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 807 F.2d
1052, 1058 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
19971
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
Second, opponents assert that the proposed rules contradict OCC's
prior position that operating subsidiaries may do no more than their
parent banks are permitted to do, that is, that operating subsidiaries
are merely incorporated "departments" of banks.
The first argument misses the point that, as the courts have found,
there presently are competent regulators concerning themselves with
the affairs of operating subsidiaries (though not the Board), and the
second misinterprets or overstates the significance of OCC's prior
pronouncements. Whatever merit there may be in these arguments,
moreover, they are hardly sufficient counterweight to overcome the
direct points in favor of the New Part 5 Rules set forth in earlier parts
of this Article.
1. Bank Holding Company Act and New Part 5 Rules as Potentially
Warring Regulatory Schemes
The first point has been vigorously asserted by Representative John
Dingell and the Securities Industry Association ("SIA") in their com-
ments to OCC in opposition to the Proposed Part 5 Rules, and vari-
ants of it have made appearances in a number of cases involving the
authority of the Federal Reserve Board over banks and their subsidi-
aries. Representative Dingell has asserted that the proposed rules:
may not be viewed as a "reasonable" interpretation of the law to
the extent that they could result in the creation of a regulatory
scheme that could compete with the Congressionally-enacted Bank
Holding Company Act. The Bank Holding Company Act estab-
lishes specific permissible bank affiliate activities, separates affiliate
capital from bank capital, and provides for tough.., restrictions on
transactions with affiliates. The OCC proposal, while it may have
the benefits of flexibility, does not have the benefit of such publicly-
debated and Congressionally-mandated standards. 325
SIA's more detailed argument invokes both the requirements of the
Bank Holding Company Act and the responsibilities of the agency
that implements it, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System.326 SIA begins with a general observation:
The BHCA [Bank Holding Company Act], which permits bank
holding companies to engage in ineligible-securities activities
through non-bank (i.e., Section 20) subsidiaries, provides the exclu-
sive method by which Congress intended to permit bank affiliates to
engage in activities other than those in which a bank could engage
directly, such as ineligible-securities activities. Accordingly, . . . by
virtue of the BHCA, the OCC lacks the authority to permit an oper-
325. 1995 Dingell Letter, supra note 113, at 5.
326. SIA Letter, supra note 103, at 30-33.
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ating subsidiary of a national bank to engage in ineligible-securities
activities.327
The argument then proceeds as follows: One purpose of the Bank
Holding Company Act of 1956328 was "to promote 'the general pur-
poses of the Glass-Steagall Act-to prevent unduly extensive connec-
tions between banking and other businesses.' ' 329 In furtherance of
that purpose, section 4330 of that Act prohibits bank holding compa-
nies from owning shares of nonbank subsidiaries, with certain exemp-
tions, including most importantly one permitting holding company
ownership of shares of a company engaged in activities that the Board
determines "to be so closely related to banking or managing or con-
trolling banks as to be a proper incident thereto."'33'
The process contemplated by section 4 reflects Congress' determi-
nation that a holding company may own a company engaged in activi-
ties that are beyond the powers of a bank itself. More importantly,
continues the argument, this process reflects "the exclusive method by
which an affiliate of a bank may engage in activities-such as limited
ineligible-securities activities-that are 'closely related to banking' but
in which the bank itself may not engage. ' 332 Otherwise, a bank organ-
ization could avoid the specific requirements of section 4 (and other
parts of the Act) by having the activities that are "closely related to
banking" take place in an operating subsidiary rather than a holding
company subsidiary. Congress, as SIA sees it, could not have in-
tended this.333
Furthermore, says SIA, OCC may not interpret Glass-Steagall in a
manner that is inconsistent with the interpretation given Glass-Stea-
gall by the Board. This is because "the Board 'has primary responsi-
bility for implementing the Glass-Steagall Act.' ' 334 Next, SIA notes
that any implementation of the operating subsidiary rule that permits
a bank operating subsidiary to engage in bank-ineligible securities ac-
tivities would be inconsistent with the Board's interpretation of Glass-
327. Id. at 30. The words "ineligible-securities activities" in the above quotation mean the
same thing as "bank-ineligible securities activities" as used throughout this Article.
328. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1850 (1994).
329. SIA Letter, supra note 103, at 30 (quoting S. REP. No. 89-1179 (1966), reprinted in 1966
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2385, 2386). This was the report accompanying the 1966 amendments to the Bank
Holding Company Act. Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-485,
80 Stat. 236 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1841 (1994)).
330. 12 U.S.C. § 1843 (1994).
331. Id. § 1843(c)(8).
332. SIA Letter, supra note 103, at 31.
333. Id. at 31-32.
334. Id. at 32-33 (quoting Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve
Sys., 468 U.S. 207, 217 (1984)).
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Steagall because the Board's Regulation Y335 "require[s] that any in-
eligible-securities activities performed by an affiliate of a bank must
be performed by a section 20 subsidiary, as opposed to a subsidiary of
the bank. '336
Finally, an OCC interpretation of the operating subsidiary rule that
permitted a bank operating subsidiary to engage in bank-ineligible ac-
tivities would also undermine Congress' intention that the Board be
primarily responsible for interpretation of Glass-Steagall since, insofar
as operating subsidiaries engaged in such activities, Glass-Steagall is-
sues related to the activities would have to be determined by OCC
and not by the Board. This is because, as SIA acknowledges, "the
Board generally lacks authority over operating subsidiaries of national
banks." 337
This last point amounts to an argument that OCC may not issue and
interpret its regulations with respect to operating subsidiaries in a
manner that would otherwise be appropriate for OCC, as the desig-
nated regulator with responsibility for national banks and their busi-
nesses, because (i) such interpretation could clash with the affiliate
organization structures and rules that the Board has imposed by virtue
of its responsibility over bank holding companies and their nonbank-
ing subsidiaries and (ii) Congress has not given the Board authority
over banks and their subsidiaries. This peculiar argument, which has
the effect of giving the Board authority to determine what a bank op-
erating subsidiary may or (more importantly) may not do, is a bit of a
bootstrap and somewhat circular, at that. It also reveals the crack that
opens up SIA's carefully constructed, step-by-step position: Gener-
ally speaking, the Board simply lacks authority to interfere in the af-
fairs and regulation of banks (national- or state-chartered) and their
subsidiaries, which have successfully resisted Board efforts to rein in
activities approved by other bank regulatory agencies or permissible
under other (non-Bank Holding Company Act) bank regulatory
schemes.
Unlike Glass-Steagall, which is, on its face at least, reasonably clear
in its treatment of banks and their affiliates, the text of the Bank
Holding Company Act is quite complex and ultimately ambiguous in
its treatment of bank subsidiaries of holding companies and subsidiar-
ies of banks. The latter statute was enacted forty years ago to deal
with, among other things, bank holding companies and their involve-
335. Regulation Y may be found at 12 C.F.R. pt. 225 (1996).
336. SIA Letter, supra note 103, at 33. This statement assumes, of course, that a bank operat-
ing subsidiary is not a section 20 affiliate. But see supra Part V.C.2.
337. SIA Letter, supra note 103, at 33.
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ment in nonbanking activities.338 Under it, a bank holding company is
any company possessing "control over any bank or over any company
that is or becomes a bank holding company. '339
Congress enacted the Bank Holding Company Act after concluding
that banking organizations were taking advantage of the holding com-
pany structure to avoid Glass-Steagall's limits on nonbanking activi-
ties and other federal and state laws applicable to banks.340 Congress
sought to remedy such evasions in Glass-Steagall by limiting both the
share ownership rights of bank holding companies (the "ownership
limitation") and the activities in which bank holding companies may
engage (the "activities limitation"). The ownership limitation pro-
vides that, except as otherwise permitted by law, a bank holding com-
pany may not acquire "direct or indirect ownership or control" 341 of
voting shares of a company that is not a bank or retain "direct or
indirect ownership or control" 342 of voting shares of a company that is
not a bank or bank holding company. The activities limitation speci-
fies that bank holding companies may not engage in any activities
other than banking or managing or controlling banks or the activities
permitted under section 1843(c)(8). 343 Section 1843(c) consists of a
list of exemptions to the ownership and activities limitations, of which
the most important, contained in subsection (8), is for ownership of
shares of a company engaging in activities that the Board determines
"to be so closely related to banking ... as to be a proper incident
thereto."344
Whether the limitations in the Bank Holding Company Act apply to
bank operating subsidiaries depends in part upon whether the phrase
"indirect ownership and control" refers to a bank's ownership of
338. According to this Act, its purpose is to define holding companies, require them to divest
themselves of inappropriate nonbanking interests, and limit their future acquisitions. Bank
Holding Company Act of 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-511, §1, 70 Stat. 133.
339. 12 U.S.C. § 1841(a)(1) (1994). For this purpose, a "bank" is any bank whose deposits are
insured under the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, id. §§ 1841(c)(1)(A), 1813(h), or any domestic
institution that both accepts deposits and makes commercial loans, id. § 1841(c)(1)(B). This
definition includes both national banks and state-chartered banks. A company has "control"
over a bank or bank holding company if: (i) it directly or indirectly owns, controls or has power
to vote 25% or more of any class of voting securities of the bank or bank holding company; (ii) it
controls the election of a majority of the directors of the bank or bank holding company; or (iii)
the Board determines that it exercises, directly or indirectly, "a controlling influence" over the
bank or bank holding company. Id. § 1841(a)(2).
340. See H.R. REP. No. 84-609, at 7 (1955); 101 CONG. REC. 8032 (1955) (statement of Rep.
Rains).
341. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(a)(1).
342. Id. § 1843(a)(2).
343. Id.
344. Id. § 1843(c)(8).
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shares of such subsidiaries. The Act provides that shares held "by any
subsidiary of a bank holding company shall be deemed to be indirectly
owned or controlled by such bank holding company. ' '345 Finally, a
company is a "subsidiary" of a bank holding company if (i) the hold-
ing company directly or indirectly owns or controls 25% or more of
the company's voting shares, (ii) the holding company controls elec-
tion of a majority of the company's directors, or (iii) the Board con-
cludes that the holding company exercises a "controlling influence"
over the company.346
From the foregoing, it might appear that a bank operating subsidi-
ary is necessarily a "subsidiary" of the bank's holding company as a
matter of the "plain meaning" of the statute, as a consequence of
which the Bank Holding Company Act's limitations must apply to op-
erating subsidiaries. 347 Other definitional provisions of the Act, how-
345. Id. § 1841(g)(1). This provision was enacted ten years after the Bank Holding Company
Act and probably means a good deal less than a quick and literal read suggests. See infra notes
396-99 and accompanying text.
346. 12 U.S.C. § 1841(d).
347. Indeed, one federal court has, at least briefly, so found. See American Ins. Ass'n v.
Clarke, 865 F.2d 278 (D.C. Cir. 1988). In this case, OCC concluded that the National Bank Act
permitted a national bank to form a subsidiary for purposes of offering municipal bond insur-
ance. The D.C. Circuit agreed. Id. at 281-84. OCC also concluded that the limitations of the
Bank Holding Company Act did not impose any impediment to the subsidiary's activity because
that Act did not apply to national bank subsidiaries. The court rejected this assertion and re-
manded for further action consistent with its opinion. The following passage constitutes the
entirety of its statutory analysis of the Bank Holding Company Act issue:
A bank holding company.., is prohibited from acquiring "direct or indirect ownership
or control of any voting shares of any company which is not a bank," unless an excep-
tion applies. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(a)(1) (1982) .... Shares owned or controlled by any
subsidiary of a holding company are "deemed to be indirectly owned or controlled by
such bank holding company." 12 U.S.C. § 1841(g)(1) .... Citicorp [the bank holding
company] manifestly exercises indirect control over AMBAC [the national bank's sub-
sidiary] because AMBAC's parent [the national bank] is Citicorp's subsidiary.
Id. at 285. The court bolstered this conclusion by citing certain of the Board's pronouncements
and regulations on the subject, id., but was utterly oblivious to the significant statutory language
issues that seriously clouded so facile a finding, see infra notes 348-65.
In any event, shortly after issuing its decision, the D.C. Circuit panel granted petitions for
rehearing filed by OCC, the United States, and the bank holding company. The panel vacated
that part of the earlier decision related to the Bank Holding Company Act issue on the basis that
"it was inappropriate for us to have reached" that issue in this case, since its outcome was not
"essential" to OCC's determination under the National Bank Act and since OCC's conclusions
on the Bank Holding Company Act issue in this case would not have any "precedential effect" if
a party challenging the municipal bond insurance proposal sought to petition the Board concern-
ing it. Id. at 287 (per curiam).
Moreover, the D.C. Circuit panel concluded that the "exceptional circumstances" that might
require a court to cause OCC to "stay its hand" pending determination of an important Bank
Holding Company issue, see Whitney Nat'l Bank v. Bank of New Orleans & Trust Co., 379 U.S.
411, 426 n.7 (1965), were "not present," Clarke, 865 F.2d at 288. This too, reflected a change in
the panel's thinking. Whitney is generally seen as limited to instances in which OCC is consider-
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ever, befuddle any such simple reading. 348 The definition of
"subsidiary" refers to a "company" that is owned or controlled by a
bank holding company.349 Under the Act, the word "company"
means "any corporation, partnership, business trust, association, or
similar organization," 350 a definition that would appear broad enough
to encompass banks. However, the section defining "bank holding
company" repeatedly treats "companies" and "banks" as "mutually
exclusive" categories. 351 With that in mind and returning again to
"subsidiary," insofar as the definition of "company" does not include
"banks," then "subsidiary" must refer only to nonbank entities. Yet
ing the issuance of a new national bank charter in connection with which a "substantial" Bank
Holding Company Act issue is raised, see American Bank of Tulsa v. Smith, 503 F.2d 784, 789
(10th Cir. 1974), as the panel acknowledged in its initial opinion, Clarke, 865 F.2d at 285 ("We
are aware of no case that applies the substantial question doctrine outside the context of the
chartering of a new bank, and we do not decide that question today.").
This did not prevent the panel from nonetheless reaching the Bank Holding Company Act
issue in its initial decision, however. It did so on the rather puzzling basis that OCC could have,
in its discretion, conditioned its approval of the municipal bond insurance program on subse-
quent resolution of the issue by the Board and, apparently, should have. OCC's failure to con-
sider exercise of that discretion was inexcusable here, said the panel in its initial decision,
because the Bank Holding Company Act issue (whether that Act's specific prohibitions on bank
holding company involvement in insurance, 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1988), prohibited the munic-
ipal bond insurance program) was not frivolous. The panel therefore felt justified in deciding
that issue in its original decision. Id. at 285-86.
The panel's original opinion did considerable violence to the "exceptional circumstances" doc-
trine and it seems clear that the panel was straining to reach the Bank Holding Company Act
issue. The conclusion it initially reached on that issue and promptly vacated, however, is con-
trary to the conclusions reached (definitively) by other courts that have considered it. The panel
plainly failed to give careful consideration to the broader range of questions that are appropri-
ately addressed in connection with the issue. See infra notes 348-410 and accompanying text.
For purposes of the New Part 5 Rules, moreover, at least insofar as they involve securities
activities to the extent permitted to bank "affiliates" under Glass-Steagall section 20, it should be
noted that there is no "substantial" Bank Holding Company Act issue that is comparable to the
insurance issue presented in Clarke. The Board has already satisfied itself that bank section 20
affiliates may engage to a limited degree in underwriting and dealing. See supra Part V.B.
348. See Carol S. Shahmoon, Federal Reserve Board Authority over Bank Subsidiaries Under
the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 965, 974-75 (1991) (the definition of
terms, such as subsidiary and company, seem to vary among the different sections).
349. 12 U.S.C. § 1841(d). This section states:
"Subsidiary", with respect to a specified bank holding company, means (1) any com-
pany 25 per centum or more of whose voting shares ... is directly or indirectly owned
or controlled by such bank holding company ....
350. Id. § 1841(b).
351. Shahmoon, supra note 348, at 975. Thus, a "company" is said to have "control over a
bank or over any company" when certain circumstances exists. 12 U.S.C. § 1841(a)(2) (emphasis
added). Where a "company" owns less than 5% of any class of voting securities of "a given bank
or company," there is a presumption of lack of "control" for certain purposes. Id. § 1841(a)(3)
(emphasis added). Similarly, for certain purposes a "company" may not be found to have "con-
trol" over "any given bank or company" unless that "company" owns or controls 5% or more of
a class of voting securities "of the bank or company." Id. § 1841(a)(4) (emphasis added).
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section 1843(a)(1) expressly prohibits a bank holding company from
acquiring "any voting shares of any company which is not a bank. '352
As has been noted elsewhere, "[t]his language appears to indicate that
banks may be a specific type of company. ' 353 Under the circum-
stances, then, the text of the Bank Holding Company Act provides
very mixed signals as to whether "banks" are "subsidiaries" that are
subject to that Act's limitations, which in turn casts doubt on any easy
conclusion that bank operating subsidiaries are subject to that Act's
limitations.
The courts have also noted the lack of clarity of the text of the Bank
Holding Company Act with respect to its applicability to banks and
bank subsidiaries. In Independent Insurance Agents of America v.
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 354 the Board took
the position that a bank holding company could retain the stock of
two state-chartered banks that engaged in the general insurance busi-
ness, as permitted by state law.355 Insurance industry trade organiza-
tions asserted that the prohibitions on such activities set forth in
section 4 of the Bank Holding Company Act 356 applied to these state
banks, whose shares the holding company could not retain unless the
subsidiaries ceased their insurance activities. The Board determined
that those prohibitions did not apply to bank subsidiaries of a bank
holding company. 357 The Second Circuit observed at the outset of its
statutory analysis of the applicability of section 4:
Though both sides support their views of the statute by relying on
some of the statutory language, we cannot say that the provisions of
the Act reveal an unambiguous congressional intent concerning the
352. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(a)(1).
353. Shahmoon, supra note 348, at 975.
354. 890 F.2d 1275 (2d Cir. 1989).
355. Merchants Nat'l Corp., 75 Fed. Res. Bull. 388 (1989). The two banks were chartered in
Indiana, whose law permitted banks "to solicit and write insurance as agent or broker for any
insurance company authorized to do business in this state, other than a life insurance company."
Id. at 389 n.2 (citing IND. CODE ANN. § 28-1-11-2 (Michie 1986)).
The Board had previously approved the holding company's application for permission to ac-
quire the two banks, subject to the holding company's agreement that it would cause the banks
to divest their insurance operations within two years unless it obtained Board approval of reten-
tion of the insurance activities by the end of that period and that, in the interim, it would cause
the banks to limit their insurance activities to renewal of existing policies. Merchants Nat'l
Corp., 72 Fed. Res. Bull. 838 (1986).
356. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8). This provision permits bank holding companies to acquire or
retain shares of any company whose activities are "so closely related to banking ... as to be a
proper incident thereto," but it further specifies that "for purposes of this subsection it is not
closely related to banking ... for a bank holding company to provide insurance as a principal,
agent, or broker" with certain exceptions not here relevant. Id.
357. Independent Ins. Agents, 890 F.2d at 1279; see Merchants Nat'l Corp., 72 Fed. Res. Bull.
at 838.
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precise question at issue .... Both sides claim that the text of the
Act supports their interpretations, and each can find some, but not
overwhelming, support in various words and phrases.358
Thus, on the one hand, given the use of the phrase "directly or
through a subsidiary" in an activities grandfathering proviso in section
4(a)(2), 359 the absence of similar language in the main activities limita-
tion language immediately preceding the proviso suggests that Con-
gress deliberately chose not to limit the activities of bank subsidiaries.
Similarly, the ownership limitation in that section prohibits bank hold-
ing companies from retaining "direct or indirect ownership" of voting
shares of companies that are not banks or bank holding companies.
The lack of similar wording in the activities limitation suggests the
same choice by Congress. 360 On the other hand, such differences in
wording could reflect a lack of care in assembling the different clauses
and standardizing their phrasing in the final assemblage. 361 It is also
difficult to see how this line of reasoning may be confined to banking
subsidiaries of holding companies.
Structural arguments looking broadly at the Bank Holding Com-
pany Act as a whole similarly support both positions. If the activities
limitations in section 4(a)(2) apply to holding company subsidiaries,
then it would appear that the ownership limitation therein would be
redundant since the activities limitation would be sufficient by itself to
prevent ownership of shares of a company that is not a bank or hold-
ing company. 362 Alternatively, the section 4(c)(8) exemption 363 uses
358. Independent Ins. Agents, 890 F.2d at 1280-81. The court further observed:
We find no provision that says, in substance, "The Board may not regulate the activities
of bank subsidiaries of bank holding companies," or "Bank subsidiaries of bank holding
companies may engage in nonbank activities to the extent permitted by their chartering
authorities." The Board reads the Act as if it contained such language. On the other
hand, we find no provision that says, in substance, "Bank subsidiaries of bank holding
companies may not engage in nonbank activities." The [insurance industry trade
group] reads the Act as if it contained this wording.
Id. at 1281 (citations omitted); see Citicorp v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Bd., 936
F.2d 66, 69 (2d Cir. 1991) (reiterating the finding in Independent Insurance Agents v. Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System that the Bank Holding Company Act is "not entirely
clear" on the question of its applicability to bank subsidiaries of bank holding companies; oppos-
ing positions on this issue "could plausibly be based on some of the language of the Act, some
aspects of the structure of the Act, and some passages from the legislative history"); id. at 76
(Bank Holding Company Act is "not clear as to whether it requires bank holding companies and
all subsidiaries within their systems to observe a total separation from nonbanking activities").
359. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(a)(2). This section states: "Provided, That a company ... may also
engage in those activities in which directly or through a subsidiary (i) it was lawfully engaged on
June 30, 1968 . . . and (ii) it has been continuously engaged since June 30, 1968. ... Id.
(emphasis added).
360. Independent Ins. Agents, 890 F.2d at 1281.
361. Id.
362. Id.
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"company" to describe the organizations entitled to the exemption,
and "company" is defined broadly enough364 to include banks. 365
Since the language of the statute leaves the intentions of Congress
more than a little opaque, legislative history may appropriately be
consulted to help settle the question of the applicability of section 4's
limitations to bank subsidiaries of holding companies. 366 While some
of the pertinent legislative history, particularly isolated statements by
legislators speaking out broadly about the need to separate banking
from nonbanking activities, is ambiguous, 367 other parts suggest that
Congress was well aware of state laws permitting state-chartered insti-
tutions to engage in a variety of nonbank activities and did not intend
the Bank Holding Company Act to displace such activities.368
Indeed, it is useful to recall that the reason for the enactment of the
Bank Holding Company Act in 1956 was to plug the holding company
loophole in the nation's banking laws369 and not to supplant the extant
system of state and federal banking laws giving primary regulatory
authority to state and federal chartering bodies. 370 As the comptroller
more recently observed, his office and state bank authorities had been
regulating banks for almost 100 years before Congress enacted the
Bank Holding Company Act, by which Congress "did not intend to
change this regulatory scheme. ' '371 Since banks were already them-
363. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8). This is the "closely related to banking" exemption.
364. Id. § 1841(b).
365. Independent Ins. Agents, 890 F.2d at 1282. Though this issue is not quite so simple. See
supra notes 349-53 and accompanying text.
366. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-45,
859-63 (1984).
367. See, e.g., 102 CONG. REC. 6853 (1956) (statement of Sen. Barkley); 101 CONG. REc. 8184
(1955) (statement of Rep. Smith); 101 CONG. REC. 8035 (1955) (statement of Rep. Multer); 101
Cong. Rec. 8033 (1955) (statement of Rep. O'Hara); 101 CONG. REC. 8030 (1955) (statement of
Rep. Rains). It is not clear whether these statements apply to holding companies or to their
bank subsidiaries and they seem to focus on ownership more than activity. Independent Ins.
Agents, 890 F.2d at 1283.
368. See Control and Regulation of Bank Holding Companies: Hearings on H.R. 2674 Before
House Comm. on Banking and Currency, 84th Cong. 536 (1955) (testimony of Ellery C. Hunt-
ington); id. at 553 (statements of Reps. Spence and Brown).
369. In contrast to the "considerable care" taken to enable state and federal banking authori-
ties to control the activities of banks themselves, "there is at present only a very limited control
over the activities of bank holding companies." S. REP. No. 84-1095, at 2 (1955); see 102 CONG.
REC. 6854 (1956) (statement of Sen. Capehart) (Act intended to prevent a bank holding com-
pany from doing "something that a bank may not do"); 101 CONG. REC. 8021 (1955) (statement
of Rep. Spence) (limiting evasion of restrictions on branch banking); Shahmoon, supra note 348,
at 976-77.
370. See S. REP. No. 91-1084, at 31-32 (1970); 101 CONG. REC. 8037 (1955) (statement of Rep.
Brown); PAULINE B. HELLER, FEDERAL BANK HOLDING COMPANY LAW § 4.02[6] (1996).
371. Real Estate Investment Activities, O.C.C. Q. J., June 1985, at 48 (citing Letter of C.T.
Conover, Comptroller, to Board of Governors of Federal Reserve System).
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selves adequately monitored, the Act had the more limited purpose of
dealing with "organizations which should be included in the scope of
[the Act] without unnecessarily encompassing organizations that need
not be included in order to accomplish the purposes of the [Act]." 372
In any event, consistent with the foregoing analysis, the Board in
Independent Insurance Agents v. Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System took the position that section 4 of the Bank Holding
Company Act did not apply to bank subsidiaries of bank holding com-
panies. 373 The Board believed that the legislative history of the Act
and its amendments show "a congressional purpose to leave the scope
of permissible activities of bank subsidiaries of a bank holding com-
pany subject only to the authority that issued the banks' charter, with-
out any further restriction from the Act itself. '374
The Second Circuit found this interpretation to be reasonable. If
this interpretation, which "confides decisions concerning the scope of
insurance and other nonbank activities of bank subsidiaries to their
national and state chartering authorities," is to be hereafter changed,
said the Second Circuit, "Congress will have to enact suitable legisla-
tion. '375 Left for another day because it was not squarely presented,
however, was the question of the Board's authority over activities of
372. S. REP. No. 84-1095, at 8 (1955). The Senate and House reports accompanying the Act
contain no hint that the Act added any further restrictions on the activities of bank subsidiaries
of holding companies. See id. at 11-12; H.R. REP. No. 84-609, at 16-17 (1955); Shahmoon, supra
note 348, at 978-82.
Even the seemingly troublesome wording of 12 U.S.C. § 1841(g)(1) (1994), which provides
that "shares owned or controlled by any subsidiary of a bank holding company shall be deemed
to be indirectly owned or controlled by such bank holding company," should not be read to
suggest that Congress intended any expansion of coverage of the Act to encompass as well sub-
sidiaries of holding company banks. See Real Estate Investment Activities, see supra note 371, at
48, 51 (quoting Letter of C.T. Conover, Comptroller, to Board of Governors of Federal Reserve
System, as stating that the Bank Holding Company Act should not be seen as applying "to the
subsidiaries of holding company banks, unless there is persuasive legislative history addressing
the subsidiary question directly. To our knowledge, there is no such legislative history ... ").
This provision was not a part of the original incarnation of the Act and did not make its appear-
ance until the 1966 amendments. Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1966, Pub. L.
No. 89-485, § 6, 80 Stat. 236, 237. The little legislative history there is concerning this provision,
S. REP. No. 89-1179, at 8 (1966), provides very generally that its three subsections were intended
to help the Board in ascertaining "whether a company indirectly controls another company."
There is reason to believe that 12 U.S.C. § 1841(g) (1994) is the direct result of a particularly
notorious abuse of the holding company device of "shell" corporations to avoid the operation of
the Bank Holding Company Act as then in force, see Shahmoon, supra note 348, at 979, and not
to effect a major change in the meaning or coverage of the Act.
373. 890 F.2d 1275, 1279 (2d Cir. 1989)
374. Id. (footnote omitted).
375. Id. at 1284.
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subsidiaries of bank subsidiaries of holding companies, that is, Board
authority over bank operating subsidiaries. 376
That day came less than two years later in Citicorp v. Board of Gov-
ernors of the Federal Reserve System,377 which involved a challenge by
a bank holding company to an order of the Board requiring one of the
holding company's bank subsidiaries to terminate the insurance busi-
ness of the bank's operating subsidiary. 378 In this case, Delaware
law 379 permitted its state-chartered banks to conduct insurance activi-
ties either directly in a department.of the bank or through a subsidiary
of the bank.380 In either case, the bank was required to maintain sub-
stantial fire walls between insurance and banking activities to protect
the bank's safety and soundness.381 The Board had initially approved
the insurance subsidiary as a subsidiary of the holding company that
could engage in credit-related insurance activities that are expressly
permitted under section 4(c)(8)(A) of the Bank Holding Company
Act.382 Thereafter, the holding company transferred the voting shares
of its insurance subsidiary to the holding company's Delaware bank
subsidiary for purposes of enabling the insurance subsidiary to take
advantage of the broader range of insurance activities permitted
under Delaware law than under the Bank Holding Company Act.383
When the bank operating subsidiary began engaging in insurance un-
derwriting and related activities beyond the scope of section 4(c)(8)'s
exemptions, the ever vigilant insurance industry trade groups peti-
tioned the Board with their complaint that the insurance subsidiary's
activities exceeded what was permissible under the Board's operating
subsidiary rule contained in its Regulation y.384
Under the Board's operating subsidiary rule, the operating subsidi-
ary of a state-chartered bank subsidiary of a bank holding company
may engage in such nonbank activities as are permitted to it under
state law, so long as those activities conform to the limitations that
would be applicable to a bank directly engaging in the activities. 385
The Board responded to the petitions by concluding that the activities
were not authorized by or exempted under Regulation Y and thus
376. Id. at 1282-83.
377. 936 F.2d 66 (2d Cir. 1991).
378. Id. at 68.
379. 67 Del. Laws 223 (1990).
380. Citicorp, 936 F.2d at 70.
381. 67 Del. Laws §§ 3, 5, 8, 10, 17, 38.
382. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8)(A) (1994).
383. Citicorp, 936 F.2d at 70.
384. 12 C.F.R. pt. 225 (1996).
385. Id. § 225.22(d)(2)(ii). The court noted the similarity to the operating subsidiary rule for
national banks, § 225.22(d)(I). Citicorp, 936 F.2d at 70 n.1.
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were in violation of the Bank Holding Company Act.386 Accordingly,
the Board ordered the holding company to cause the bank operating
subsidiary to discontinue insurance activities that exceeded what was
permissible under section 4(c)(8)(A). 387
In its petition to the Second Circuit challenging the Board's order,
the bank holding company argued that the insurance activities of its
bank operating subsidiary conformed with Regulation Y, a position
that the court rejected, though with considerable reluctance.388 The
holding company also asserted that the Board lacks authority under
the Bank Holding Company Act to regulate the activities of the
bank's operating subsidiary.389 On this point, the Second Circuit re-
minded the Board that another panel of the circuit had recently ac-
cepted as reasonable the Board's view that "Congress intended to
leave unimpaired the primary regulatory authority of state and na-
tional bank chartering agencies to determine the activities of institu-
tions under their jurisdiction. '390 That first step, which was taken by
the Board two years earlier with respect to the authority of bank char-
tering agencies over their chartered banks in the face of an effort to
apply the Bank Holding Company Act to those banks, would deci-
sively color the Second Circuit's consideration of the statutory issue
raised in this second case concerning the authority of those chartering
agencies over bank operating subsidiaries. This case would have to be
resolved in a manner consistent with the rationale of the first case.39'
If the Bank Holding Company Act permits bank chartering agen-
cies to retain authority to regulate the banks they have chartered, then
the chartering agencies surely also have "ample authority to deter-
386. Citicorp, 936 F.2d at 71.
387. Id.
388. Id. at 72-73. The court found the Board's position on this point to be burdened with
significant inconsistencies but ultimately decided to defer to the Board's reading of the meaning
of its own regulations. Id.
389. Id. at 71.
390. Id. at 73. The court referred to its earlier consideration of "the extent to which banks are
authorized to engage in nonbanking activities" in Independent Insurance Agents v. Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 890 F.2d 1275 (2d Cir. 1989). Id. at 68; see supra notes
354-65 and accompanying text (discussing the Second Circuit opinion in more detail).
391. The court stated:
Thus, in the aftermath of [Independent Insurance Agents v. Board of Governors], we
take the Act as if it said in terms, "The Board is without authority to limit the activities
of a bank subsidiary of a bank holding company." Now the question is whether the
Board may nonetheless regulate the activities of a bank subsidiary's subsidiary. The
rationale of the position that the Board successfully urged upon us in [Independent
Insurance Agents] requires an answer consistent with the interpretation the Board there
urged us to adopt.
Citicorp, 936 F.2d at 73.
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mine the permissible activities of the subsidiaries owned by the
banks. '392 The Board offered no satisfactory reason why the charter-
ing agency's jurisdiction should not extend to all entities controlled by
the bank. Indeed, the detailed and careful fire-wall restrictions im-
posed by Delaware law and implemented by Delaware's bank regula-
tors on insurance activities performed in a bank operating subsidiary
were ample proof that the chartering agency had considerable interest
in and authority over subsidiaries owned by the bank.393 The court
found the "generation-skipping approach" 394 of the Board to be so
strange that it refused to believe that Congress could have intended
such a thing, particularly in light of section 7 of the Bank Holding
Company Act: "No provision of this chapter shall be construed as
preventing any State from exercising such powers and jurisdiction
which it now has or may hereafter have with respect to... banks...
and subsidiaries thereof. '395
Nor does section 2(g)(1), which states that shares held by any sub-
sidiary of a holding company (for example, by a bank) "shall be
deemed to be indirectly owned or controlled by such bank holding
company, '396 save the Board's position. The court refused to adopt
any literalist reading of that provision that might, as a consequence of
a finding that the insurance operating subsidiary is "owned" by the
holding company, result in a prohibition on state-chartered bank sales
of insurance, as fully permissible under state law, through an operat-
ing subsidiary.397 Congress could not have had such an outcome in
mind when it enacted section 2(g)(1), which was altogether noncon-
troversial when enacted, seemingly aimed at a "technical question" of
the definition of control. 398 The Second Circuit took further comfort
392. Id.
393. Id.
394. Id. The court was referring to the Board's idea that, while the Board had authority over
the activities of a bank holding company and over the subsidiary of the holding company's bank
subsidiary, the bank itself, occupying the middle generation, was uniquely free from the Board's
authority. Id. at 73-74.
395. 12 U.S.C. § 1846 (1988).
396. 12 U.S.C. § 1841(g)(1) (1994).
397. Citicorp, 936 F.2d at 74.
398. The Second Circuit stated:
Citicorp [the holding company] contends, and we agree, that the purpose of section
2(g)(1) was to make clear that the BHCA applied when a holding company's nonbank
subsidiaries controlled, but did not wholly own, another company. See Amend the
Bank Holding Company Act of 1956: Hearings on S. 2353, S. 2418 and H.R. 7371
Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, Pt. 1, 89th Cong.,
2d Sess. 342 (1966) ("Technical question[] ha[s] arisen" regarding applicability of
phrase to situation in which a bank holding company "owns less than 50% of the voting
shares of" a company that owns another company.). The 1966 amendment was noncon-
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in its conclusion in the fact that the other two federal bank regulatory
agencies also rejected the Board's reading of the Bank Holding Com-
pany Act to give the Board, rather than state chartering agencies, au-
thority over bank operating subsidiaries. 399
With the issue of Board authority over activities of state-chartered
banks and activities of operating subsidiaries of state-chartered banks
thus apparently settled, it is only a matter of awaiting the arrival of the
right case for the remaining pieces of the picture to be completed.
The reasoning of Independent Insurance Agents v. Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System and Citicorp v. Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System with respect to state-chartered banks and
their operating subsidiaries, respectively, is readily applicable to na-
tional banks and their operating subsidiaries. 400 In Norwest Bank
Minnesota National Ass'n v. Sween Corp.,401 a federal district court
expressly adopted the reasoning of those two opinions in a case in-
volving applicability of the Bank Holding Company Act to national
banks.402 The district court's approving reference to Citicorp suggests
that it would have reached the same conclusion with respect to the
applicability of that Act to national bank operating subsidiaries. 40 3
Returning now to the controversy surrounding the New Part 5
Rules, it appears that, barring a change in judicial treatment of the
subject, 40 4 the Board simply has little or no role to play in the regula-
troversial and elicited no opposition from national or state bank regulators who surely
would have objected, as they do now, to the contention that the amendment permits
the Fed, and not these chartering regulators, to determine what activities may be en-
gaged in by the operating subsidiary of a bank subject to their jurisdiction.
Citicorp, 936 F.2d at 74.
399. Citicorp, 936 F.2d at 75. "In our [the FDIC's] view, subsidiaries of state banks are be-
yond the scope of the Bank Holding Company Act." Id. (citing Letter of L. William Seidman to
Alan Greenspan (Apr. 28, 1989)). "[T]he Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC)
does not believe that the BHCA gives the [Board] the authority to regulate or define permissible
activities of state banks, whether conducted directly or through subsidiaries." Id. (citing Letter
of Dean S. Marriott to William W. Wiles (Apr. 28, 1989)).
400. Indeed, in many critical passages, the Second Circuit did not limit its reasoning to state
entities. See supra notes 390 & 398 and accompanying text (referring to national banks as well as
state banks).
401. 916 F. Supp. 1494 (D. Minn. 1996).
402. Id. at 1507-08.
403. Id. at 1507.
404. These questions have not, of course, been addressed by the Supreme Court as yet, but
inferences can be drawn from the Court's decision and reasoning in ICI that suggest that the
Court would probably adopt the reasoning of the circuit and district court cases discussed above.
In ICI, the Investment Company Institute challenged the Board's amendment to its Regulation
Y, 12 C.F.R. § 225.4(a)(5)(ii) (1995), that by its terms permitted bank holding companies and
their nonbank subsidiaries to act as investment advisors to closed-end investment companies.
ICI, 450 U.S. 46, 53 (1981). In the course of its opinion, the Court noted that the Institute
argued that the regulation it was challenging "authorizes banks as well as bank holding compa-
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tion of bank operating subsidiaries, as in fact SIA conceded in its let-
ter of comment to OCC.405 That does not quite end the point since
SIA argued more generally that the Proposed Part 5 Rules, by permit-
ting OCC to regulate activities for banks and their subsidiaries that
are also, when carried out by bank holding companies and their non-
bank subsidiaries, regulated by the Board, could introduce inconsis-
tency and anomaly into banking regulation. 40 6 "Congress could not
have intended such a result," said SIA, "when it gave the Board pri-
mary responsibility for interpreting the Glass-Steagall Act. '40 7
This is an argument in favor of preserving a particular view of co-
herence in the regulatory fabric by invoking the purposes of an act,
here the Bank Holding Company Act, to achieve an outcome that is
nies and nonbank subsidiaries to act as investment advisors.... Respondent [Institute] contends
that banks have relied on the interpretive ruling as authorization for them to sponsor investment
companies." Id. at 59 n.25.
In rejecting this point, the Court suggested that the Board could not have granted such author-
ity to banks, even if it intended to do so, because the Board had no power to confer permission
to engage in such activities on banks. Specifically, the Court said:
The simple answer to this argument [that the challenged regulation authorized banks as
well as holding companies and non-bank subsidiaries to act as investment advisors] is
that not only does the interpretive ruling confer no authorization [on banks] to under-
take any activities, but also the Board does not have the power to confer such authoriza-
tion on banks.
Id. (emphasis added). The Court went on to quote with clear approval the Board's opinion on
this point:
As the Board's opinion in this case stated: "[Tihe Board's regulation was adopted pur-
suant to section 4(c)(8) of the Bank Holding Company Act and authorizes investment
advisory activity to be conducted by a nonbanking subsidiary of the holding company.
The authority of national banks or state member banks to furnish investment advisory
services does not derive from the Board's regulation; such authority would exist inde-
pendently of the Board's regulation and its scope is to be determined by a particular
bank's primary supervisory agency."
Id.; see Independent Ins. Agents v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 890 F.2d 1275,
1284 (2d Cir. 1989); Cameron Fin. Corp. v. Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 497 F.2d
841, 848 (4th Cir. 1974).
In yet another respect, the Supreme Court's reasoning in ICI is pertinent to this question of
whether provisions of the Bank Holding Company Act can be found to restrain bank operating
subsidiary activities that other provisions of law, in particular, Glass-Steagall, would seem to
permit. After careful consideration in ICI of the convoluted history of enactment of the Bank
Holding Company Act, the Court concluded:
Nothing in the legislative history of the Bank Holding Company Act persuades us that
Congress in 1956 intended to effect a more complete separation between commercial
and investment banking than the separation that the Glass-Steagall Act had achieved
with respect to banks in §§ 16 and 21 ....
450 U.S. at 71. In other words, the Bank Holding Company Act cannot be read to expand the
reach of the bank-ineligible limitations contained in Glass-Steagall, whatever they are. Nor did
subsequent amendments to that Act have any such expansive result. Id. at 71-73 n.49.
405. SIA Letter, supra note 103, at 33.
406. Id. at 32-33.
407. Id. at 33.
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not to be clearly found in the actual words of the act. The Board itself
has from time to time invoked such a general "plain purpose" of the
Bank Holding Company Act argument. It typically falls on deaf judi-
cial ears, however.408 As the Supreme Court stated in a related con-
text, "[i]f the Bank Holding Company Act falls short of providing
safeguards desirable or necessary to protect the public interest, that is
a problem for Congress, and not the Board or the courts, to ad-
dress. ' '40 9 Similarly, if the inability of the Board to regulate bank op-
erating subsidiaries is a serious impediment to protection of
regulatory coherence, this is a problem for Congress to address.410
2. Operating Subsidiary as Mere Department of Bank-Prior OCC
Statements and Policy
The final point in the argument against the operating subsidiary ele-
ment of the New Part 5 Rules is that OCC has historically limited the
activities of operating subsidiaries to those which the operating sub-
sidiary's bank parent could undertake. This is seen as part of the orig-
inal rationale for the creation of operating subsidiaries. OCC, it is
asserted, may not now, at this late date, undertake such a fundamental
change in its regulatory approach, one indeed that is allegedly incon-
sistent with the basis for permitting operating subsidiaries. 411
Without doubt, OCC has broken new ground with its suggestion
that it would entertain, on a case-by-case basis, proposals for operat-
ing subsidiaries to engage in activities that, while within the "business
of banking," are nonetheless beyond the authority of national banks.
408. See, e.g., Synovus Fin. Corp. v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Bd., 952 F.2d 426
(D.C. Cir. 1991); MCorp. Fin. v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 900 F.2d 852 (5th
Cir. 1990), rev'd on other grounds, 502 U.S. 32 (1991); cf. Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve
Sys. v. Dimension Fin. Corp., 474 U.S. 361 (1986).
409. Dimension Fin. Corp., 474 U.S. at 37. The context of this case was that the Board at-
tempted to assert its authority over institutions (so-called "nonbank banks") that reserved the
right to require notice before withdrawal of funds from an account, typically a NOW (negotiable
order of withdrawal) account. Thus, its depositors lacked a "legal right to withdraw on de-
mand," which is a key part of the definition of "banks" that the Board could regulate. 12 U.S.C.
§ 1841(c) (1994). As a matter of course, these institutions rarely exercised this right of notice.
Because of the explosive growth of NOW accounts that functioned very much like ordinary
checking accounts, the Board was concerned that many financial institutions that were function-
ally equivalent to banks were escaping its regulatory reach. It accordingly amended its regula-
tions to define "bank" to mean an institution that accepts deposits that "as a matter of practice"
are payable on demand, even if the depositor has no "legal right" (the phrase in the statute) to
demand immediate withdrawal. The Court rejected the regulation as being clearly contrary to
the statute. Dimension Fin. Corp., 474 U.S. at 367-68, 373-75.
410. See Independent Ins. Agents v. Board of Governors of the Fed Reserve Sys., 890 F.2d at
1284 ("If that interpretation [that the activities of banks are beyond the Board's authority] is to
be altered, Congress will have to enact suitable legislation.").
411. See 1995 Dingell Letter, supra note 113, at 6; SIA Letter, supra note 103, at 14-15, 18-20.
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The prior version of its operating subsidiary rule provided that all
rules applicable to banks were equally applicable to operating subsidi-
aries.4 12 When OCC first formalized its operating subsidiary rule in
1966, it described an operating subsidiary as "a corporation the func-
tions or activities of which are limited to one or several of the func-
tions or activities that a national bank is authorized to carry on. ' '413
This approach has persisted in prior amendments to section 5.34.414
Moreover, in describing the activities and operations of operating sub-
sidiaries, OCC has frequently invoked the image or analogy of a "sep-
arately incorporated department of the bank. '415
412. See Rules, Policies, and Procedures for Corporate Activities, 12 C.F.R. § 5.34 (1996);
supra note 61 and accompanying text.
413. Acquisition of Controlling Stock Interest in Subsidiary Operations Corporation, 31 Fed.
Reg. 11,459 (1966). The OCC stated:
It is antediluvian to contend, as some still do, that there is an inevitable tendency for
banks to conduct operations of their subsidiary corporations in a way that is unsuitable
for a part of a banking enterprise, to disregard pertinent restrictions and requirements,
and, in particular, to venture through their subsidiaries into activities which are beyond
the powers of the parent bank.
Id. at 11,460.
414. See Operating Subsidiaries, Other Equity Investments, Conversions, Changes in Equity
Capital, Subordinated Debt, 55 Fed. Reg. 996-97 (1990) ("A national bank's decision to carry on
activities in an operating subsidiary as opposed to the bank itself is a business decision. National
bank operating subsidiaries are treated under the National Bank Act ... as part of the bank
itself. The subsidiaries' activities are limited to activities permissible for the parent national
bank.... Thus, to determine whether a national bank operating subsidiary legally may conduct
a particular activity, the OCC is governed by the rules applicable to national banks them-
selves."); Corporate Applications; Operating Subsidiaries, 48 Fed. Reg. 1,732 (Jan. 14, 1983)
(proposing amendments) ("An operating subsidiary of a national bank may perform only activi-
ties that can be performed within the corporate structure of its parent bank.").
415. See SIA Letter, supra note 103, at 15 n.21 (quoting Letter from Peter Liebesman, Assis-
tant Director, Legal Advisory Services Division, OCC, to James A. Peden, Jr., Stennet, Wilken-
son & Ward (July 2, 1981)), stating that "[a]n operating subsidiary is, in effect, an incorporated
department of the bank and may perform any business function which the parent bank is permit-
ted to perform."); id. at 18 n.28 (quoting Letter from Peter Liebesman, Assistant Director, Legal
Advisory Services Division, OCC, to Eugene E. Henn, Vice President and Senior Counsel,
American Fletcher National Bank (Mar. 15, 1983) that "[c]onceptually, the OCC regards operat-
ing subsidiaries as integral departments of the parent bank. All of the banking laws generally
applicable to the parent bank also apply to its subsidiaries."); id. at 14-15 (quoting Letter from
Doyle L. Arnold, Senior Deputy Comptroller for Policy and Planning, to OCC (Apr. 18, 1984))
[hereinafter Arnold Letter]. The Arnold Letter states:
National Banks are generally prohibited by 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh) from acquiring
corporate stock. However, this Office has interpreted this prohibition as being inappli-
cable to a bank's ownership of stock of an operating subsidiary. This interpretation is
based on the fact that a bank's operating subsidiaries are merely separately incorpo-
rated departments of the bank. This being the case, the ownership of the stock of such
corporation does not involve the bank in speculation in securities that section 24 (Sev-
enth) is intended to prevent. Rather, it represents a bank's legitimate adoption of a
particular organizational structure.
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In response to critical commentary concerning the Proposed Part 5
Rules, OCC readily acknowledged that it has used the "department of
a bank" descriptive tag, but it says that critics misunderstand the rea-
sons for such use. This was intended, says OCC, as a shorthand
phrase to capture the idea that a bank, like any other corporation,
might find it preferable for reasons of convenience to conduct some of
its business affairs through a subsidiary rather than within the bank
itself.416 In any event, neither use of that phrase nor prior versions of
section 5.34 should be taken as an indication that OCC believes or
believed that "a [bank operating] subsidiary's functions had to be so
limited," 417 that is, limited to those functions or activities that a bank
is permitted to undertake and no more.
By the same token, however, the class of activities that an operating
subsidiary might undertake, but that a bank could not, is necessarily
quite limited, by law and by the New Part 5 Rules themselves. Any
such activity must in any event be part of or incidental to the "busi-
ness of banking," and furthermore, it must be a bank-related activity
that, for one reason or another, the bank itself may not undertake but
a subsidiary might. Where a disability to conduct a part of the busi-
ness of banking is limited in its application to a national bank but does
not apply to the bank's subsidiary, OCC believes that it is perfectly
appropriate for it to consider, on a case-by-case basis, whether the
subsidiary may properly, consistent with safety, soundness, and other
prudential concerns, undertake the activity that its banking parent
may not.418  Indeed, said OCC, with more than a little
understatement:
The OCC's proposal only establishes a process that enables the
OCC to consider and act on a broader range of corporate activities
than is currently permitted for operating subsidiaries. The OCC has
not committed to approving any particular activity. In addition,
consistent with past practice, the OCC will evaluate an application
to engage in any new operating subsidiary activity on a case-by-case
basis following a comprehensive review of any supervisory, policy,
or legal concerns.419
OCC has given only one example of the kind of activity that might
fit into this narrow category: the bank operating subsidiary acting as
416. See OCC Response to Dingell, supra note 57, at 4 ("The so-called 'department of the
bank' limitation ... has been misunderstood. The OCC has often used the 'department of the
bank' phrase as a shorthand way to express the idea that an operating subsidiary is a convenient
and useful way to conduct activities permitted for the parent bank.").
417. Id.
418. Id.; see Rules, Policies and Procedures for Corporate Activities, 61 Fed. Reg. 60,341,
60,350-55 (1996) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 5).
419. OCC Response to Dingell, supra note 57, at 5.
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general partner in a partnership, an activity that old judicial precedent
determined to be beyond the authority of a national bank due to the
financial risks involved in general partner status.420 It is perfectly
clear, however, that the other obvious candidate for such treatment is
underwriting and dealing in securities to the extent permitted by
Glass-Steagall section 20 for bank affiliates, which, as argued ear-
lier,421 should properly include bank operating subsidiaries. The clear
distinction that Glass-Steagall makes between such activities that may
be carried on by banks (very little under sections 16 and 21) and by
affiliates of banks (somewhat more under section 20)422 is perfectly
tailored to fit into the narrow category of activities that the New Part
5 Rules would permit OCC to consider in the context of specific appli-
cations for approval submitted by national banks. In light of the fact
that such applications would present novel safety, soundness, and
other issues for OCC to consider, it is perhaps understandable that the
agency does not wish to commit itself to any particular policy or
course or even to acknowledge that securities activities may be on its
agenda at present.423
420. Id. at 4; see supra notes 204-11 and accompanying text.
421. See supra Part V.C.2.
422. See supra Part V.B.
423. OCC also no doubt wishes to avoid controversy in advance of when it is unavoidable,
both because this could have a negative impact on the prospects for meaningful financial services
reform in Congress, see supra note 51, and because, if such reform is enacted, OCC may conceiv-
ably be able to proceed as it wishes without making any unnecessary enemies.
Another reason for OCC's reluctance to address the bank-ineligible securities issue in connec-
tion with the New Part 5 Rules is suggested by SIA. See SIA Letter, supra note 103, at 10-14. A
provision of the National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 93a (1994), gives OCC certain rulemaking
power with respect to its statutory responsibilities but carves out an unusual exception for
rulemaking concerning Glass-Steagall. Section 93a provides in pertinent part:
Except to the extent that authority to issue such rules and regulations has been ex-
pressly and exclusively granted to another regulatory agency, the Comptroller of the
Currency is authorized to prescribe rules and regulations to carry out the responsibili-
ties of the office, except that the authority conferred by this section does not apply...
to securities activities of National Banks under the Act commonly known as the "Glass-
Steagall Act."
SIA Letter, supra note 103, at 10.
SIA interpreted this somewhat peculiar provision to deprive OCC of authority to adopt the
critical operating subsidiary language in Proposed Part 5 Rules section 5.34(d)(3), since in SIA's
view any use of that provision to grant operating subsidiaries bank-ineligible securities powers
would confer on national banks powers that they do not have under existing substantive law.
SIA Letter, supra note 103, at 10.
A quick look at the legislative history of section 93a, however, reveals a rather different pic-
ture of its meaning and intent. Congress was apparently concerned that it not be perceived, as a
consequence of the very act of conferring rulemaking authority on OCC, as having given that
agency authority to grant or recognize new or additional bank powers for national banks. See
126 CONG. REC. 6902 (1980) (statement of Senator Proxmire, floor manager of the bill that
included what is now section 93a). According to Senator Proxmire:
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As to the suggestion that OCC is contradicting its prior position, a
careful reading of all of prior pronouncements by OCC and certain of
its employees that have been marshaled to date by opponents of the
new operating subsidiary rules shows no conclusion by OCC that the
prior versions of the operating subsidiary provisions had exhausted
the limits of what substantive law would permit operating subsidiaries
to do. Most of the cited statements are no more than descriptive of
the regulatory landscape that OCC had, at the time of the statements,
approved. 424 In light of the enormous changes in the financial services
industry and growth in competition for banks over the last thirty years
since OCC first formalized its operating subsidiary program, it is
surely appropriate for OCC to reexamine its earlier approach and
Since the rulemaking authority [under section 93a] is only available to carry out the
responsibilities of [the Comptroller,] it carries with it no new authority to confer on
national banks powers which they do not have under existing substantive law. To give
national banks authority under this rulemaking provision which they otherwise do not
possess under existing substantive law would not be carrying out the responsibilities of
the Comptroller since only Congress can define those responsibilities so as to confer
powers on national banks.
See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 96-842, at 83 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 298, 313 (language
in section 93a makes clear that the rule-making provision carries no authority to permit "other-
wise impermissible activities of national banks with specific reference to the provisions of... the
Glass-Steagall Act").
The rulemaking limitation language contained in section 93a thus merely preserves the statu-
tory status quo concerning securities powers. Any determination by OCC that bank operating
subsidiaries may engage in bank-ineligible securities activities as bank "affiliates" under Glass-
Steagall section 20 would not involve conferring any powers on banks themselves and would
amount to no more than recognizing existing but heretofore dormant powers of operating sub-
sidiaries as "affiliates," which is not at all the same thing as conferring new powers which "they
do not have under existing substantive law."
SIA's position in this respect thus, in effect, assumes its conclusion, that is, that section 93a
prevents OCC from adopting Proposed Part 5 Rules section 5.34(d)(3) because that might, with
subsequent OCC connivance, permit operating subsidiaries to exercise bank-ineligible securities
powers, which would amount to the granting of new powers since current substantive law would
not permit operating subsidiaries to act as affiliates under Glass-Steagall section 20. I believe
that the assumption at the end of that sentence is quite clearly faulty. If so, then so is SIA's
reasoning in its section 93a point.
424. See supra notes 412-15. Moreover, many of the statements are apparently from private
correspondence that is probably not sufficiently formal or official to establish that they reflect
clear OCC policy. In Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota), 116 S. Ct. 1730 (1996), a party challeng-
ing OCC's position in litigation, on the basis, inter alia, that it was inconsistent with prior OCC
positions, pointed to a letter from the Comptroller to a presidential committee and an opinion
letter from OCC's Deputy Chief Counsel to several banks about the meaning of the statutory
provision in question. The Supreme Court did not agree that these statements could be a basis
for demonstrating inconsistency in OCC's position:
We doubt whether either of these statements was sufficient in and of itself to establish a
binding agency policy-the former, because it was too informal, and the latter because
it only purported to represent the position of the Deputy Chief Counsel in response to
an inquiry concerning particular banks.
Id. at 1734. The same could be said about many of the statements cited by the rule opponents.
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consider whether additional profitable activities may be conducted by
bank operating subsidiaries in a manner conducive to safety and
soundness. Indeed, presumably OCC would be seriously remiss in its
responsibilities if it did not reexamine its policies from time to time in
light of such developments.
Moreover, even if it were possible to read any of these statements
as demonstrating that OCC had concluded earlier that its operating
subsidiary activities regime had reached the outer limits of what the
relevant statutes permitted, that hardly forecloses reconsideration by
OCC, particularly in light of the fact that any such conclusion by OCC
was surely (if so reached) incorrect, as this Article serves to demon-
strate. As the Supreme Court recently observed in another bank case,
Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota):425
Of course the mere fact that an agency interpretation contradicts a
prior agency position is not fatal. Sudden and unexplained change
... or change that does not take account of legitimate reliance on
prior interpretation ... may be "arbitrary, capricious [or] an abuse
of discretion" ..... But if these pitfalls are avoided, change is not
invalidating, since the whole point of Chevron is to leave the discre-
tion provided by the ambiguities of a statute with the implementing
agency.426
425. 116 S. Ct. at 1734. This case involved the meaning of the term "interest" for purposes of
12 U.S.C. § 85 (1988), which permits a national bank to charge its borrowers "interest at the rate
allowed by the laws of the State ... where the bank is located." Id. at 1732. Specifically, at issue
was whether late charges were "interest" for purposes of section 85. See Marquette Nat'l Bank
v. First of Omaha Serv. Corp., 439 U.S. 299 (1978). A national bank card holder asserted that
the more protective rules of her home state with respect to late charges ought to apply to the
exclusion of the comparable rules of the bank's home state. Smiley, 116 S. Ct. at 1731. She also
asserted that OCC had significantly changed its position on the question of whether late charges
were part of "interest" for section 85 purposes. Id. at 1734.
426. 116 S. Ct. at 1734; see NationsBank of North Carolina v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co.,
115 S. Ct. 810, 817 (1995) (stating that "any change in the Comptroller's position might reduce,
but would not eliminate, the deference we owe his reasoned determinations"); Idaho v. Federal
Reserve Sys., 994 F.2d 1441, 1445 (9th Cir. 1993) (stating that "[w]here an agency takes a posi-
tion that is inconsistent with its previous views, the courts may owe less deference to the agency's
position.... Nevertheless, if the agency is able to show both that its new position is reasonable
and that a reasonable rationale existed for the change, its new position remains entitled to some
weight").
The D.C. Circuit's decision in Clark-Cowlitz Joint Operating Agency v. Federal Energy Regula-
tory Comm'n, 826 F.2d 1074 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (en banc), contains a useful and relevant discussion
of "the fundamental question as to an agency's ability to change its mind about the law and to
act upon its new interpretation." 826 F.2d at 1078. In this case, the Commission's initial inter-
pretation of a provision of the Federal Power Act was challenged and upheld in court. Id. at
1074. Some time later, the Commission reversed itself on this issue and arrived at a new inter-
pretation, which was also challenged in court, on inconsistency as well as collateral estoppel and
res judicata grounds. Id. at 1078-79. The D.C. Circuit made the entirely reasonable (to this
author, at least) observation that more than one interpretation of a statute could be "reason-
able" and thus deserving of judicial deference:
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It should be noted, moreover, that any "change" in OCC policy at
this point is purely hypothetical since OCC has (as yet) had no occa-
sion to consider any applications under the New Part 5 Rules. Pre-
sumably, however, OCC will, as it has promised, carefully consider the
issues and explain its decision. There is, furthermore, no reliance is-
sue in this context.
Thus, while the best interpretation of the New Part 5 Rules is that
they do not contradict earlier versions since the earlier versions did
not reflect OCC's views of the maximum extent of operating subsidi-
ary activity, even if the new rules are deemed to be inconsistent with
OCC's earlier positions, it is plainly open to OCC to provide, if and
when the time comes, a full explanation of and rationale for its
change. This should not be a very difficult task.
CONCLUSION
OCC's New Part 5 Rules are at once bold and limited. They are
bold in the sense that they may permit subsidiaries of banks to engage
in (for them) new and potentially profitable business activities. They
are limited since, in any event, operating subsidiaries may not stray
from what is part of or incidental to the business of banking. In light
of the enormous changes in the financial services industry in recent
decades and the challenge those changes pose to the continued suc-
cess and relevance of commercial banks, as well as the continued in-
ability of Congress to untie itself from the knots in which it becomes
caught whenever it seriously considers reforming our archaic statutory
structure, it is surely appropriate for OCC to adopt them.
It is safe to assume that OCC will proceed cautiously with applica-
tions under the new rules both because it is potentially entering new
territory and because Congress and numerous jealous nonbank par-
ticipants in the financial services industry will be watching closely.
The new rules, however, are sound as a policy matter.42 7 Congress
[The first] decision [finding that the Commission's initial interpretation]... [which] was
both consistent with the statute and otherwise reasonable does not, as a matter of law
or logic, resolve the distinct issue of whether [the Commission's] recent interpretation
is also reasonable and in accordance with the statute. It should go without saying that
an ambiguous or broadly worded statute may admit of more than one interpretation
that is reasonable and consistent with Congressional intent. ... That is to say, there may
be more than one "right" interpretation if Congress has painted with a broad (or at
least non-specific) brush so as to permit an agency flexibility in carrying out its duties.
Id. at 1079-80 (footnotes omitted; citations omitted). It is particularly appropriate for OCC to
have some flexibility in dealing with operating subsidiaries, given recent enormous changes in
the financial services industry.
427. See Statement of Shadow Regulatory Committee on Recent Fed and OCC Rulings on
Permissible Bank Activities, Dec. 9, 1996, at 3 (on file with the DePaul Law Review) ("In our
1997]
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should permit such limited agency reform to unfold. It may provide
useful lessons for future legislative reform. It will probably provide
needed additional income for banks. It is in any event a lawful exer-
cise of OCC's regulatory authority and a fine example of incremental
reform.
view, there is no meaningful difference between permitting a bank to engage in an activity
through a subsidiary and permitting the same activity to be carried on by the parent of the bank
or by an affiliate of the bank that is a subsidiary of the bank's holding company.").
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